

A Handbook of Philosophy



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**МЕТОДОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ
И МЕТОДИКА ИЗУЧЕНИЯ ФИЛОСОФИИ**

(Учебно-методическое пособие)

На английском языке

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PART I

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

1. PHILOSOPHY: ITS SUBJECT-MATTER
AND ROLE IN SOCIETY

The study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is one of the main ways of forming a scientific world-view. There is no mastering Marxism-Leninism as a whole, scientific communism, political economy or other social sciences without knowing philosophy. Dialectical and historical materialism is a component of Marxism-Leninism and constitutes its general theoretical and methodological basis.

Philosophy as a form of social consciousness. In studying this question, it is necessary to bear in mind the following circumstances:

First, the definition of the subject-matter of philosophy in general and the definition of the subject-matter of Marxist-Leninist philosophy do not entirely coincide. Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a science in the true sense of the word. Pre-Marxist schools of philosophy were scientific only to a degree, nor can present-day bourgeois philosophy be considered scientific. Beginners of philosophical studies who treat these concepts as identical often form imprecise initial notions.

Second, the definition of the subject-matter of philosophy is a difficult task. What makes it difficult is primarily the fact that the subject-matter of philosophy and its formulation have been changing in the course of history and that diverse philosophical trends differ, now as in the past, over the content of philosophical problems.

Originally, when philosophy had just arisen, or about 3,000 years ago, it embraced all the knowledge which people possessed at the time. It was not for nothing that the philosophers of antiquity were seen as omniscient sages, whence the word "philosophy" (Gk *phileo*—to love, *sophia*—wisdom), literally "love of wisdom". There were no spe-

cial sciences in those days, but they appeared gradually and separated themselves from philosophy as production and society developed and experience grew. The separation of special scientific knowledge began in the Hellenistic period (late 4th-1st centuries B. C.). Afterwards it went on unevenly: its pace was slow in the Middle Ages but quickened from the 16th century onwards and is in the main over by now. The separation of knowledge gained by the special sciences narrowed the range of problems dealt with by philosophy. At the same time there emerged a group of philosophical questions proper, such as neither belonged nor could belong in any other science and provided the basis for the existence of philosophy as a separate discipline.

Philosophy is a special *form of social consciousness* existing alongside religious, political, legal and moral views and having a social function and subject-matter of its own. It has always inquired into the questions whether the world exists of itself or depends on something supernatural; whether it is eternal or was created by God; what underlies its transformations and whether they are determined by its own need and laws, or by a spiritual principle, by consciousness. Similar questions arise in examining problems of social development: What are the principles and motive forces of society? Is its development governed by objective laws or willed by people or Providence? Ethical and aesthetic problems were a concern of philosophy and still are, to a considerable extent. Man's essence and his place in the world have always been among the central problems. Man and the world, man's attitude to and conception of the world are strictly philosophical problems. They may be described in general terms as *problems of world-view*.

The knowability of the world, the ways and means, forms and methods of cognising and influencing reality, truth and its criteria, the laws, forms and categories of logical thought are traditional philosophical questions. The second group of questions may be called *methodological problems* of cognition and activity.

All the problems listed above come down to that of the relation between being and thought, the objective and subjective, matter and consciousness. Its solution is the starting point for understanding the principles of world-view, all philosophical problems. This has made it the *fundamental question of philosophy*.

It follows that the mission of philosophy is to answer the

most general questions about being and cognition, about the relation between them. Philosophical knowledge is therefore characterised by a high degree of generalisation. Philosophical concepts and judgments are universal and bear on every sphere and every aspect of reality. Universality is the first distinguishing feature of philosophical knowledge, and special inquiry into the general interrelation of being and consciousness is its second characteristic.

However, people's world-view is not restricted to philosophical concepts; it covers a wide range of convictions and notions and includes their knowledge of the world and themselves. As for philosophy it concerns itself specially with problems of world-view and evolves general theoretical principles of their study.

It deals with questions of both what the world is like and how to cognise and influence it. Accordingly, every reasonably elaborated philosophical system has two aspects: theory and method. Theory discloses the essence and understanding of reality while method contains conclusions and rules on ways and means of cognising and influencing reality. The two aspects of philosophy are inseparable; method is based on theory, and the development of theory depends on method.

The formation of philosophy hinges on and is determined by social life. Changes in production and in social relations, progress in science and culture, the level of maturity and the characteristics of society find a generalised reflection in this or that set of philosophical views. However, the content of these views (which may and do differ in one and the same society) is directly determined by the class allegiance of the given school or trend.

Philosophy plays an active role in the life of society and can influence it to a considerable extent. But the character and trend of its influence depend on the class whose interests it serves. The philosophy of reactionary classes generally plays a negative role and that of progressive classes, a positive one.

The fundamental question of philosophy. Materialism and idealism as its main trends. All philosophical problems are linked in one way or another with the question of the relation between matter and consciousness. Their solution depends on how the fundamental question of philosophy is solved.

The fundamental question of philosophy was presented,

formulated and answered in scientific terms for the first time in the history of philosophical thought by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Engels dealt with it specially in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. (See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 335-376.) This made it possible to specify the nature of philosophical knowledge and find a common basis for classifying and describing philosophical trends.

The fundamental question of philosophy has two aspects. One of them consists in establishing what is primary or determining, whether the material or the ideal, and what is secondary, or determined. The other aspect, too, examines the relation between matter and consciousness, except that it does so from the standpoint of how human consciousness is related to reality and whether it can cognise it, or, in other words, whether the world is knowable.

All philosophical doctrines necessarily answer the fundamental question, wittingly or unwittingly. And depending on which is recognised to be primary, whether matter or consciousness, they divide into two main trends: materialism and idealism. The materialists regard matter and being as primary and consciousness as derived. For the idealists, it is the idea, the spirit, consciousness, that is primary. In philosophy there only exist these two opposed and irreconcilable trends; there are no other trends either "between" or "above" them, for the fundamental question of philosophy has only two variant solutions—materialist and idealist—although the history of philosophy has recorded dualistic views. The dualists affirmed that there existed in the world two equivalent and mutually independent principles: the spiritual and the material. This doctrine was advanced by, for instance, the 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes. But it did not change the essence of the problem, for dualism failed to overcome the difference between the two main philosophical trends. In fact, it arrived at idealism for its part, since recognition of the independent existence of the ideal is idealism. The ideal possesses being but it does so as a product and property of the material, not as an independent essence.

The other aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy is likewise treated in two ways. Some philosophers (all materialists and certain objective idealists) recognise the possibility of cognising the world while others deny it. Those

who insist that the world is fundamentally unknowable are called agnostics, and their school of thought is known as agnosticism (Gk *agnostos*—unknown).

The causes, roots and sources of the existence of materialism and idealism divide into social-class and epistemological (theoretico-cognitive) ones. They are examined in Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Chs. II and IV) and in Lenin's "On the Question of Dialectics", *Karl Marx* (section on "Philosophical Materialism") and *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Ch. V, 8).

The sharp struggle going on between the main philosophical trends is due to something more than the difference in their answer to the fundamental question of philosophy. A number of bourgeois philosophical schools and various revisionists deny the division of philosophy into materialism and idealism, dismissing the fundamental question of philosophy as a "pseudo-problem". In this manner they would like to disguise the partisanship of bourgeois philosophy and to spread it among working people on the false claim that it is "neutral".

Dialectics and metaphysics as the main philosophical methods of cognition. The *problem of method* is a pivotal one in philosophy. Method is the set of rules, devices and modes used for investigation and for advancing to the truth. The achievements of all sciences depend directly on the method used by them. The search for a fruitful method has always been a most important task of every science. Philosophy has been studying and evaluating the methods of the special sciences and working out its own, philosophical method, which, unlike the methods of the special sciences—methods intended for limited areas of investigation—is universal and can be applied in any sphere of knowledge.

Two basic universal methods, dialectics and metaphysics, have shaped up in the history of philosophy. Dialectics is a truly fruitful method only in unity with materialism. Dialectical materialism is the highest form of dialectics, a real science of the most general laws of development of nature, society and knowledge. (See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 161-162.) Metaphysics examines phenomena in their immutability and mutual independence and denies inherent contradictions as the source of their development.

Dialectics and metaphysics are antitheses and have always

combated each other; this struggle is continuing. Students of philosophy should form a clear idea of the essence and class significance of these methods. (See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring* ("Introduction. I. General"), *Dialectics of Nature* ("Old Preface to [Anti-] Dühring. On Dialectics"), *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Chs. I and III); V. I. Lenin, *Karl Marx* ("Dialectics"), *Philosophical Notebooks* (fragment "On the Question of Dialectics").)

The subject-matter of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Marxism has disclosed the specific features of philosophy and accurately defined the significance and place of dialectical materialism among other sciences. The founders of Marxism showed that dialectical materialism neither dissolves in the sciences (as positivism and neo-positivism would have it) nor divorces itself from them (formerly the natural philosophers looked on philosophy as the "queen of sciences"). Being one of the sciences, it has its strictly circumscribed subject-matter. Whereas the concrete sciences investigate the laws of this or that sphere or aspect of reality, the laws of dialectical materialism, being universal, are valid for every sphere or aspect of reality. Dialectical materialism studies the most general laws of being and consciousness, of their interrelation and development. The special sciences analyse diverse aspects of being, of objective reality. A number of sciences study consciousness, but investigation of the general fundamental relation of being to consciousness is a distinguishing feature of philosophical theory. Dialectical materialism is the science of the most general laws of development of nature, society and knowledge, which it studies on the basis of its own solution of the fundamental question of philosophy.

It would be wrong to regard the separation of the special sciences from philosophy as absolute; it is relative and hence does not imply a complete rupture between them. In every one of the special sciences, the philosophical principles of its theoretical constructions continue playing an important part. In the special sciences there constantly crop up complicated methodological problems whose solution conditions their progress. Cognising the general laws of development, dialectical materialism evolves a scientific world-view and a universal methodology of cognising and transforming reality, and equips scientists, practical workers, all working people, with them. Conversely, present-day scientific

philosophy cannot do without the conclusions and concepts of the special sciences, without studying their methods. Neither science nor philosophy can develop successfully without close interaction. (See Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* ("Old Preface to [Anti-]Dühring. On Dialectics"); V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Ch. V), "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "On the Significance of Militant Materialism".)

To grasp the subject-matter of philosophy, it is necessary to carefully study Engels' and Lenin's propositions on it. Very important for understanding the essence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is Lenin's idea that in it dialectics as the teaching on the universal laws of the development of reality coincides with the theory of knowledge and dialectical logic. This sets it far apart from earlier philosophical teachings in which ontology (the science of being), epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and logic (the doctrine of correct thinking) were independent of and isolated from one another. The basis for the coincidence of the aspects of dialectical materialism we have listed is the material unity of the world, the unity of being and consciousness, that is, the fact that operating in the objective world, in knowledge and thought are identical universal laws, which manifest themselves distinctively in these essentially different spheres.

At the same time, Marxist-Leninist philosophy connotes something more than a theoretico-cognitive approach to the object. Being a science, it is concerned with a search for real solutions to the problems of nature and social life. As a form of social consciousness, it expresses its attitude to the world, to social phenomena, assessing them from the standpoint of the working classes and moulding convictions about principles of action, social utility, justice and good.

Dialectical materialism, which is a theoretical system, has its structure and composition. Its components are principles, laws, categories and methodological conclusions. Its principles, or basic initial propositions, include the principle of the unity of the world, the principle of development, the principle of universal connection and the principle of determinism. Its laws include the law of the priority of being over consciousness, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, the law of causality, etc. Its categories, or basic philosophical concepts, include matter, consciousness, contradiction, necessity, quantity, negation, etc. Methodological conclusions

from principles, laws and categories are part of the method of cognition. The structure of the system expresses a definite interrelation and interconnection of the components.

Marxist philosophy, studying the world as a whole, also inquires into social life and evolves a materialist conception of the latter, historical materialism, which is inseparable from Marxist-Leninist philosophy as an integral whole. Historical materialism is related to dialectical materialism in the same way as the specific is related to the general. Historical materialism is impossible without dialectical materialism, and vice versa.

The significance of philosophy in the life of society. Marxist-Leninist philosophy, like any other, is a class, partisan philosophy expressing and defending the interests of the working class and other working people; it belongs to the materialist trend and steadfastly develops it, applying it when concrete problems come up for solution and combating idealism. Marxist philosophy is a true science. Its partisanship coincides with an objective, scientific approach to the phenomena of nature, society and knowledge. This means that the partisanship of Marxism is different in principle from that of bourgeois ideology, which serves the interests of the exploiting classes and is contrary to the interests of all working people and to the course of history. To conceal this, bourgeois ideologues deny the partisanship of philosophy in general, saying that a partisan philosophy cannot be true and hence scientific.

On this question, we recommend reading Engels's work "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" and Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Ch. VI, 4 (see also V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, pp. 78-80; Vol. 20, 1977, p. 456).

Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a creative science renewing itself continuously as it develops in step with life, with the practice of revolutionary struggle, with socialist and communist construction, on the basis of revolutionary dialectics.

The dynamism and complexity of social processes, the high rate and specifics of the development of contemporary scientific knowledge, and an intensifying ideological struggle make for the growing significance of scientific philosophy in the life of society.

Dialectical and historical materialism, which is part of Marxism-Leninism, substantiates the fundamental principles of the world-view of the working class and its political par-

ties. It is the theoretical and methodological basis of policy, strategy and tactics in the scientific leadership of society and the management of social processes, and serves as a means of forming the scientific world-view of all working people.

2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM IN PRE-MARXIST PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy has its history. A study of it, if only a brief one, is necessary primarily because the very history of philosophy is an illustration of the operation of the basic laws and principles brought out by Marxist philosophy.

Besides, it makes possible a more active and successful struggle against contemporary bourgeois ideology and revisionism, since their exponents generally proceed from concepts already advanced in philosophy before them, and use methodological approaches and devices criticised earlier. The Marxist history of philosophy serves to this day as an important ideological weapon in the struggle against bourgeois philosophy and revisionism.

The philosophy of slave-owning society. Philosophy as a set of views on the world that has separated itself from other parts of social consciousness, as a science which poses and answers its own questions, and as historically the earliest form of theoretical knowledge arose in the period of formation of antagonistic class society. An important prerequisite for its rise was the separation of mental activity as a special social function appropriated by members of the ruling class.

Historically, materialism was the earliest form of philosophy. The materialists of antiquity tried to trace all the phenomena and processes observed by man to nature itself. This is true above all of the *Milesian* school of ancient Greek philosophy (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes) and of teachings bordering upon it.

The philosophers strove to ascertain where the objects, things and phenomena around man came from, what they were composed of and what became of them in the process of change and destruction. In other words, they searched for a common natural basis of matter determining the unity of the multiform world of things. For Thales it was water, for Heraclitus, fire and for Anaximenes, air. What was taken

as the capital element was immaterial. The important thing was to indicate the concrete and sufficiently widespread form of existence of natural bodies which could give way (in reality or in the philosopher's imagination) to any other form.

In this manner four natural elements, four matters, four essences, were singled out: fire, air, water and earth, which the ancient materialists' philosophical systems presented as basic to the entire infinite diversity of concrete things.

The other problem tackled by the ancient philosophers may be put as follows: What is it that forms all things from initial matters? The answer to this question produced the notion of an intrinsic law operating in the world and dominating the rise, existence and destruction of things. There appeared the concept of Logos (Gk *logos*—speech, word, reason) typical of ancient Greek philosophy, and similar concepts in other philosophical systems, such as Tao "way" in ancient Chinese philosophy. Attempts were also made to formulate more concrete notions of the law of the origin of things. The philosophers singled out opposed forces, properties and trends which in their opinion generated individual objects. Those were either properties of nature (the warm and the cold) or moral categories extended to it (love and enmity).

The study of the ancient materialists' philosophy requires a clear notion of the foundations on which they built their systems: matter and the universal laws of nature. For Democritus (460-370 B.C.), primordial matter was already an essence grasped by the mind and not by the senses. To a degree, Democritus opposed the world of things perceived by the senses to their invisible but true essence: atoms, or minute particles of matter. He endeavoured to develop a system in which indivisible elements operating by universal laws could form different things. Democritus held that changeless, indivisible, impenetrable and eternal particles of primordial matter possessed an infinite variety of forms and that their number, too, was infinite. Hence his notion of the infinite multitude of worlds.

Democritus developed a system of views based on the atomistic theory. Specifically, he conceived the theory of knowledge whose centrepiece was the idea of the emission of eidolons, or very fine material images of bodies. These images, reaching the soul (likewise made up of atoms) through the sense organs, came into contact with it, and in this way sensuous cognition took place, with the similar being cognised

by the similar. However, this was only a first stage of cognition at which the latter did not penetrate into the essence. It was only thought, Democritus pointed out, that made it possible to understand the world as consisting of atoms and a vacuum, as a single whole in which the universal law of causality operated, and to comprehend knowledge as resulting from the interaction of the soul and eidolons.

What is the invariable basis of changing things? The answer offered by Plato (427-347 B.C.), an objective idealist, differed in principle from that given by Democritus and other materialists. He recorded the existence in society of ideas whose existence had no direct relation to the existence of this or that individual man. Plato did not probe into the origin of ideas or the laws of functioning of social consciousness. He took these ideas as a fact and used it for developing a special philosophical theory, postulating the independent existence of the world of ideas prior to that of the world of things and independent of the latter. What is more, he considered things, natural objects and people themselves to be derived from the world of ideas. Accordingly, he concentrated on building a world of ideas, establishing a hierarchy of ideas, and so on. In his philosophy an absolutely immutable, absolutely perfect, eternal world of ideas became the determining factor for the existence of a world of transient, imperfect, mutable things.

Plato also developed his theory of knowledge according to his general philosophical position as an objective idealist. Its basic concept is that of reminiscence. Plato held that the souls of individuals were purely ideal formations related to the world of ideas. And cognition was primarily a reminiscence of the soul limited by the shell of the mortal body, a reminiscence of what it saw in the world of ideas when it wandered into it for a while, of the pure essences of things of which it could be reminded by material objects, or imperfect replicas of these ideas.

In Plato's philosophy Greek idealism took for the first time ever the form of a world-view, opposing itself to materialism. Materialism and idealism have since been the two main contending trends in the development of philosophy. The struggle between two lines, two camps, two fundamentally different approaches to the question of the essence of the world, of man and cognition, has invariably been the pivot of the philosophical development of mankind although the forms of this struggle, its intensity, the philosophical prob-

lems brought to the fore, have been changing in the course of history.

The answer to the fundamental question of philosophy is not the only criterion of philosophical teachings. There also exist other important criteria.

Two methods have taken shape in philosophy: dialectical and metaphysical. The dialectical method was dominant in ancient philosophy. The Greek philosopher *Heraclitus* (544-483 B. C.) was one of the early exponents of dialectics. He linked motion, change, rise and destruction to the struggle between opposed principles. His philosophy must be given credit for this.

Parmenides adhered to an entirely different position. He maintained that being grasped by the mind was invariable, immobile and integral.

Zeno of Elea, upholding Parmenides' theses, formulated a number of aporias (Gk *aporia*—difficulty, perplexity), or propositions, which ran counter to sense experience but which he tried to substantiate theoretically, such as the thesis "The flying arrow is at rest".

Zeno's aporias reflected contradictions which philosophy and some other sciences, primarily mathematics, faced afterwards. Wittingly or unwittingly, Zeno posed the problem of reflecting and expressing contradictory reality in thought.

Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) was a great philosopher of antiquity. His significance to Greek philosophy itself and the subsequent development of philosophy in Europe and the Middle East was enormous.

Aristotle generalised and systematised the achievements of the natural and social sciences as well as the philosophies of his day. An encyclopaedist of antiquity, he subjected idealism, primarily Plato's, to in-depth criticism. And while Aristotle did not always deal with problems from a materialist standpoint—far from it—his posing of new philosophical questions, his versatile approach and the profundity of his analysis distinguish him from other philosophers of antiquity.

Ancient philosophy was the first historical phase in the development of philosophy. In that period, philosophy emerged as a special form of social consciousness; the main philosophical trends—materialism and idealism—took shape, and dialectics made progress. Originally materialism was spontaneous, and this was in keeping with the level of development reached by the social practice and science of the time.

In examining the main periods in the development of philosophy, Engels noted that the multiple forms of Greek philosophy already contained in embryo nearly all the subsequent types of world-view. He offered in *Anti-Dühring* a general description of this stage and later stages in the development of philosophy. (See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 25-26.)

The philosophy of feudal society. It was a period when the spiritual life of society was dominated by religious ideology. Religion had become the leading form of social consciousness, a form which had brought all other forms, including philosophy, under its sway. The formula "Philosophy is the handmaiden of theology" reflected both a wish expressed by theologians and the real state of affairs.

Scholasticism, a system of religious philosophy which drew largely on falsified philosophical systems of antiquity, especially Aristotle's teaching, won the greatest influence in the Middle Ages. The philosophers of the period saw their chief task in substantiating and interpreting religious dogma, primarily the thesis of the existence of God. Materialism was harassed and forced out of the universities. Within the framework of scholasticism, it found expression in nominalism (*l nomen*—name), which limited the intervention of God in nature and recognised the primacy of the object over the concept.

Dogmatism was a common mode of thinking in the Middle Ages. Discussion was pseudo-scientific and never went beyond the basic canons of religious ideology. The epoch of the Renaissance and the modern times were faced with the task of defeating scholasticism, substantiating materialism and investigating nature from the standpoint of science.

Philosophy in the 17th and 18th centuries. The new stage in social life, the rise, development and consolidation of the capitalist mode of production which succeeded feudalism, and the resultant changes throughout the system of social relations demanded that the philosophers should cast off the tyranny of theology and vindicate philosophy as an autonomous branch of knowledge. It was necessary to take account of the achievements of natural science and at the same time to foster its progress. In these circumstances the problem of the method and means of cognition, the question of the role of experience, the senses and reason in cognition, gained vast importance.

What developed and became prevalent in the philosophy

of the 17th and 18th centuries was the metaphysical approach to reality. It assumed that the objects of nature and society as well as the concepts reflecting them were given once and for all, were virtually immutable and should be investigated alongside and independently of one another. That period of development of philosophy was also characterised by mechanicism due to the leading position of mechanics among the natural sciences of the time. The struggle between materialism and idealism gained fresh intensity in the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries. And whereas at the beginning of the period materialism often assumed guises concealing its essence, such as deism (L *deus*—God),¹ at the close of the period it openly and emphatically rejected both idealism and religion. This was done by 18th-century French materialism.

The materialism of modern times was founded by the English philosopher *Francis Bacon* (1561-1626). His writings may be regarded as the divide between the metaphysical materialism of modern times and medieval philosophy. Bacon saw the chief task of his philosophy in substantiating a new, experimental science which, he was absolutely certain, would give humanity great strength before long and enable it to create a new, prosperous society. He depicted this society in *New Atlantis*, a utopian novel.

Bacon considered the question of a method bringing out the real causes of phenomena to be central to evolving the new science. He opposed dogmatism, scholasticism and narrow-minded empiricism, which reduces science to an aggregate of facts singled out at random. According to Bacon, these delusions were alien to real science, which should be based on processing the evidence of experimental knowledge and scientifically organised observations. In contrast to scholasticism, he devised and publicised the inductive method, seeing it as the chief method of science.

Marx called Bacon the father of English materialism and the whole of contemporary experimental science.

Baconian materialism was systematised by the English philosopher *Thomas Hobbes* (1588-1679), whose materialism was more consistent than Bacon's but then also more mechanistic. Hobbes was a typical exponent of 18th-century metaphysical materialism which reduced the multiformity of

¹ In view of the dominance of a feudal religious world-view, deism was often a latent form of materialism.

nature to the mechanical movement of material bodies and proclaimed geometry the chief science.

René Descartes (1596-1650), the French thinker, was perhaps the most prominent European philosopher of the first half of the 17th century. He did much for the advancement of philosophy, physics, mathematics and physiology. Descartes was a classical exponent of dualism and rationalism and a staunch, uncompromising opponent of scholasticism, the dominant trend of the time. He rejected the church-imposed dogmatism of the Scriptures, the writings of the church fathers and the authority of an Aristotle distorted by scholastics, and advocated experiment and reflection as the road to cognising nature.

The rejection of authorities and dogmas within the framework of Cartesian philosophy translated into the principle of doubt. If I want to build a new scientific system, to evolve a new philosophy, Descartes argued, I must renounce all that I have been offered as ready-made and immutable truths. I doubt dogmas, the infallibility of church and philosophical authorities. I am prepared to doubt everything, even the existence of the world, the existence of my own body. But is there a limit to my doubt? Yes, there is. For what is doubt? It is thought. Consequently, in doubting everything, I cannot doubt that I doubt. This is the only indubitable circumstance that is the limit of my doubt and the starting point for my philosophy. I think, therefore I exist (*cogito, ergo sum*). But how do I exist? From all the foregoing I can infer that I exist only as a thinking substance. Thus Descartes deduced the existence of thought and of a spiritual thinking substance. But what about the real, material world whose reality Descartes never doubted? The philosopher proposed recognising the existence of both a thinking substance and a material substance. As for the fact that it did exist, God could testify to it—surely God would not deceive people. The argument, though naive, was convincing enough for Descartes's contemporaries.

The special role which thought plays in the Cartesian philosophical system is the obvious reason for his rationalism, his recognition of innate ideas and his high opinion of intellectual intuition. And his dualism (*L duo*—two)¹ proved quite helpful in that subsequently materialists and idealists alike relied on this or that part of his philosophy.

¹ Philosophical trend which sees the beginning of being in two different principles, two substances: material and ideal.

In contrast to Descartes's dualism, *Benedict Spinoza* (1632-1677), outstanding Dutch philosopher of the 17th century, evolved a consistently monistic philosophical concept. His chief philosophical work is *Ethica*. And his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, a critical analysis of the Bible, played a notable role in the ideological struggle of the time.

Spinoza's monistic philosophical system rests on the concept of substance. This is the central, fundamental concept of his philosophy. Speaking of substance, Spinoza introduced the principle of *causa sui*, or the causal self-conditionality of substance. This principle was directed against religious ideology, which posited the creation of the world by God. The cause of the world lay in the world itself, not in God, Spinoza pointed out. By identifying God with substance, he dissolved God in nature, as it were, subordinating him to universal causal conditionality. The philosopher opposed the principle of causality to the religious philosophical principle of purposefulness.

Spinoza assumed that substance appeared before man in the form of its two attributes: an extended thing and a thinking thing. Thus thought turned out to be a universal property of nature. The order and connection of ideas were the same as those of things. Spinoza followed Descartes in developing the concept of rationalism. He placed mathematics, especially geometry, whose method (from axioms through theorems to consequences) he considered a scientific philosophical one, high in the system of scientific knowledge. His *Ethica* is written in this "geometrical" style.

The vindication of the rights of experimental cognition in the science and philosophy of modern times led to widespread discussion on problems of the theory of knowledge, above all the problem of interpreting experience. The progress of philosophical thought in this direction was strongly influenced by the English philosopher *John Locke* (1633-1704). His chief philosophical work is *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

Locke took exception to Descartes's positing of the existence of innate ideas. His main thesis was that all knowledge was based on experience. He accepted two kinds of experience: external, with sensations caused by the external world serving as a source of knowledge, and internal, or reflective, with observations of the activity of the soul performing the same function. This implied that the soul owed its very capacity for activity to nature. All the ideas making up

the content of knowledge sprang from these two sources. Locke created a pattern tracing the origin of complex ideas of various kinds to simple ones, and offered a detailed classification of ideas and kinds of cognition. In the theory of knowledge, he proceeded on the whole as a sensualist materialist (*L sensus*—feeling, sensation).¹ However, his recognition of internal experience as a special and independent source of knowledge detracted greatly from his materialist position.

The metaphysical limitations of Locke's philosophy also came out in his singling out a small group of properties of material bodies in the form of the basis of adequate ideas. We mean the so-called primary properties. Locke classed extension, figure, motion and rest among them. As for all other simple properties of objects, such as colour, light, taste or smell, which are cognised through the sense organs, Locke classed them as secondary properties. He defined the corresponding simple ideas as inadequate, asserting that in the bodies themselves there was nothing similar to these ideas. His approach to properties was due to his metaphysical absolutising of individual properties of objects and mechanical motion. At the same time, it undermined the foundations of materialist sensualism by questioning the ability of sensations to adequately reflect the external world.

The Irish philosopher *George Berkeley* (1685-1753) was an exponent of the subjective idealism of the early 18th century. He openly declared his philosophy to be aimed chiefly at refuting materialism and defending idealism and religion.

Locke's philosophy served Berkeley as the point of departure. But Locke was a materialist, and so Berkeley carried out a number of operations to reconstruct sensualism on idealist lines. For instance, he transformed Locke's thesis "all knowledge comes from sense experience" into the thesis "nothing exists outside sense experience", and interpreted Locke's postulate "many qualities are secondary" as "all qualities are secondary", that is, are determined by the subject. It followed that things were merely certain aggregates of sensations and that to exist meant being perceived.

The logic of subjective idealism led it to solipsism² (*L solus*—alone, *ipse*—self), that is, to recognising the existence of only one subject to whose feelings the rest of the world,

¹ Adherent of the doctrine recognising sensation as the only source of knowledge.

² Philosophical trend doubting the possibility of authentic knowledge.

including all other people, owed its existence. But Berkeley invoked God as the common source of identical sensations existing in the consciousness of different people. It was God and not matter that was the real source of sensations, he contended. This meant that he had departed from consistent subjective idealism and arrived at objective idealism. Subsequently many idealists and philosophical revisionists drew on his doctrine. Lenin examined Berkeley's views in detail and criticised them in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* ("In Lieu of an Introduction").

The Scottish philosopher *David Hume* (1711-1776) dealt in his writings with the philosophical problem of the role of the senses and reason in apprehending the world. He accepted Locke's theses that all knowledge came from experience and that primary impressions subdivided into sensuous and reflectory ones. However, Hume's interpretation of sense impressions differs essentially from both Locke's and Berkeley's. In his theory of knowledge, Hume substantiated scepticism (Gk *skepsis*—examination).¹ He rejected the concept of substance (whether material, as in Locke, or ideal, as in Berkeley), declaring that one could say nothing about the causes of perceptions but must accept them as a primary, initial fact. Perceptions did not connect us with the outside world but separated us from it, so that we could say nothing about the external world because it was beyond our knowledge. Thus Hume's scepticism differs essentially from the Cartesian principle of doubt. In Hume's philosophy scepticism leads to agnosticism (Gk α —not, *gnosis*—knowledge).² Within the framework of agnosticism Hume criticised both materialism and religious philosophical concepts. He made consciousness the subject-matter of philosophy. The task of investigating the internal mechanisms of psychic activity turned out to be the chief task of science. Hume reduced philosophy to psychology and described all sciences as products of psychological activity and mere ramifications of psychology. The principle of causality only operated in the sphere of consciousness, determining the psychic mechanisms of forming notions, desires, passions, and so on. As for placing causality beyond the boundaries of consciousness, Hume considered it an unlawful operation; he denied the objective character of causality. Authentic knowledge was

¹ Philosophical trend doubting the possibility of an authentic knowledge of objective truth.

² Idealist doctrine affirming that the world is unknowable.

only possible in the case of mathematical objects, since these were pure products of reason.

On the basis of such philosophical premisses Hume evolved the typically bourgeois concept of utilitarianism (*L'utilitas*—utility, benefit)¹ in ethics, advancing the principle of utility as the basis for ethics.

Idealism and agnosticism were criticised in the writings of materialist philosophers, above all by 18th-century French materialists.

18th-century French materialism was a broad ideological current. It gave expression to the views of the revolutionary-minded French bourgeoisie, which was ready to take feudalism by assault. The French bourgeoisie of the time tried to represent its class interests as those of the whole nation and indeed, humanity, and rallied all anti-feudal forces to its banner under the slogan "Liberty, equality, fraternity". Accordingly, ideologues of the French bourgeoisie, too, came out as radical critics of existing social relations and the prevailing ideology. The most prominent spokesmen of French materialism were *La Mettrie* (1709-1751), *Diderot* (1713-1784), *Helvetius* (1715-1771) and *Holbach* (1723-1789).

As far as interpreting nature is concerned, they were materialists showing greater consistency than their 17th-century counterparts. They no longer needed compromise forms, such as deism or pantheism (Gk *pan*—all, *theos*—god),² and openly defended materialism, advocating atheism, scathingly deriding the church and the religious hypocrisy of the nobility and clergy. They adhered to sensualism, defending its materialist interpretation and emphatically criticising subjective idealism and solipsism ("mad piano", to use Diderot's phrase).

In investigating nature and man, the French materialists took up a mechanistic attitude by reducing everything to the displacement of immutable atoms in space and trying to explain man himself by analogy with clockwork or some other mechanism (*La Mettrie's L'Homme-machine*). They consistently upheld the principle of mechanical causality, denied chance and represented all processes as necessary. The problem of man and his environment held a big place in their teachings. "Man is a product of external conditions", ac-

¹ Doctrine putting personal benefit at the basis of morality.

² Doctrine rejecting the supernatural principle.

according to their fundamental thesis. As they considered all men equal by birth, it was easy to infer the need to change social conditions, end feudal relations and bring about a new kingdom, the kingdom of freedom and reason, through education.

French materialists active in the educational sphere did much to spread the atheistic and scientific views of their day. We owe it to their efforts (particularly to Diderot's) that the famous *Encyclopédie* as well as a number of books exposing religion (*Le Christianisme dévoilé* and *Théologie portative* by Holbach) were brought out.

Although the French materialists abided by metaphysics and took an idealist view of history like all other pre-Marxian philosophers, they made a considerable contribution to the vindication and development of materialism in France and elsewhere. Their views had a notable effect on the development of socio-political thought in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Classical German philosophy. The political revolution in 19th-century Germany, just as in 18th-century France, was preceded by a philosophical revolution, Engels pointed out.

Credit is due to classical German philosophy primarily for carrying forward dialectics, if on an idealist basis. Besides, classical German philosophy culminated in Feuerbach, a philosopher who rejected Hegel's idealist and metaphysical system and proclaimed the triumph of materialism.

Classical German philosophy as the highest achievement of philosophical thought in the late 18th and early 19th centuries was a theoretical source of Marxism, and this lent it lasting historic value.

It was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who ushered in classical German philosophy. In the early years of his activity, he generally came out as a materialist. Engels had a high opinion of Kant's scientific contribution of the time. However, acquaintance with Hume's writings affected Kant's views. Kant decided to make a critical appraisal of the potentialities of human knowledge and to revise the whole of philosophy on this basis. The result was *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*), *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft* (*Critique of Practical Reason*) and *Kritik der Urteilkraft* (*Critique of Judgment*), that period of his activity coming to be called critical. Kant's critical phi-

losophy resulted in agnosticism. He met with the following contradiction: in experiment man has to do with isolated phenomena but in mathematics and theoretical natural science there occur general and necessary judgments. Since they could not be deduced from experience, Kant argued, they were inherent in consciousness from the outset, a priori, that is, before experience. Kant broke down consciousness into feelings, common sense and reason. For the first sphere, it was space and time that were the a priori regulating forms and for the second, a set of a priori categories. As for the third sphere, in it reason, which discussed philosophical problems and tried to ascertain the essence of the world, the soul and God, was faced with insolvable contradictions, "antinomies of pure reason", indicating that the essence of the world was unknowable. Kant described the unknowable essence of individual things, an essence from which people were shut off by phenomena, and the unknowable essence of the world in its entirety, the soul and God, as a "thing-in-itself".

Lenin, defining Kantian philosophy, pointed to duality as its main aspect. Where Kant recognised the objective existence of the world he was a materialist, and where he accepted a priori forms of consciousness and postulated the existence of a "thing-in-itself" he was an idealist and agnostic.

This duality accounted for the dissimilar attitudes of materialism and idealism to Kantian philosophy.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was an outstanding exponent of classical German philosophy. His philosophy was of historic importance, first of all, because it was the crown of the development of the idealist trend in classical German philosophy. Hegel created a philosophical system comparable to an encyclopaedia. His philosophy inquires, if within limits, into the development of the spirit, society and nature; he concerned himself with the history of philosophy and with the philosophy of law, morality, religion and art. Second, the significance of Hegelian philosophy lies in the fact that its founder, setting out to develop dialectics as the only method adequate to the subject-matter, achieved appreciable results. Third and most important, a new trend emerged in philosophy with the disintegration of Hegelianism, a trend which criticised it while preserving all the positive that it contained. This new trend, dialectical materialism, was founded by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

Hegel's philosophy constituted one of the theoretical sources of Marxism.

Hegel was a consistent objective idealist. His philosophy represents all development as self-development of the idea and sees all forms of being as forms of self-alienation and self-manifestation of this idea.

Hegel built his system on the principle of triad, that is, an indispensable three-stage cycle of development of the idea.

In describing the process of self-development of the idea, Hegel represented it as a process of rise and solution of intrinsic contradictions. He considered that philosophy, the highest level of thinking, was an adequate form of reflection of the process of self-development of the idea and that as such it could be nothing but dialectical logic. Hence the title of his chief work, *Wissenschaft der Logik* (*Science of Logic*).

Hegel saw philosophy as a system of dialectical laws and categories expressing the process of self-development of the idea, not of matter. Marx described his own dialectical method as the opposite of Hegel's.

Hegelian philosophy is inherently contradictory. It has a progressive, revolutionary aspect in the form of dialectics and a conservative, reactionary aspect in the form of a metaphysical system and reactionary socio-political views.

With the disintegration of the Hegelian school and the reappraisal of Hegel's philosophical legacy, there emerged a number of new philosophical schools, including both idealist and materialist ones.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) represented the closing stage of classical German philosophy. He criticised idealism and reinstated materialism in German philosophy. Also, he criticised religion and initiated a systematic critical elaboration of the theory and history of Christianity and 19th-century German philosophy. Most important of all, Feuerbach's philosophy is one of the theoretical sources of Marxist philosophy.

Feuerbach placed man as a biological being and generic concept at the centre of his philosophical system. This abstraction became the philosophical determinant of a special variety of metaphysical materialism evolved by Feuerbach and known as anthropological materialism (Gk *anthropos*—man, *logos*—doctrine). The latter had an appreciable impact on the philosophy of the Russian revolutionary democrats. Feuerbach was a materialist in interpreting nature and

an idealist in interpreting society, religion and man. His views are analysed in detail in Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, which describes the whole of pre-Marxian materialism, including that of Feuerbach. Pre-Marxian materialism was mechanistic, which was due primarily to the state of the natural science of the time. It was a metaphysical, non-dialectical materialism, a materialism only in explaining nature.

The pre-Marxian materialists failed to extend the materialist conception of the world to society. These shortcomings of materialism were analysed and overcome by dialectical materialism.

The philosophy of the revolutionary democrats. The 1840s in Russia saw the emergence of a new form of pre-Marxian materialism, the philosophy of the revolutionary democrats, with *Alexander Herzen* (1812-1870), *Vissarion Belinsky* (1811-1848) and *Nikolai Chernyshevsky* (1828-1889) as its main exponents. And while this form of materialism originated and developed first in Russia, its significance is international.

The revolutionary democrats' philosophy arose at a time of growing social crisis and class struggle, when the country still lacked a proletariat. The revolutionary democrats expressed the interests of the exploited, primarily the peasantry. The strong point of their world-view was its revolutionary character, its aspiration to free the working people through a peasant revolution. But its weak point was that its exponents adhered to utopian socialism. They believed the peasant commune to be the form of social organisation that would lead to socialism provided tsarism and landlord property were eliminated.

In evolving their philosophy, the revolutionary democrats drew on the achievements of their predecessors, on the materialist concepts of Mikhail Lomonosov, Alexander Radishchev and Ludwig Feuerbach. Their chief contribution was the fact that they carried forward materialism and strove to enrich it with dialectics.

Lenin noted that Herzen had come close to dialectical materialism and stopped short of historical materialism. The revolutionary democrats were consistent materialists and dialecticians in examining nature. They made substantial headway towards comprehending practice and rose to dialectical materialism in dealing with individual problems. Thus, Chernyshevsky consistently criticised Kant for agnos-

ticism and subjectivism, a fact pointed out by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Speaking generally, however, the revolutionary democrats stuck, to an idealist conception of history in analysing society, and exaggerated the significance of ideas, education and culture like the 18th-century French philosophers. On the other hand, they explained individual social phenomena in materialist terms.

The revolutionary democrats stressed that many historical movements were motivated by material interests. Unlike other pre-Marxian materialists who considered the activity of outstanding individuals to be the chief factor in history, they emphasised the great constructive role of the masses. The revolutionary democrats were militant atheists whose writings were inspired by the class struggle. They were real continuers of the materialist tradition in philosophy and forerunners of the Social-Democrats.

3. THE RISE OF MARXISM— A REVOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY. THE LENINIST STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY

The rise of dialectical and historical materialism marked a revolution in philosophy. There emerged an integral scientific world-view, the basis for Marxism-Leninism and the whole of revolutionary transformative practice.

The historical context of the rise of Marxist philosophy. What is meant by historical context of the rise of Marxist philosophy is its social, economic and political prerequisites, as well as its theoretical and natural scientific sources.

It was no coincidence that Marxism arose in the mid-19th century. By then capitalism, which had become established in many countries, had amply revealed its exploitative nature and laid bare its evils.

Having set up a new economy, bourgeois society achieved a steep upturn in the productive forces and labour productivity. Public wealth grew fast. However, wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small group of capitalists while every section of the working population was hit by poverty.

There arose an objective necessity for the proletariat to realise its place in the capitalist production system, end bourgeois oppression and choose ways and means of abolishing the exploitation of man by man. That the proletariat had

awakened to this was exemplified by the uprisings of weavers in Lyons (1831 and 1834) and Silesia (1844) and by the Chartist movement in Britain, all of which were spear-headed against the bourgeoisie.

It was in these circumstances that Marx and Engels answered, for the first time ever, questions posed by contemporary history; they demonstrated the historical inevitability of the proletariat destroying the capitalist system and replacing it with a socialist society. Marxism equipped the proletariat with a powerful ideological weapon.

The social, economic, political and theoretical prerequisites for the rise of Marxism are examined in Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Ch. IV) as well as in Lenin's writings "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" and *Karl Marx*.

The theoretical sources of Marxism were English political economy, French and English utopian socialism and classical German philosophy, primarily that of Hegel and Feuerbach.

In developing their philosophical doctrine, the founders of Marxism-Leninism drew on the great scientific discoveries of the 19th century which showed dialectics to be a reflection of the objective logic and dialectic of things and not a figment of the imagination.

The discovery of the cell as the structural base of animals and plants refuted the metaphysical idea of the existence of an unbridgeable gulf between animals and plants.

Experimental substantiation of the law of conservation and transformation of energy showed that motion and energy neither arise nor disappear, that what happens is merely an equivalent transition of one form of energy to another. In other words, none of the dividing lines in nature are, contrary to the metaphysical view, an absolute barrier to reciprocal transformations, including transformations expressive of the process of development.

The vindication of materialism and dialectics was assisted by the revolutionary doctrine of Charles Darwin, who put an end to the notion that animal and plant species were created by God and were changeless. He proved that every species is something having an origin, and revealed the deep-going interconnection of the living world, which expresses itself primarily in transitions, in the transformation of one species of living creature into another. He showed contra-

dictions—intra- and interspecies struggle—to be the source of evolution.

And so, the mid-19th century witnessed the formation of the social, economic, theoretical and natural scientific prerequisites for the new philosophy, dialectical and historical materialism. In order to develop it, however, Marx and Engels had to accomplish a vast amount of work.

The founding of dialectical and historical materialism: a revolution in philosophy. Marx and Engels did not arrive at dialectical and historical materialism directly. Originally they were followers of Hegel and sided with the Young Hegelians, who wanted to give Hegel's idealist philosophy an atheistic and hence an explicitly revolutionary trend. But Marx and Engels went further than the Young Hegelians. They combined militant atheism with an uncompromising stand on any form of exploitation or suppression of the rights of labour. This explains why Marx and Engels moved on from revolutionary democracy to communism and from idealism to materialism (1842-1843).

Lenin saw the *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847) and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848) as the early works of mature Marxism. During the bourgeois democratic revolutions of the 1848-1851 period in Europe, Marx and Engels generalised the experience of the revolutionary movement and worked out in their writings of the time a theory of social revolution, the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The 1850s and early 1860s were years of sustained theoretical activity by Marx and Engels. That is when Marx wrote *Capital*. This fundamental work not only reveals the laws governing the capitalist economy but analyses with extraordinary profundity the main laws and categories of materialist dialectics. It extends the materialist conception of history by contributing the doctrine of socio-economic formations, of the basis and superstructure of society. On the strength of an economic analysis, *Capital* develops a universal theory of socialist revolution, a theory of the class struggle.

In the final period of their lives, Marx and Engels wrote several works generalising the historical experience of the time. Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875) anticipated the future by analysing two phases in the development of communist society: socialism and communism. In *The Civil War in France* (1871) Marx showed that a destroyed bourgeois state would have to give way to a state of

the Paris Commune type. In *Anti-Dühring* (1878), *Dialectics of Nature* (1873-1883) and letters written in the 1890s, Engels drew on the scientific achievements of the day to continue elaborating the basic laws and categories of materialist dialectics, the doctrine of the basis and superstructure. He pointed out the relative independence of ideology.

Marx's and Engels's ideological legacy is the object of sharp, unabating controversy. A thesis current among present-day revisionists alleges the existence of "two Marxes", of a discrepancy in ideological position between the early Marx and the mature Marx. Revisionists divorce the notions of the young Marx from the ideological treasury of the subsequent period and treat them as opposites, misinterpreting Marx's views. Actually there is no discrepancy between Marx's works but a natural line of development, enrichment and substantiation of a doctrine originally set out in general terms.

Dialectical materialism, an essentially revolutionary philosophical doctrine, corresponded to the position of revolutionary fighters who had taken sides with the proletariat, the most revolutionary class in history. The rise of dialectical and historical materialism amounted to a revolution in philosophy.

In the past, there was no organic connection between the development of dialectics and that of materialism. And while materialism, finding itself in the tight grip of metaphysics, drew to a degree on the achievements of natural sciences, dialectics was elaborated by idealists. It was imbued with idealism and so could not serve as an instrument of scientific cognition of the world.

This meant that Marx and Engels could not simply borrow the dialectical method from Hegel and materialism from Feuerbach. They had to rid dialectics of idealism and reform it on materialist lines; also, they had to thoroughly reshape materialism in the spirit of dialectics. After this work had been completed, dialectics and materialism merged to form an integral doctrine, dialectical materialism.

The organic integrity of dialectical materialism consists in its being at once a world-view, a methodology, an epistemology and a logic.

The emergence of dialectical materialism ended the undivided ascendancy of idealism in views on society and vindicated the materialist conception of history.

Thinkers of the past saw no connection between historical events and the production of material benefits even though they considered the latter important for maintaining man's life. They put material production outside the pale of history, as it were. Marx and Engels established that material production as the basis of human society gives rise to an intricate system of connections and dependences extending to every social phenomenon. It is not social consciousness that determines social being as pre-Marxian thinkers believed, but vice versa.

The revolution in philosophy accomplished by Marx and Engels also expressed itself in an entirely different conception of the relation between philosophy and the concrete, special sciences. They showed that philosophy has no reason to pretend to the role of "the science of sciences" solving specific problems bearing on nature and society. Its mission is to construct a scientific world-view, with the specific sciences contributing their share.

An important aspect of the revolution in philosophy was that Marx and Engels put philosophy in the service of the revolutionary transforming activity of the proletariat and all other working people. They proved that an impartial, non-partisan philosophy is out of the question in an antagonistic class society. Marx and Engels took a new view of the social role of philosophy. "The philosophers," Marx wrote, "have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it."¹

The philosophy founded by Marx and Engels became a necessary theoretical basis for transforming the world.

The Leninist stage in the development of Marxist philosophy. Marxist philosophy, like any other truly scientific teaching, is developing continuously. The prerequisites for this are the intrinsic logic of the development of philosophical knowledge as well as major discoveries in natural science and deep-going changes in social reality. All this was there in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the Leninist stage in the development of Marxist philosophy set in.

¹ Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 8.

At the turn of the century, the natural sciences went through a revolution which expressed itself in the founding of quantum physics, a science differing qualitatively from the classical physics of the previous period, under the impact of discoveries in the microcosm. The revolution in the natural sciences made philosophical interpretation of the new science a pressing task.

In the lifetime of Marx and Engels, socialist revolution remained a thing of the future. But in the late 19th century, the development of capitalism entered a new phase, imperialism, the epoch of the downfall of capitalism, the epoch of socialist revolution. The new historical situation made it urgent to analyse new social phenomena from the standpoint of theory, to answer questions posed by the revolutionary practice of the proletariat.

The struggle against revisionism, a struggle which called for a deeper-going elaboration of the ideas of Marxist philosophy, was one of the factors for the latter's development.

Lenin creatively carried forward Marxist philosophy in the new conditions, contributing many new propositions to it.

In *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (1894) and in *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book* (1894-1895), Lenin concentrated on analysing the role played in history by the masses, by classes, parties and individuals, by the ideas guiding them, that is, on problems which gained in relevance when the need for a revolutionary transformation of capitalism became the order of the day.

The founding of a Marxist party made it necessary to demonstrate the significance of revolutionary ideology for its activity, for the working-class movement. Lenin revealed the enormous damage done by the theory of spontaneity in the working-class movement, and indicated the main lines on which a Marxist party should operate to introduce socialist consciousness into a spontaneous working-class movement. It is only through combination with revolutionary theory that the working-class movement ceases to be spontaneous and assumes an explicitly revolutionary trend. Advanced revolutionary ideology holds an important place in a radical transformation of society. This was the conclusion drawn by Lenin in his works of the time.

Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908) is Lenin's

most important philosophical work. It generalises the revolutionary discoveries made in physics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A special place in Marxist philosophy is held by Lenin's famous definition of matter—a profound generalisation of the views of contemporary natural science on individual concrete forms of matter—and his proposition about the unity and intertransformability of every form of matter. Lenin convincingly proved that the new notions of natural science about the structure of matter could only contribute to dialectical materialism but could never disprove the reality of matter.

Marx and Engels concentrated on elaborating the problems of dialectics and historical materialism. As for the theory of knowledge, its problems did not come to the fore at the time. In Lenin's days, the situation changed because bourgeois philosophy was specialising in epistemological problems. As a counter to the agnosticism of bourgeois philosophy, Lenin developed the theory of reflection, which holds a key place in the Marxist theory of knowledge.

Philosophical Notebooks was the next step in the development of the ideas of dialectical materialism by Lenin. In this work Lenin formulated his famous proposition about the unity of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge: dialectics is Marxism's logic and theory of knowledge. Great importance attaches to Lenin's analysis of the laws and categories of materialist dialectics, to his demonstration of the complex and contradictory nature of abstract thinking.

In *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* Lenin formulated a law discovered by him, namely, the law of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism in the epoch of imperialism; from this law he drew the important conclusion that a socialist revolution can triumph first in several countries or even in one country.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Lenin inquired in many of his works into the general laws of transition from capitalism to socialism, showing the special role of the socialist state and the interdependence of economy and politics. He worked out problems of the Communist Party's leadership of socialist construction, and problems of the communist education of the masses.

The article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism"

(1922) is Lenin's philosophical testament. It analyses the methodological role of Marxist philosophy in regard to the natural sciences and puts forward in this connection a programme for consolidating the alliance between Marxist philosophers and natural scientists. Lenin stressed in the article the importance of using the philosophical legacy of the past, primarily Hegel's doctrine and the atheistic teachings of the 18th-century French philosophers.

Lenin's ideological legacy is of lasting value. It reflects the historical experience of the Soviet Union as well as that of the liberation movement of the world proletariat. The further development of Marxist philosophy by Lenin was an achievement of vast international significance.

The significance of Leninism goes beyond the contribution made to Marxism by Lenin himself. A major contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism is being made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the communist and workers' parties of other socialist countries and the world communist movement as a whole.

4. MATTER AND THE BASIC FORMS OF ITS EXISTENCE

Matter is a basic category in dialectical materialism. This accounts for the significance of this theme in the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

Lenin's definition of matter. The material unity of the world. Lenin defined matter in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. "Matter," he wrote, "is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them."¹

Lenin defined matter by opposing it to consciousness and offered a deep insight into the materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy.

The concept of matter is a scientific abstraction reflecting a universal property of all phenomena of the objective world: being universal, it corresponds to all of them and not to an individual phenomenon or a group of phenomena.

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968, p. 130.

Matter exists in the shape of definite formations, of things, and their change is evidence of the development of matter, which, however, does not cease to be what it is, for "the sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside the mind".¹

The concept of *material* used in literature is regarded, epistemologically too, as the opposite of the concept of *ideal*. The concept of *real* is seen as encompassing both the material and the ideal.

Dialectical materialism considers that matter precedes mind and that the latter is derived. The priority of matter implies that matter is unique as a world substance: there is nothing but matter, and matter exhausts all that exists. The idea of the integrity of the world, of its material unity, follows directly from the notion of the uniqueness of matter.

The dialectical materialist conception of the unity of the world is expounded in Engels's *Anti-Dühring* (Part I, Chs. III and IV) and *Dialectics of Nature* ("On the 'Mechanical' Conception of Nature") and in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Ch. I, 1-3; Ch. II). In substantiating the idea of the material unity of the world, Engels wrote, it is necessary to proceed from the results achieved by philosophy and natural science, rejecting all scholastic, speculative assumptions. (See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 55). The material unity of the world expresses itself in the fact that for all the immense diversity of structurally differing material objects and systems, they show a similarity in physico-chemical composition. Matter is in space, which, being a form of its existence, is inseparable from it. In other words, there is no such thing as "empty" space or absolutely isolated things. The material world is a single interconnected system whose every element interacts with other elements.

The material unity of the world is the initial prerequisite for development, which includes transitions from the simple to the complex; life originates as a result of the growing structural complexity of inanimate matter, and society appears at the highest stage of biological evolution.

The idea of the material unity of the world includes notions of the attributes of matter: motion, space and time. Matter only exists in its attributes.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 260.

Motion as a mode of existence of matter. Motion is, even by virtue of the material unity of the world, the interaction, interconnection and reciprocal conditionality of all phenomena and objects. Being an attribute of matter, it is universal, uncreatable and indestructible. Motion continuously maintains itself due to contradictions which constitute the inner state of the process of motion and not something imposed upon it from without.

Matter exists in diverse forms of motion whose number is infinitely great.

The principles of classifying the forms of motion are set out in Engels's *Anti-Dühring* (Part I, Chs. VI and VII) and *Dialectics of Nature* ("Basic Forms of Motion"). Engels listed the following basic forms of motion of matter: mechanical, physical, chemical, biological and social. All forms differ qualitatively from one another: each is characterised by a definite material exponent and special laws. Higher forms of motion of matter necessarily include lower forms but are not reducible to them.

The doctrine of the forms of motion of matter developed by Engels defeated the mechanicism of pre-Marxist materialism (which ascribed phenomena belonging among higher forms of motion to the operation of the laws governing lower forms); it is very important methodologically to present-day science as well. The chief element of Engels's doctrine is the proposition about the development of matter, the irreducibility of higher to lower forms of motion, and the unity of the connection and reciprocal transition of all forms of motion of matter.

In the 20th century, science discovered new forms of motion of matter, with the result that the classification offered by Engels was extended and carried forward.

Space and time as forms of existence of matter in motion. "There is nothing in the world but matter in motion," Lenin wrote, "and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time."¹

Space and time are forms of activity of matter. They are absolute in the sense that they constitute the universal conditions of all being. They are relative in that their concrete properties depend on the state of matter in motion. The main properties of space and time are that space is three-dimensional, while time is one-dimensional and irreversible.

¹ Ibid., p. 175.

The one-dimensional, irreversible property of time is expressive of the direct character of the connection between changing states of material objects as well as of the general trend of succession of material phenomena, of the transition from lower to higher forms and from simple to complex ones.

Space and time are infinite, and this is a manifestation of the absoluteness of matter in motion, of the absence of any finite, rigid states, of the inexhaustibility of the qualitative transformations of matter.

Newton's notion of absolute space and time was metaphysical. The founding of non-Euclidean geometry in the first half of the 19th century by Nikolai Lobachevsky and then by Bernhard Riemann eliminated one of the main arguments in favour of the Newtonian conception of space and time, the existence of Euclidean geometry only. The contemporary theory of relativity has made it evident that space and time do not exist separately, either from each other or from matter.

For an in-depth study of this theme, we recommend the following sources: Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Chs. IV-VII; and *Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 70-86, 231-248; V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Ch. III, 1 and 5; Ch. V.

5. CONSCIOUSNESS: ITS ORIGIN AND ESSENCE

Consciousness is one of the most important philosophical categories with whose aid the fundamental question of philosophy is posed and solved.

Consciousness as the highest form of reflection of reality. In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin, speaking of sensations, offered a general description of consciousness from the standpoint of the theory of reflection as a subjective image of the objective world. This seemingly simple formula has deep philosophical meaning. First, it takes the objective world, that is, matter, as the starting point. Second, it registers the presence of an epistemological image as the chief characteristic of consciousness. Third, it notes that the image belongs to the subject, that is, the formula stresses the subjective character of the mode of reflection. The first of these moments determines the materialist line in the theory of knowledge.

The second makes it possible to dissociate from agnosticism, in particular from the theory of symbols or hieroglyphs, and induces one to inquire into the peculiarities of the formation and functioning of epistemological images in the system of knowledge. The third moment makes it possible to dissociate from philosophical concepts identifying matter with mind and the material with the ideal. The material can be identified with the ideal on both an idealist basis (as in Hegel's objective idealism) and a materialist one (vulgar materialism, which presumes that consciousness is material).

Dialectical materialism, analysing the relation between matter and consciousness, arrives at the notion that consciousness is the highest form of reflection of reality, a product of development of matter over a long period.

At present it is customary to examine the following groups of forms of reflection: reflection in inanimate nature, which corresponds to the first three forms of motion of matter (mechanical, physical and chemical); reflection in animate nature, which corresponds to the biological form of motion of matter; and lastly, consciousness, that is, reflection in society, which corresponds to the social form of motion of matter.

The origin of consciousness. The socio-historical character of consciousness. A new type of reflection emerges with the appearance of a new activity, a new type of attitude to the environment. This process is connected with the history of the rise of human society.

The labour theory of anthropogenesis was formulated by Engels in *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man*.

The manufacture of instruments of production was a turning point in the history of the animal kingdom, for that is when the history of the formation of man began. The production process forced its way more and more into activity aimed at meeting biological requirements; in this process, a goal was set and achieved which met the requirements of production and not a biological need.

The world of things and material processes mastered by man in the process of labour found its second life in the world of language, the world of thought. The new type of activity (material production) engendered a new type of reflection: ideal reflection, reflection in a system of words.

Labour, production team and coherent speech (language) are the three main factors which determined the genesis of consciousness.

Consciousness is a function of the brain of man as a member of society and not a function of the brain as an organ given to man by nature. None but communication with people, the mastering of a language and of forms of thinking through the language plus participation in human practice and human culture make man a man. There is no other way in which consciousness can develop.

The problem of the ideal. Epistemological image. In examining consciousness, it is important to grasp the concept of image. Images reflect objects; objects dictate the content of images. The concept of image used in the theory of knowledge is very broad. In everyday life it generally denotes a visual image or sensuous notion. In the theory of knowledge, however, the concept of image does not come down to that of sensuous image.

In consciousness, the bulk of images consists of logical and not sensuous images, that is to say, it is made up of reflections in language form, mostly reflections of those objects of the real world which are not directly given in sensory cognition. In reasoning about the structure of the atom, the past history of one's own country, and so on, one forms a thought image, an image of these objects. It is an ideal logical image, an image created by means of a natural language. A logical image mirrors phenomena as well as an essence, a law, which do not lie on the surface but only come out with the development of knowledge in the course of practice.

The epistemological image is a developing, deepening and expanding ideal reflection of reality. Its movement is based on practice. In the final analysis it is a result of the movement of cognition of humanity as a whole. It reveals the dialectical relation between the individual and social in consciousness.

The epistemological image is a most effective instrument in the hands of humanity and the individual, an instrument constantly used in people's lives. It is the form in which the aim of an activity manifests itself and the likely ways of achieving it, the success or failure of the means used, are analysed, and lastly, the initial ideal image is compared with the concrete result.

Man's self-consciousness and social activity. Self-con-

sciousness is a characteristic of man's consciousness. It begins with singling oneself out from other objects and other people.

An important factor in the development of self-consciousness is awareness of one's inner world, appreciation of oneself as a feeling, suffering, rejoicing, thinking human being.

The next stage in the development of self-consciousness involves fuller and deeper realisation of one's social standing and membership of a nationality, class or profession. It is linked with man's real, socially meaningful activity as a member of his class and nation and a citizen of his state.

Fostering the working people's social activity and class consciousness is a major task of communist and workers' parties.

6. DIALECTICS AS THE SCIENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNIVERSAL CONNECTION

Materialist dialectics is a philosophical science inseparable from Marxist philosophy; it is characterised by the organic unity of dialectics and materialism, by their interpenetration, with materialism being dialectical and dialectics, materialist.

General definition of dialectics. Whereas philosophical materialism deals with the nature of the world, the relation between matter and consciousness, and so on, dialectics is concerned with the state of the world, the changes occurring in it, and the laws governing these changes. This applies both to the laws of development of being and to those of knowledge, for knowledge is developing too as it reflects being. Dialectics draws from its theoretical propositions conclusions about their significance to knowledge and practice, thereby operating as not only a theory of development but a method of cognising and changing reality. At the same time, it is a theory of knowledge and dialectical logic.

Being an effective method, dialectics is the source of the creativity and revolutionariness of Marxism; it is the methodological basis for the policy, strategy and tactics of the working class and Marxist-Leninist parties.

The main ideas of dialectics are expressed in its principles, laws and categories.

Motion and the development of the material world.

Motion is change in general. As for development, it is a special kind of change characterised by inevitable qualitative transformations, restructurings and irreversibility.

With regard to the conception of development, materialist dialectics differs in principle from metaphysics and idealist dialectics. Materialist dialectics considers that development is objective and material, for what is developing is the objective world while the mind reflects this development.

As everything in the world develops, development is universal; it is objective and irreversible, and necessarily includes qualitative changes. Development is contradictory; it is an inseparable, basic property of reality.

The principle of development is the central, initial stage of dialectics around which all its elements revealing development from various angles and showing how it takes place are grouped. Dialectics should therefore be regarded as the science of development. Lenin called it a comprehensive, profound doctrine of development rich in content. (See V.I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Karl Marx*, and "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism".)

The universal connection of phenomena of reality. Development takes place through the interconnection of phenomena. Materialist dialectics considers that the interconnection of phenomena is objective and universal. The universality of connections implies that every phenomenon is necessarily connected with others. Universal interaction is the internal source of self-motion of matter, the cause of the motion and development of all separate phenomena.

Connection, universal interaction, is a basic, inseparable property of matter. In dialectics it expresses itself in the *principle of universal connection*, with dialectics operating as the doctrine of the universal connection and reciprocal conditionality of phenomena. The principles of development and universal interconnection demand that things and phenomena be examined in their evolution and interconnection; that the events and processes under consideration be approached from a concrete historical standpoint; that they be studied in every respect; and that the chief link in the chain of historical events be singled out. (See V.I. Lenin, "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin" and "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government").

In applying these demands, account must be taken of the

vast diversity of connections in both content and form. They may be essential or inessential, necessary or accidental, direct or indirect, general or individual, and so on. The main universal kinds or types of connection are reflected by the categories and laws of dialectics.

Laws are definite kinds of connections between phenomena or their aspects, properties or elements. They are objective, general, essential, necessary, stable and recurrent.

In degree of generality, they divide into *universal* laws operating in all processes and phenomena, in every form of motion of matter, and studied by philosophy; *general* laws operating in several forms of motion of matter; and *particular* laws operating in one form of motion of matter and studied by the special sciences like the previous group. On other grounds a distinction is made between dynamic and static laws, between laws of development, functioning and structure. The totality and interconnection of dialectical laws reflect the complex and many-sided process of development, each of them reflecting a definite feature, aspect or peculiarity of the process.

Categories are the basic concepts of science reflecting the properties, aspects, relationships and connections of definite classes and phenomena.

Materialist dialectics as a scientific system and a universal method of cognition. Philosophical categories reflect aspects, properties and relations inherent in every form of motion of matter, in all processes and phenomena, which means that they are universal. This sets them apart from the laws of the special sciences. And what is the relation between the laws and categories of philosophy?

Most categories reflect various aspects and properties of objects and processes, such as quality, opposition, content or form. Laws express the interconnections of aspects and properties of phenomena. Some categories likewise express connections: causality, contradiction, and so on. However, they coincide in essence with the relevant laws. Categories are used for expressing content and formulating laws. This is why laws and categories should be studied jointly. While examining a law, we grasp the content of the categories expressing it. And in studying categories, such as those of causality and contradiction, we bring out the laws of dialectics.

The laws of dialectics, being universal, operate both

in the objective world and in the process of cognition, their manifestation varying from sphere to sphere. Dialectics is therefore both a theory of development and a theory of knowledge. But since the laws of dialectics operate at a stage of cognition like thinking, dialectics also operates as dialectical logic. In other words, it combines the general theory of the development of objective reality, the theory of knowledge, and logic, the dialectic of the development of reality being *objective* and the dialectic of cognition and thinking *subjective*, for it is a reflection of objective dialectics in people's minds.

To gain a deep insight into the theme, we recommend studying Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring* ("Introduction. I. General") and *Dialectics of Nature* (see pp. 40-49, 202, 203, 205); Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition", *Capital*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983, pp. 28-29; Frederick Engels, "Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 472-477; V.I. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, 1980, pp. 221-222)).

7. THE BASIC LAWS AND CATEGORIES OF DIALECTICS

The unity and struggle of opposites. Lenin called this law the core of dialectics, a law expressing its essence. It is the structural centrepiece of dialectics as a theoretical system; all other dialectical laws depend on it. The law of the unity and struggle of opposites expresses one of the most important characteristics of development: its source and inner cause. An in-depth examination of the law makes it possible to understand the content and essence of the process of development.

With a view to providing an adequate mastery of the content of the law, several of its aspects may be singled out. The essence of one of them is that all phenomena of nature, society and knowledge are characterised by intrinsic opposites. *Opposites* are different, mutually opposed elements, aspects, properties and trends of one integral material or spiritual formation.

Another aspect of the law is the interconnection of opposites. It is *contradiction*, that is, the interconnection

of opposites within the whole in which they interpenetrate and at once posit and negate one another, being both in unity and in struggle. Contradictions have two important aspects: the unity of opposites and their struggle.

The aspects of a contradiction differ in significance. "The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites," Lenin wrote, "is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute."¹ The unity of opposites includes their necessary presence in one phenomenon, their reciprocal conditionality, their equilibrium or equal action in certain periods of development, and their identity. Evidently, not all these moments are relative. What is relative is equal action, for it is temporary and secondary in comparison with struggle, and identity, since it is not the chief aspect of a contradiction. As for the presence and reciprocal conditionality of opposites, they are absolute and so is struggle, since without them there would be no contradiction, either.

The struggle of opposites means their mutual resistance, mutual exclusion and mutual negation. In a general sense, it is absolute, being the chief factor in the contradiction compared with unity, and it alone resolves contradictions and assures further development. This proposition of dialectics serves as the methodological basis for criticising bourgeois, reformist and revisionist theories of class conciliation in capitalist society as well as the theory of "convergence", or of increasingly close ties and conciliation between capitalism and socialism.

Like all that exists, contradictions develop and the interrelation of their aspects changes. The development of a contradiction passes through the stages of essential distinction, opposition and conflict.

The unity and struggle of opposites, contradictions, are the inner source of development of all phenomena and processes.

Inasmuch as motion and development are due to internal and not external causes, they constitute in the final analysis self-motion and self-development if integral independent material formations undergo changes. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 358.) The interaction of opposites accounts for the intensity and vitality of the process

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 358.

and channels it in a definite direction.

External forces and the contradictions of concrete formations likewise influence their development but this influence depends on the unfolding and solution of intrinsic contradictions.

We recommend drawing on the evidence of the natural and social sciences to examine the operation and peculiarities of contradictions in inanimate and animate nature, in social life, in order to gain a more concrete idea of the above propositions of dialectics.

The law of the unity and struggle of opposites, being universal like any other law of dialectics, operates in concrete phenomena and processes variously, in special forms which depend on the essence and peculiarities of the processes concerned. Therefore the contradictions existing in reality are exceedingly varied. They may be divided into diverse groups according to the degree of generality, to the object spheres of their existence, to their distribution, significance and character. There are, for instance, external and internal, basic and non-basic, antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions.

Recommended reading on this theme: Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Ch. II, § 1, "The Method", Observations 4 and 7); Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring* ("Introduction. I. General", Part I, Ch. XII) and *Dialectics of Nature* (pp. 211-217); V.I. Lenin, *Karl Marx* ("Dialectics"), "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", and *Philosophical Notebooks* (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, pp. 221-222).

Transition from quantitative to qualitative changes. The second law of dialectics reveals the procedure of origination of the new in the course of development by showing how quantitative changes come about in phenomena. Each thing possesses many qualities from which the chief quality stands out as an integral and generalised characteristic of the thing. The *basic quality* is the totality of characteristics expressing the nature and peculiarities of a thing. Its transformation is a transformation of the thing itself.

The quality of this or that material formation is determined by its composition—the set of its components—as well as by its structure—the situation, relations and connections of its components. Quality is therefore a stable unity of components and structure; it changes due either to a change in com-

position, which also results in a restructuring, or to a direct change of structure.

The qualities of a thing manifest themselves through its properties. *Properties* are what brings out qualities as the given phenomenon interacts with others. They characterise things in diverse respects. The basic essential properties are close to qualities.

Quantity is the definiteness of a thing characterising the extent, pace and degree of its development and the development of its qualities. Quantitative indicators may be extensive or intensive. The former comprise size, volume, number, and so on. They are indifferent in a measure to the essence of things. The latter express the pace, degree and level of development. Changes in intensive characteristics directly cause a change in the structures and qualities of objects. Extensive and intensive changes are interconnected, with the result that extensive changes can ultimately lead to intensive and then also to qualitative changes.

Quality and quantity are different characteristics of a thing; they are opposed and irreducible to each other but are in unity and interaction, depend on each other and enter into mutual contradiction. This contradiction, becoming sharper, demands a solution, which comes about through the formation of a new quality and the rise of new quantitative characteristics. The contradiction becomes sharper due to a change in quantitative indicators, which therefore pave the way for qualitative transformations and bring them about at a definite moment. The essence of the second law of dialectics is that *qualitative transformations can only take place through quantitative changes*. (See Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 63.)

Measure is the unity of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an object. It shows that this or that qualitative state has strictly definite quantitative limits. A change of quantity within these limits occasions no qualitative transformations. Going beyond these limits, quantity brings about a change of quality, for there occurs a restructuring of substance, body, system.

The dependence of quantitative and qualitative changes is reciprocal, therefore in objective reality and in the process of cognition there also takes place a reverse transition—from qualitative to quantitative changes, which means that new qualities impart new quantitative characteristics to objects.

Development is the unity of continuity and discreteness. The property of continuity in it is expressed by quantitative changes coming about gradually, and the property of discreteness, by changes in quality, which take place more abruptly and rapidly, by leaps. A leap is a break between continuous quantitative changes; it is a crossing of the boundary between qualities, a radical change in the development of a phenomenon. Leaps are indispensable for the transition to a new quality although they differ in form. There are abrupt leaps taking place once and leaps that are gradual in a measure, for they occur after a series of intermediate states.

The transition from socialism to communism is a typical great qualitative change in the development of the communist formation, a gradual leap from its lower to its higher phase. Communism is a direct continuation of socialism, and the transition to it is effected by developing and perfecting the foundations of socialism and not by destroying them. But this transition is a leap, for communism differs qualitatively from socialism.

Development in the right, dialectical sense of the word cannot be only quantitative or only qualitative; it is the unity of quantitative and qualitative changes, of evolutionary and revolutionary forms, where it is a question of the development of society.

Questions concerning the relation between leap and revolution, between revolution and evolution in social development are very important in this respect. (See V.I. Lenin, "Differences in the European Labour Movement".)

A proper understanding of these problems leads to the conclusion that the methodological basis of reformism and right-wing opportunism is a one-sided, evolutionary conception of development as purely quantitative change ruling out leaps and hence revolution. "Left"-wing revisionists, anarchists, various extremist groupings ignore the need for sustained preparations, for educational and organising work, pinning their hopes on decisive events, on big leaps, on upheavals. Yet the dialectics of social development shows that revolutionary transformations (revolutionary leaps, i.e., radical changes in the life of society) cannot be brought about in the absence of mature conditions or without preparatory work.

The negation of the negation. The law of negation

expresses the interconnection of successive stages of development, its general trends and end result.

Negation is an objective moment of development and not a subjective attitude to something. It is a transition from one stage to another, a new one.

Dialectical negation has several peculiarities. To begin with, it is universal; there is no development without negation. Marx stressed this. (See Karl Marx, "Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality. A Contribution to German Cultural History. Contra Karl Heinzen", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 317-318.)

Negation is contradictory itself, and it is always closely connected with contradictions. If complete, it is the transition of a phenomenon or a stage in its development to its opposite. Such negation is due to the inherent contradictions of the object and is a form of their solution. It is therefore self-negation, or a negation taking place under the impact of the internal forces and laws of the given process and in a form corresponding to its nature. Marx wrote that capitalist production negates itself with the necessity of a natural historical process. (See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 715.)

Negation, removing the obsolete, affirms the new, born of and prepared by the old. While removing the obsolete, negation at the same time preserves all that was valuable and positive at the previous stage of development and includes it in the new stage. Lenin repeatedly stressed the importance of this aspect. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, 1971, pp. 298-300; Vol. 31, 1977, pp. 285-289; Vol. 38, pp. 222-225.) The preservation of some features of the old by the new is continuity, a requisite for all development expressing the unity of this process and the interconnection of its stages.

In motion and development there occur many negations, not one. The stage of development which in the past was new and negated the previous, old stage, becomes obsolete with the passage of time and is negated at a definite moment: there occurs the negation of the negation. Afterwards it is also the latest stage that is negated in time, and so forth. At a definite stage in this process there comes a partial repetition of earlier stages, which means that what takes place in development is not only advance but repetition as well.

Pre-Marxist, metaphysical notions of development were one-sided. Some theorists saw in it nothing but a recurrence

of the old while others interpreted development as uninterrupted advance in a straight line. It was only Marxist dialectics that developed a strictly scientific theory of the contradictory character of development as the dialectical unity of advance and relative repetitiveness, with advance as the main thing. A repetition does not necessarily come after two negations; it may and often does come after many negations, but this can only occur after a second transition to its opposite. It is because not all negations are complete, that is, not all of them are a transition to their opposites; on the contrary, most negations are partial and what is needed for the transition to an opposite is not one but several such negations. Thus, the features of primitive communal property recur in socialist social property after four negations and a second transition to their opposite.

A spiralling line may serve as a graphic image of the path of development combining advance with relative repetitiveness. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, 1974, pp. 55-56.)

Accordingly, it is necessary to single out and study the peculiarities of the operation of the law in question in the development of socialist society. Under socialism, negations are not antagonistic; they neither can be nor are socio-political revolutions; big negations take place gradually and are effected consciously and methodically, with continuity gaining in importance.

The law of the negation of the negation, being universal like all other dialectical laws, is a law of development of the external world and a law of cognition, which is accomplished as the replacement, the negation of one stage by another, of some scientific theories and theses by other, higher, more exact and complete ones.

The individual, the separate, the particular, the general. The *separate* is a relatively isolated formation: a body, thing, phenomenon, process, event. The *individual* is the unique, inimitable features and properties of the separate. The *general* is the essentially similar, identical, recurrent features and properties of all the separate phenomena of a definite group. The separate and the individual are not identical. The separate is a thing as a whole, which has both individual and general characteristics. It is the unity of the general and individual. The individual and general are moments or aspects of the separate. And the separate is a whole.

Thus, every birch-tree is a separate. It has individual characteristics proper to it alone and distinguishing it from all other birch-trees. At the same time, each birch-tree has characteristics that all other birch-trees have too, that is, it also has general characteristics.

The individual expresses the peculiarities of the separate while the particular expresses those of a group of phenomena. It is therefore general, being proper to a particular group, as of people (a class, a nation) or countries (the socialist countries), and so on.

There is a fundamental analysis of the essence of the general and its relation to the separate in Lenin's article "On the Question of Dialectics".

Treating the general as absolute and dissociating it from things and matter is one of the main epistemological sources of idealism. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, pp. 357-361. For the general and the individual, see pp. 99, 279-280, 361 and 362 of the same volume.)

The above categories help understand the processes and phenomena of reality and cognition, in particular the relation between the laws of socialist revolution and socialist constructure which are common to all countries, and the peculiarities of these processes in diverse countries. Thus, general laws are of decisive importance for the formation of the new social system but their operation varies from country to country because so do socio-historical conditions. On this point, it is necessary to criticise right- and "Left"-wing revisionism and dogmatism.

Cause and effect. The cause-effect connection is an important type of universal connection. In it a *cause* is what produces an *effect*, and an *effect* is the result of the operation of a *cause*. But what exactly is a cause? It is correct to see a cause, not as an isolated factor, but ultimately the interaction of forces, bodies, processes or the internal elements and aspects of processes and systems. Reciprocal action is the main source of the rise, change and disappearance of phenomena. "...Reciprocal action," Engels wrote, "is the true *causa finalis*¹ of things."² And it must be borne in mind that a most important kind of reciprocal action is contradiction, the source of change.

Thus, the conflict between the productive forces and production relations, or the two aspects of the production

¹ Final cause.—Ed.

² Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 231.

mode which forms the basis of a social system, is the deepest economic cause of social revolution.

The cause-effect connection has certain characteristics. It is objective, for it exists in reality irrespective of consciousness. It is universal, for every event or phenomenon always has a cause and there are no causeless phenomena. It is necessary, for a definite cause always has one and the same effect given proper conditions.

Cause differs from conditions. It is an active, operative factor giving rise to an event. Conditions cannot produce effects by themselves even though they are necessary for the onset of an event and contribute to it.

Causality has always been an object of controversy between the main philosophical trends. The materialists uphold the principle of determinism, which maintains that causality is universal and objective. The subjective idealists adhere to indeterminism, which denies the universality and objectiveness of causality. The objective idealists do not seem to deny causality but for them causes are ideal, supernatural, divine phenomena. Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* reveals the untenability of idealist views on causality. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, pp. 153-169.)

Necessity and chance. *Necessity* implies what is conditioned by the internal causes and essence of processes, what comes inevitably. It expresses the orderly, law-governed character of the development of the world.

Chance, which exists together with necessity, is an objective phenomenon. Like all other phenomena, chance phenomena have their causes. The conception of chance as a causeless phenomenon is a typical error of everyday consciousness. To understand chance correctly, it is important to realise its relativity. There is no absolute chance, that is, a chance which is a chance in every respect. A phenomenon can be a chance only with regard to a definite law-governed connection. With regard to something else, the same phenomenon is a necessity.

It follows that *chance* is a phenomenon external to a given process, a phenomenon which is possible but not indispensable to it although it has a cause, is connected with the essence of other processes and is necessary in them.

On examining the interconnections and reciprocal transitions of necessity and chance, one should grasp Engels's thesis that chance is a complement to and a manifestation

of necessity implying that there is no pure necessity without chances either in nature or in society. (See Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, pp. 365-368, and his letter to W. Borgius of January 25, 1894, *ibid.*, pp. 502-504.) Necessity is not only accompanied and complemented by chances but manifests itself through them alone.

In the communist social formation the character of social necessity and chance changes in comparison with earlier societies. Whereas a society based on private property is dominated by anarchy, with necessity as a blind, spontaneous force making its way through a multitude of chances, conscious, planned management of social processes under the new system makes it possible to a degree to foresee and restrict the effect of undesirable chances.

Content and form. Objects and phenomena of reality have many aspects. Content and form are essential aspects of objects and phenomena. Every phenomenon or thing has its content and form which constitute its different, opposed aspects. *Content* is the sum total of the elements and processes of a thing; it is what the thing consists of. *Form* is the internal and external structure and mode of existence of content, a certain balance of elements and processes in time and space, stable connections between them. The form of an atom, for instance, is a definite order of arrangement and interaction of its component elementary particles and their movements.

Content and form interact. Content is determinative but form, whose development depends on content, influences it in its turn. This influence may be of two kinds. Form contributes to the development of content if it is adequate to the latter; it retards development if it is obsolete and no longer corresponds to content. The contradiction between an old form and a new content grows, reaching a point where it becomes a conflict, and then the phenomenon stagnates and finds itself in crisis. To make development possible again, the old form must be replaced by a new one. This always takes place in nature and society. The contradictions between a new content and an old form are an important incentive to movement and development. (See Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 305; V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, 1961, pp. 389-390; Vol. 38, pp. 92-94, 144-145, 149 and 222.)

The influence exerted by form on content is due to the relative independence of the former. This expresses itself in the ability of form to outpace or lag behind content and in one and the same content developing in several forms although it is not any but only definite forms that correspond to one content. It is therefore important to deal with the multiformity of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 96-97, 113-114.)

The relative independence of forms also manifests itself in the circumstance that a new content may use some old forms and vice versa: an old content may use some new forms.

In studying this problem, it is necessary to criticise the metaphysical and idealist conception of content and form.

Essence and appearance. The categories of essence and appearance are necessary for forming a correct idea of the process of cognition. The latter begins with what is accessible to direct sense perception in processes and things. This external, relatively variable aspect of things and processes is called *appearance*. There is also an internal, relatively stable and determinative aspect hidden behind appearances and inaccessible to direct perception. It is their *essence*, the unity of inherent, necessary aspects and connections. Essence is usually general while appearance is individual.

Essence and appearance are different or even opposed aspects of one object but they are in unity and interconnection. "...The essence appears. The appearance is essential," Lenin wrote.¹ A change in essence determines a change in appearance. At the same time, essence comes out in appearances, nor can it come out without appearance. Appearance is the external revelation of essence.

The untenability of the idealist and metaphysical interpretation of essence and appearance comes out in the light of a critical examination of the concrete views of exponents of these trends.

A correct understanding of essence and appearance, of their interconnection, is necessary for a correct notion of the relation between the sensuous and rational moments in cognition. Whereas appearance can be perceived directly by the senses, essence is only within the range of abstract thinking. Marx wrote that essences such as value and surplus

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 251.

value cannot be revealed by any instruments or experiments but the force of abstraction replaces both.

Science, cognising the essence of a process, discloses the laws governing it. Essence and law are very close concepts of one and the same order: laws are an essential, inherent connection, a connection within and between essences.

Cognition moves from appearance to essence, from the external aspect of things to inner law-governed connections. But an essence does not wholly come out at once. On revealing a certain essence, one moves on from cognising an essence of the first order to cognising an essence of the second order, a deeper-lying essence, and so on ad infinitum. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 251.)

Possibility and reality. These categories help understand the genesis of the new. *Possibility* is the totality of conditions, prerequisites and causes involved in the rise of the new, the ability of matter, of reality, to engender the new. *Reality* is all that really exists in the objective world. At the same time, a reality is a realised possibility.

Possibility and reality are closely interconnected: whereas a reality is a realised possibility, a possibility is brought about by the development of a reality. At the same time, it may become a reality. This is why they cannot be separated.

Nor can possibility be identified with reality, for they are separated by a complex process of transformation of the former into the latter. What is needed for the realisation of the process in social life as distinct from nature is, besides objective conditions, active influence of the subjective factor, that is, the conscious activity of social forces, classes, parties.

In practical and scientific activity it is important to classify possibilities. They divide into *real* and *formal* ones. The former flow from an objective necessity and are given by the laws and trends of development. The latter are due to chance factors. Real possibilities divide in their turn into *abstract* and *concrete* ones. Possibilities which cannot yet be realised because the requisites are lacking are considered abstract. And possibilities for whose realisation the requisites are there are called concrete.

* * *

The principles, main laws and categories of dialectics in their totality and interconnection, which we have dealt

with on these pages, form a harmonious theoretical system, materialist dialectics. Dialectics gives no specific answers to particular questions of direct importance to practice. They can be obtained through a special analysis using means and methods of the special sciences. The significance of dialectics as a universal method lies in the fact that it guides the thinking of the researcher or politician along the right path leading to the truth, and points to peculiarities, forms and laws of cognition which must be taken into account to make investigation fruitful and effective.

8. THE DIALECTICAL MATERIALIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Cognition, an active and purposeful reflection of reality in man's mind, is dialectical. This is why the founders of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly stressed the need to consciously apply dialectics—its principles, laws and categories—in the cognition process.

The main shortcomings of pre-Marxist materialism's theory of knowledge. Pre-Marxist materialism, while recognising the knowability of the world, was unable, none the less, to discover the real laws of cognition or find a criterion of the truth of our knowledge; pre-Marxist materialist theories of knowledge had serious shortcomings: they were contemplative, anthropologist, metaphysical. They saw cognition as a passive reflection of the environment by the individual.

The revelation of the role of practice in cognition and the discovery of the laws of social development enabled Marxist-Leninist philosophy to study the laws of cognition, show its social nature, investigate the dialectic of the social and individual in cognition and solve in this way the problem of the relation between the individual sense experience of man and the necessary, universal theoretical knowledge of society.

Man cognises the world around him only in the process of its practical transformation. But the objective world can be transformed and reshaped, and hence cognised, only by people involved in the system of social relations. This explains why the subject of cognition is society as a whole. Society's knowledge is recorded and finalised in language as a set of meanings.

However, society is composed of people, and it is living, concrete individuals who carry on the process of cognition. In this process, man does not confine himself to assimilating what has already been created by society. Applying available knowledge in practice, he makes new discoveries and contributes to the social system of knowledge. It is in this dialectical interconnection of the social and individual moments that man cognises objective reality.

Dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge as a theory of reflection. "...All matter possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection."¹ This is an important proposition.

Reflection may be defined as a specific reaction in which the properties of some things come out in internal changes and in external reactions of other things. It may be regarded as an aspect of the universal connection in the objective world.

Reflection in inanimate nature is a reflection in mechanical, physical and chemical processes. In animate nature, reflection is active and selective. Its development has gone through a series of stages from the diffuse irritability of protoplasm to the rise of a special system performing the function of reflection, the nervous system. In society, reflection takes the form of human consciousness.

The activity of human consciousness and cognition is conditioned by their connection with human practice, with the process of goal-setting, and the activity of the cognising subject is determined primarily by its practical attitude to the world. Lenin stressed on more than one occasion that reflection (in the form of the truth) must not be seen "in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matt), without impulse, without motion".² This is why the attacks against the Leninist theory of reflection made by today's revisionists (Henri Lefebvre, Roger Garaudy, Leszek Kolakowski, Gajo Petrovič, Svétozar Markovič and others) are unfounded. They consider that the theory of reflection underestimates the activity of the subject, the creative activity of the mind and cognition, and therefore propose replacing the category of reflection by the category of practice, describing the problem of existence of the objective world irrespective of

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 92.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 38, pp. 194-195.

practice as a "false" problem and interpreting practice in an extended sense—as the sum total of all forms of human activity.

Lenin never identified practice with cognition, with the reflection of objective reality in man's mind. He considered practice and reflection to be independent categories expressing different but interacting processes. He showed that the concept of truth is determined by the concept of reflection, for truth implies a correct, adequate reflection of the objective world, a reflection verified and confirmed by practice. (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, pp. 139-140.)

The role of practice in the cognition process. This is a fundamental question in Marxist epistemology. It was examined by Marx in "Theses on Feuerbach" (2nd, 8th and 11th theses), by Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, pp. 346-348); and by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Ch. II, 6) and *Philosophical Notebooks*. Knowledge is based on practice. After all, theory ultimately generalises practice, and arises also as a result of practical requirements. Practice equips theory with technical means of investigation and is the goal and motor of cognition.

What makes an inquiry into the relation between theory and practice important is that present-day revisionists, having interpreted practice broadly and in a subjectivist manner, efface the line between material and spiritual activity, thereby dismissing the problem of the connection between theory and practice.

Theory and practice are philosophical categories denoting two aspects (intellectual and material) of one socio-historical process.

Practice as an activity is the sum total of all the *material*, socio-historical activities of people. It is the production effort and socio-historical activity of society governed by objective laws and aimed at transforming the surrounding world in accordance with its laws and the goals of social man.

The term *theory* is used in two senses: (1) in a broad sense, as a synonym of knowledge in general by contrast with the practical activity of society; (2) in a narrow sense, as denoting part of scientific knowledge in the form of logical systems.

In examining the unity of theory and practice, the term *theory* is used in its former sense. But it should be remembered that scientific systems are the foundation and core of all knowledge.

"The standpoint of life, of practice," Lenin wrote, "should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge."¹ "What is necessary," he wrote in another work, "is the union of cognition and practice... The unity of the theoretical idea (of knowledge) and of practice—this NB—and this unity *precisely in the theory of knowledge*."²

The unity of the sensuous and rational moments in cognition. Alongside the unity of theory and practice, the relation between the sensuous and rational moments in cognition reveals an aspect of the dialectical path of cognising the objective world.

The content of the concepts of the sensuous and the rational should be clarified. The former comprises forms of sensuous reflection: sensations, perceptions, representations; the latter, forms of abstract thinking: concepts, judgments, deductions.

Sensuous reflection enables man to cognise the world around him in all its diversity. But it cannot penetrate into the essence of things, cannot cognise the laws of their functioning and development. Law-governed connections of reality are investigated through abstract logical thinking. In this connection attention should be called to Lenin's description of sensations; one should realise the difference between image and sign and see clear in Lenin's criticism of the theory of symbols. (See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, pp. 232-238 and 216-217.)

The dialectical interconnection of subjective form and objective content in our sensations and representations is complex. The dialectical materialist theory of knowledge therefore examines the relation between image and sign. An image is a result of the reflective activity of a subject; it is the unity of the objective and subjective. It is objective in content and in source—the object which it reflects—and subjective in form of existence. An image corresponds to an object but the correspondence is relative. It not only corresponds to the object but correlates with it in the activity of the subject. There are sensuous images (sensations,

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 142.

² Ibid, Vol. 38, pp. 216 and 219.

perceptions, representations) and mental images (concepts, hypotheses, theories, and so on).

Unlike an image, the relation of a sign to the object indicated by it is generally conditional. The sign is not assumed to resemble the object. Signs subdivide into language and non-language signs (words, sentences, formulas, graphs, diagrams, and so on). The idealists distort the cognitive significance of signs, considering that sign systems are arbitrary constructions with whose aid a picture of the world is formed. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge regards signs as a means of people's abstract and generalised reflective activity. The conditionality of the connection between a sign and the object indicated by it offers enormous opportunities to single out, generalise and abstract the properties and relationships of things of the objective world thereby helping cognise it more deeply.

The reason for the active character of forms of sensuous reflection is that a sensuous image takes shape in the process of people's goal-setting activity. Such an image records and affirms those aspects of an object towards which the activity is directed and which are of definite importance to this activity. True, in each individual act of reflection man does not need to make practical efforts in order to form an image of the object. An image is formed as a result of activity by the sense organs. The results of an analysis of the mechanism of sensuous reflection reveal and prove the adequacy of sensuous images, their correspondence to objects and phenomena of the surrounding world.

The interaction of sensuous reflection and abstract thinking is mobile, dialectical, contradictory. With man, sensuous images are always something grasped and realised to one degree or another; on the other hand, abstract logical thought itself can only develop with constant support from sensuous images.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on truth comprises the following moments: the objectivity of truth, the relation between the absolute and relative in truth, and the concreteness of truth.

What Marxist-Leninist philosophy implies by truth is the content of our knowledge corresponding to objective reality. The very definition of truth stresses its objective character. Truth is subjective in form because the concept of truth is not related to the real world but to our knowledge of it. As for its content, truth is objective, since it is a

correct reflection of the objective world. Lenin described as *objective truth* a content of human knowledge such as does not depend on the subject, on either man or humanity. (See V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Ch. II, 4.) It is necessary to grasp the methodological character of the proposition about the objectivity of truth and its significance for criticising diverse idealist interpretations of truth.

Truth is a process of increasingly full and deep reflection of the material world in man's mind. "The *reflection* of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly', not 'abstractly', *not devoid of movement, not without contradictions*, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution."¹

This raises the question of the relation between the absolute and relative moments in the movement and development of human knowledge. (See V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Ch. II, 5; Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Ch. IX.)

Mention should be made in this connection of the diverse meanings of the concept of absolute truth: (1) a real possibility of complete, exhaustive knowledge of the world; (2) a limit which our knowledge strives for; (3) moments of absolute, lasting knowledge within relative knowledge.

It is necessary to criticise dogmatism and relativism, giving arguments based on the dialectical conception of the relation between absolute and relative truth.

Of great methodological importance is the Marxist proposition about the concreteness of truth, a proposition which demands that the object be studied with due regard to definite conditions of place and time.

Also, there is a need to analyse in detail the *criterion of the truth of our knowledge*. (See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach"; Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Ch. II; V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Ch. II, 6.)

Methods and forms of scientific cognition. To begin with, a deep insight should be gained into the *relation between the dialectical method and concrete modes and devices of scientific research*. Materialist dialectics is the methodological foundation for contemporary scientific cognition.

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 195.

The methods of the special sciences should be developed and used on the basis of mastering materialist dialectics, which specifies the limits of their application.

The problem of method was scientifically elaborated by Marx, Engels and Lenin. (See Frederick Engels, "Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 472-477; Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 223-230; Karl Marx, "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, pp. 37-45; V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 36.)

The general scientific methods used by modern science in investigating diverse realities comprise observation and experiment; analysis and synthesis; the inductive and deductive methods; hypothesis and scientific prevision; the historical and logical methods; the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete. Also widely used in modern science are formal methods, the method of modelling and the systems approach to the analysis of complex objects of science.

To acquire a deep understanding of the laws of contemporary scientific cognition, it is necessary to see clear in the *relation between the empirical and theoretical levels* in it. What makes the relation between theory and empiricism relevant is that the theoretical apparatus of modern science has grown considerably and that its relation to the empirical basis is becoming increasingly complex and mediate. The connection between theory and empiricism has two aspects: one, the dependence of theoretical systems on the empirical basis of science, and two, their reverse influence on experiment.

Philosophy generally associates the empirical level of science with observation, description, measurement, experiment, which prepare factual evidence to disclose this or that general law. At the theoretical level, facts established by experiment are rationally explained and the laws of their existence and development revealed. The theoretical level contains the concepts and laws of science. The empirical and the theoretical as categories reflect definite stages in the formation and development of scientific knowledge, in the movement from abstract to concrete knowledge, and the complex process of an increasingly deep-going and comprehensive cognition of reality.

Marx applied in *Capital* the method of ascending from

the abstract to the concrete, a method which is a logical form of the dialectical movement of thought: from a concrete reality to abstract definitions and from them, to a mental reproduction of the concrete.

The empirical level is a stage of transition from the concrete to the abstract, resulting in abstractly general concepts and definitions. The reverse consists in synthesising abstract definitions, which results in reproducing the concrete as the "unity of the multiform", that is, in theoretical cognition of the object in its numerous connections and relations, in its contradictory, dialectical development.

At the empirical level of scientific research, methods such as *observation* and *experiment* have gained wide currency. *Observation* is prolonged and methodical perception of objects and phenomena of the objective world. It has a definite purpose and is carried on systematically. To cognise an object, we must also describe it, that is, record the characteristics and properties identified in the course of observation (as in botany, zoology, and so on).

Experiment is a scientific operation through which an object is either reproduced artificially or placed in conditions taken into precise account, which makes it possible to study their effect on the object in pure form.

Analysis and *synthesis* play an essential role in science. *Analysis* is a factual or mental breakdown of an object into its components; *synthesis* is a factual or mental recombination of the whole from parts separated through analysis. Synthesis enables us to restore an object as a concrete whole in all the diversity of its manifestations. Analysis and synthesis are inseparable. Analysis, which separates objects into parts and studies each of them, must necessarily examine them as parts of a single whole and not in themselves.

Induction is a method of scientific research generally based on observation and experiment. It is by the inductive method, by studying individual facts, phenomena and objects, that a general conclusion is drawn regarding the properties of the objects of a given class. Depending on the principle of selection, the following methods of scientific induction are singled out: the method of similarity, the method of difference, the method of concomitant changes, and the method of residues. They lead to conclusions that are authentic only to a degree.

The *deductive method* yields authentic knowledge. It

is a deduction from the general to the particular (as in mathematics or logic). In the dialectical process of cognition, induction and deduction are inseparable.

Hypothesis and *scientific prevision* play an immense role in cognition. A *hypothesis* is a scientific assumption that has yet to be proved correct by practice and is advanced as an explanation of new facts in science which is needed from the point of view of existing theories. It is with the aid of hypotheses that scientific knowledge moves on from an old theory to a new one. *Scientific prevision* is a forecast of what will happen or be discovered in the future, a forecast based on a knowledge of the laws of the objective world.

Prognostication means foretelling the trends and prospects of development of this or that process on the strength of an analysis of data about their past and future state (for instance, demographical forecasts). It precedes planning. Planning solves the problem of specifying ways and means of achieving definite goals on the basis of prognostication.

Scientific cognition of the objects of reality implies a study of their formation and development, that is, their history. This can only be done by two methods: the *historical* method, which reproduces all the details of real historical development, and the *logical* method, which likewise reproduces history, but only as far as its main, essential features are concerned. This method is a logical reconstruction of the history of the object. Marx used it in investigating the capitalist mode of production. Describing this method, Engels wrote that it "is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering contingencies".¹ Diverse classes of models are singled out. Depending on the mode of reproduction, that is, the means by which a model is constructed, all models may be divided into two large classes: operating, or material; and "imaginary", or ideal. We may list as material the models of a dam, building, aircraft, and so on. Ideal, or mental, models subdivide into visually observable models (model of the atom, diverse diagrams, and so on) and sign models (mathematical formulas, chemical symbol-

¹ Frederick Engels, "Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 475.

ics, and so on). Cybernetic models are classed specially, as models replacing control systems that have yet to be studied adequately and helping investigate the laws of functioning of a given system (such as the modelling of individual functions of the human mind).

The systems approach became widespread in the second half of the 20th century, above all in biology, psychology, linguistics, cybernetics and other sciences. The main concepts of the systems approach are: system, elements, structure, function. A *system* is a set of interconnected elements forming a definite integral unity. *Elements* are relatively indivisible parts of a whole. A *structure* is a law-governed stable connection between the elements of a system. A *function* is the external manifestation of the properties of an object in a given system of relations.

It is necessary to explicitly distinguish the systems approach as an element of scientific methodology from trends in bourgeois science such as structuralism and structural functional analysis in sociology. These trends absolutise various aspects of the systems approach, with metaphysics and idealism as a result. It is only the Marxist dialectical method that makes it possible to establish the limits of applicability of the devices of systems investigation which single out and study a strictly definite, limited aspect of objective reality.

9. CRITIQUE OF THE MAIN TRENDS OF CONTEMPORARY BOURGEOIS PHILOSOPHY

In studying this theme, we recommend dealing with the following questions.

The general crisis of capitalism and the peculiarities of contemporary idealism. With the general crisis of capitalism deepening, bourgeois philosophy resorts more and more often to analysis of the contradictions of social life, admitting that the conflict between the individual and society is a determining factor in the life of society today. Bourgeois philosophers ignore the concrete historical approach to the causes of the conflict. They describe the crisis of capitalism as a crisis of "modern man" and "modern science", a "spiritual crisis of the epoch". They identify the historical destiny of capitalism, a system doomed to extinction, with the destiny of humanity as a whole, with the "end of civilisation".

The inability to explain new social phenomena correctly and a plainly false interpretation of realities are a major symptom of the crisis of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. The crisis is also characterised by a fundamental change in bourgeois philosophy's attitude to science and reason, the admission that science and world-view are incommensurable and that a philosophical world-view can neither underlie special sciences nor result from them. The conclusions drawn from this lead to the formulation of positivist, irrationalist and religious tenets in philosophy.

According to the logic of neo-positivism, science does not furnish an objective, lasting picture of the world because its notions of the world are changing continuously. Consequently, neither could scientific philosophy pretend to this. It could only serve as a "theory of knowledge of the exact sciences", a "philosophy of science", ultimately losing its independent subject-matter and becoming an "analysis of language".

And the irrationalist philosophy of existentialism implies that science is based on abstractions and deliberately disregards all that is concrete, "vital", failing to reach the "depths of man's being". Philosophy must therefore reject an orientation to science, must be fundamentally unscientific thinking, turning to the "completeness of the experiences of life".

The interpretation of science as an aggregate of symbols or signs concealing a "mystery" proved very favourable to religious philosophy, neo-Thomism.

All the main as well as secondary currents of contemporary idealism gravitate to these leading trends in today's bourgeois philosophy, which are based on minimising the significance of scientific knowledge to world-view.

The Leninist principles of criticising bourgeois philosophy. The principles formulated by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* are the methodological basis for a scientific critique of any trend in bourgeois philosophy.

Lenin stressed that in examining a philosophical trend, it is necessary: to compare the theoretical principles of the philosophy in question with those of dialectical materialism, that is, to ascertain how the fundamental question of philosophy is solved; to establish the place and role of the philosophical trend under investigation among other philosophical schools and trends, that is, to approach its evaluation from a concrete historical standpoint, bringing out its

theoretical sources and showing its trends of development; to look into the attitude of this philosophy to the natural sciences and ascertain the conclusions drawn by it from the achievements of these sciences; to adhere to the principle of partisanship in philosophy and take an uncompromising stand in combating idealism.

The main currents of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. We recommend beginning a critical analysis of bourgeois philosophy with the philosophy of *neo-positivism*. This is one of the main subjective idealist trends in contemporary bourgeois philosophy, the "philosophy of science", which has gone through several stages.

The first stage of this philosophy was *positivism*, which sprang up in the mid-19th century. It is a philosophy recognising none but concrete scientific knowledge and asserting that there can be no other knowledge whatever. Positivism denies the significance of philosophy to world-view, its methodological role with regard to special, concrete, "positive" sciences. Philosophy, Auguste Comte and other positivists contended, can only record the most general laws discovered by the positive sciences.

The second stage in positivist philosophy was *empirio-criticism*, whose essence and untenability were exposed by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.

The third stage of positivism, known as *neo-positivism*, set in at the beginning of the 20th century under the impact of the successes of a new form of logical science, mathematical logic. Neo-positivism, like positivism, wants to abolish the ideological function of philosophy. Bertrand Russell, for one, asserted that all philosophical problems turned out to be logical ones when analysed and purified. Ludwig Wittgenstein inferred from this that philosophy was not a doctrine or an aggregate of theoretical propositions but an activity consisting in logical analysis of the language of science.

Neo-positivism bases the analysis of science on three main theses: (1) there is a marked distinction between analytical (logico-mathematical) and synthetic (factual, empirical) statements; (2) theoretical knowledge comes down to direct experience or statements about it (reductionism); (3) our knowledge does not concern the objective world but the "content of consciousness", "observations", "experience" and their recording in language forms. This explains why neo-positivism devotes so much attention

to the principle of "verification" recognising as true what can be empirically verified through the sense organs. It regards all affirmations which cannot be verified in this manner as false ("metaphysical"). Neo-positivism classes among them primarily all philosophical, ideological problems. By making the truth of affirmations about the world directly dependent on the possibility of verification through the sense organs, by direct observation, neo-positivism smuggles in subjective idealism under the guise of an "anti-metaphysical" philosophy.

Contemporary research into scientific knowledge and the relation between the empirical and theoretical in it have shown the principle of verification to be utterly untenable. As a result, neo-positivism has confined itself still more to the sphere of language. "Linguistic philosophy" has become the most widespread form of neo-positivism; it has proceeded to a "linguistic analysis" of everyday language to cure it of all "philosophical maladies".

Philosophical statements, linguistic analysts believe, are simply an inaccurate, arbitrary interpretation of the most ordinary statements. The task of this analysis was to achieve complete clarity in order to eliminate all philosophical problems. The linguistic analysts, dissociating language from reality, fail to see the social epistemological conditionality of philosophy, and as for their "linguistic analysis", it ultimately comes down to operations intended to specify the linguistic means of expression and language communication.

The social essence of neo-positivist philosophy is its bid to leave everything intact, to deny the possibility of a scientific world-view.

The subjective idealist philosophy of existentialism is a striking manifestation of irrationalism in philosophy affirming the senselessness and powerlessness of man's existence, the hopelessness of the historical process.

Existentialism, which arose in the 1920s, became widespread in Germany, France, Italy, Latin America and elsewhere. Its sources are the views of Søren Kierkegaard, a 19th-century Danish philosopher, who affirmed that a thinker must examine reality subjectively, that is, only as it was reflected by his individual existence and his emotional, primarily religious, life.

Later on, existentialism borrowed from the German philosopher Edmund Husserl the "phenomenological

method" based on intuition, and also drew on the irrationalism of Friedrich Nietzsche's "philosophy of life".

The initial principle of existentialism is the affirmation that existence precedes essence and that the investigation of being must begin with subjectivity.

Existentialism adds to subjective idealism, which combined denial of the objectivity of the surrounding world with belief in the knowability of the subject itself. According to the existentialists Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, the subject is inaccessible to rational cognition. It could not be cognised because existence (man's internal spiritual life) was strictly individual while rational knowledge required what was general; it could not be cognised also because existence was the subject itself and the subject could not look at itself "from without" in the same way as it looked at its objects in doing scientific research.

In dealing with important problems of human existence, existentialism completely rules out their objective, primarily social, significance. The mysteries of being cannot be separated from myself, from my personal decision, cannot become common property.

Existentialism opposes a religious idealist solution to a scientific solution of these problems. Marcel held that man constantly sensed the presence of divinity and therefore needed no other proof.

What the existentialists see as a further proof and confirmation of the irrationality of man's existence is that the "actual depths" of existence open before man, according to Jaspers, in special conditions, so-called border situations. These situations were suffering, death, fear, a mental disorder, and so on. It was only at such moments that man became spontaneously aware of his "real existence", his freedom, which in ordinary circumstances was hidden behind the "ordinariness", "unreality" of everyday life. This joint everyday life of people fully dissolved the real life of each individual in "someone else's" mode of being. The personality of man in society was depersonalised, effaced, dissolved in the ordinariness of the circumstances. This was typical of any society, and no social transformation could alter or end this impersonal, alienated existence.

The concept of "unreal existence" is proper to the whole of existentialism. Occasionally existentialism offers fairly profound characterisations of social life. It points

out, for instance, that property ("possession") is the source of the inhumanity of the world of private property. But existentialism sees the road to liberation from this bondage not in a social transformation of society, but in love and mercy, in "sacrifice", in religion, art and philosophy, that is, in pious wishes of a religious and idealist nature.

A vivid expression of bourgeois individualism, existentialism sees social relations as marked by conflict. Such relations united people only because they divided them. Jaspers considers that connection between people ("communication" as "life with others") is communication between solitary individuals. The relation of domination and subservience turns out to be the initial form of communication. In these circumstances, the desire for communication was inevitably accompanied by fear of it, by doubts about its possibility, and so on. While expressing the really contradictory and controversial character of social relations under capitalism, existentialism tries at the same time to camouflage them. It describes them as elements proper to "human existence" as such and hence indestructible. And it regards the antagonism born of an exploiting society as a universal attitude of man to man.

The problem of freedom holds an important place in existentialist philosophy, which sees in freedom an impulsive, emotional choice, an unconscious, instinctive act lacking an objective content. Sartre held that as the formation of man, which conditions his likely behaviour, remained a deep mystery, so did the ways of influencing man, of transforming his consciousness and behaviour as precisely a free man. In the final analysis the concept of freedom turns out to be a meaningless abstraction.

Man is said to be powerless in the face of "human existence", for it is both incomprehensible and beyond influence and transformation. While this drives the atheist existentialist to despair, the religious existentialist seeks salvation in religion.

Neo-Thomism, the most representative school of contemporary religious philosophy, proceeds from the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, the 13th-century Christian theologian and scholastic philosopher. Its more noted exponents include Martin Grabmann, Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Gustav Gundlach, Joseph Bohenski and Gustav Wetter.

Neo-Thomism may be divided into two currents: "palaeo-Thomism" ("strict Thomism") and Thomism

proper. The former tries to keep the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas intact, considering that his works contain solutions to all philosophical problems. The latter wants to "carry forward" Thomas Aquinas's thesis by borrowing certain ideas from the philosophy of modern times (especially Kant) or today (phenomenology, neo-positivism, and so on).

However, the main content of Thomism is religious propositions about the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, freedom of the will (the doctrine of the reality of the material world created by God, the doctrine of the supra-experimental, transcendental world, "rationalism", and so on); this content remains unchanged.

The Neo-Thomists try to substantiate religious belief theoretically, using to this end discoveries of natural science and falsifying them in an idealist spirit in the theory of "thermal death of the universe", the hypotheses about the "finiteness of the universe", the difficulty of a scientific explanation of life and mind, and so forth. This interpretation of scientific evidence comes from Neo-Thomist natural philosophy, which claims that all natural phenomena are made up of matter and form, with form determining matter. Natural objects situated themselves according to the degree of perfection of their forms on a hierarchical ladder on whose lowest rung were inorganic bodies, then organic plants and animals, and lastly man. In society too, there exist, as the Neo-Thomists see it, a secular and a church hierarchy, with a "heavenly hierarchy" higher up. The higher hierarchy was decisive and should therefore not be conceived in evolutionary terms, as something higher born of something lower.

Neo-Thomism tries to reconcile science and religion, alleging that they do not conflict, for they have a common divine origin.

Neo-Thomism declares "revelation", belief in God, to be the highest level of knowledge. None but revelation helped draw near cognising God. This was beyond sensuous or rational cognition. Either could and must defend faith, God. Neo-Thomism actively defends contemporary capitalism, showing an outspoken anti-communist trend.

Bourgeois pseudo-Marxism in philosophy finds expression in the concepts of the Frankfurt school developed in the 1930s by Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm and others and carried forward in the 1960s by Jürgen Habermas, Alfred Schmidt, Oscar Negt and others.

The Frankfurt school, which expresses the sentiments of the petty bourgeoisie, had a tangible impact on the "New Left" movement, "left extremism", "Left"-wing opportunism and revisionism. Adherents of this school, while using Marxist terminology, distort Marx's teachings. After beginning to criticise capitalism from abstract humanist positions, they moved to a pessimistic philosophy of history and from it, to a general negation and negativism, to a "leftist" type of political extremism. This evolution ended in complete disillusionment with the constructive potentialities of revolutionary action. The doctrine virtually serves to defend imperialist interests.

The trend upheld by the "new philosophers" is a further variety of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. It arose in France in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Its main exponents are Bernard-Henri Lévy, A. Glücksman, Jean-Marie Benoist, Maurice Clavel and some others. The basic aspects of their concept are: speculative attempts to unravel the contemporary world, especially the origin and essence of authority in general and state power in particular; deep historical pessimism; criticism of capitalism and socialism; outspoken anti-Marxism.

In spite of the multiplicity of bourgeois philosophical schools, they are all idealist and at one in combating Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Not one of the philosophical schools of present-day idealism, any more than all of them together, can really answer the questions which social development, the practice of class struggle and social revolution, and progress in science and technology have put to philosophy.

PART II

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

10. MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

The given topic is an introduction to the second part of the course of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

Unity of dialectical and historical materialism. Subject-matter of historical materialism. Historical materialism took shape in the mid-19th century. Its appearance, like that of entire Marxist philosophy, was caused by the sharpening class contradictions of capitalism and the emergence of the proletariat on the scene of class struggle, the class whose main goals accord with the development of social progress. (See F. Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*; *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*.)

The appearance of historical materialism was also prepared by the preceding development of sociology.

Pre-Marxist sociology was, however, incapable of evolving a true science of society or discovering the objective laws of the historical process. In his work *Karl Marx* Lenin pointed to the chief shortcomings of earlier historical theories:

"In the first place, the latter at best examined only the ideological motives in the historical activities of human beings, without investigating the origins of those motives, or ascertaining the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations, or seeing the roots of these relations in the degree of development reached by material production; in the second place, the earlier theories did not embrace the activities of the *masses* of the population."¹

Forming an inalienable part of Marxist-Leninist philo-

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 56.

sophy, historical materialism is organically linked with dialectical materialism and at the same time constitutes a relatively independent entity. The unity of dialectical and historical materialism is manifest in the fact that historical materialism exemplifies the application of the principles and laws of dialectical materialism to the development of society. For this reason, severed from dialectical materialism, historical materialism ceases to be a philosophical science. Marxist-Leninist philosophy cannot be recognised an integral and coherent science unless the dialectical materialist essence of the social form of motion of matter is laid bare. It is inadmissible either to isolate historical materialism or to dissolve it in dialectics. As a part of Marxism-Leninism, historical materialism has its own subject-matter, laws and categories.

Historical materialism is a science of the more general laws of social development and its motive forces, of the structure of society and its functioning, and of the inter-relationship between social being and social consciousness. Unlike other social sciences, historical materialism studies society as a single and integral system, with all of its aspects and elements taken in unity and interaction.

Materialist understanding of history—a revolution in sociological views. The materialist understanding of history evolved by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels and carried on by V.I. Lenin, which is the essence of historical materialism, marked a truly revolutionary change in sociological views. Lenin emphasised that the evolving of historical materialism was of paramount importance in the shaping of Marxist philosophy and that Marx and Engels paid prime importance to building the philosophy of materialism to the very top, "to the materialist conception of history" (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 329).

The development of the materialist conception of history and of scientific Marxist political economy together with the discovery of the law of surplus value made it possible to turn socialism from utopia into the science of the working people's class struggle and of the necessity of socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, into the science of the regularities of the development of communist society.

A preface to Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* briefly outlines the essence of the materialist conception of history and the most important

sociological laws and categories of historical materialism (see Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 21).

Historical materialism gives a consistent solution to the fundamental question of philosophy as applied to social life, the question of the relationship between social being and social consciousness. Marx expressed it in his maxim: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness."¹

Social being stands for the material life of society, first and foremost for the mode of production of the material benefits, and also for the relations that the people establish in the course of production. *Social consciousness* stands for the sum total of ideas, theories, views, feelings, moods, customs and traditions which reflect the nature and material life of society and the entire system of social relations.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism demonstrated that material production is decisive in the life of society. See in this connection Engels's *Anti-Dühring* (p. 316-317) and Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and *Karl Marx* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 325 and Vol. 21, pp. 54-61).

By treating the problem of the relationship between social being and social consciousness from the materialist point of view Marxism analysed scientifically the complicated system of social relations, which are divided into two groups—material and ideological.

Material relations are rooted in production, economic relations which are in the long run of decisive importance.

Ideological relations (political, legal, moral, aesthetic and religious) take shape on the basis of material relations and translate into practice certain ideas and views (of a class or society as a whole).

The *materialist understanding of history*, which presupposes the recognition of the *law-governed development of society*, finds the fullest possible expression in the doctrine of historical materialism on socio-economic formation.

Social life is governed by different laws, which can be classified according to the nature of their essence. There are *general sociological laws* operating throughout the

¹ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 21.

course of history, encompassing all socio-economic formations. They reflect continuity in history, the most general and essential things characteristic of all stages of social development. At the same time society is regulated by *specific laws* which reflect the qualitative peculiarities of a certain socio-economic formation.

Unlike natural laws that operate spontaneously, blindly and independently of man's consciousness and will, social laws are manifest only in the purposeful activity of people—classes, social groups and political parties.

Historical materialism was the first to interpret scientifically the importance of the objective conditions and of the subjective factor in social development. The *objective factor* covers the conditions that do not depend on the people's will and consciousness (for example, natural conditions, the attained level of the development of the productive forces and so on).

The *subjective factor* presupposes the activity of the mass of the people, classes, parties, states and individual personalities (their consciousness, will-power, the ability to act, etc.). In their activity people are compelled to take into account objective conditions.

It is not enough to have objective conditions for new things to triumph and for a possibility to turn into reality in social development: it is the revolutionary classes and society's progressive forces that are the motive force of historical progress. Whether pending social problems will be resolved depends on how profoundly classes understand historical laws, on the level of their consciousness and organisation, on their revolutionary drive and will.

The Marxist-Leninist conception of the dialectical relationship between the objective conditions and the subjective factor in history is opposite to both voluntarism and fatalism. People slide to voluntarism and adventurism in politics when they absolutise the role of consciousness and the will of the people (political parties and individuals) and ignore objective laws. On the contrary, fetishism of objective laws and conditions and the belittling of people's conscious activity breed fatalism and obeisance to spontaneity.

The dialectical relationship between the historical regularity and people's conscious activity is manifest in the categories of *necessity* and *freedom*. While recognising objective regularity and necessity in history, Marxism-

Leninism by no means denies certain freedom, initiative and conscious activity of the people but views freedom from the class position as a concrete historical category. The limits of human freedom are determined by the nature and historical possibilities of every stage in social development. Marxism is against both fetishism of historical laws and the concept of absolute freedom, offering instead a scientific interpretation of the relationship between necessity and freedom. (See on the problem F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Ch. XI; Part II, Ch. II; Part III; V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Ch. III, 6.)

The methodological role of historical materialism. Historical materialism is not only a general sociological theory but also a philosophical method. The need to study social phenomena in development, in the conflict of opposites and to analyse the motive forces and laws of the new replacing the old is the basic requirement imposed by the dialectical method in social studies. Dialectics calls for a comprehensive study of social phenomena and for revealing basic motive forces in external appearances. (See Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 390-394 and 454-456; V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, 1977, p. 146.)

The philosophical method of historical materialism is its theory applied to analysis of social reality. The methodological importance of historical materialism is most forcefully manifest in its relationship with other sciences, first and foremost special social sciences. The latter study separate aspects of social life or some of them taken as a certain totality, whereas historical materialism studies society as an integral whole, the interrelationship of its various aspects and the fundamental reasons for the transition from one socio-economic formation to another. It helps to evaluate correctly the achievements of social sciences, to reveal the process of their integration and to determine the significance of scientific methods, that is those of concrete sciences. At the same time Marxism is against absolutising individual methods and against any attempts to identify the laws of nature with those of society.

Historical materialism and special social sciences are organically interrelated, and any disregard for this fact dooms special sciences to futile attempts to reveal the essence of the development of social processes.

Historical materialism: party character and creative

nature. As a philosophical science of society, historical materialism is a party, class-based science.

Party character means the objectively regulated class character of the ideas, views and theories, which find expression in the activity and actions of social groups, political parties and individuals. Historical materialism openly proclaims itself an ideological, intellectual weapon used by the proletariat in its class struggle.

Party character finds its highest expression in the class position, that is to say, the interests of what class the given philosophy eventually reflects.

In historical materialism party character is organically linked with *scientific objectivity* because the interests of the proletariat coincide with the objective course of historical development, with the laws of history. To attain its class goal—to rebuild society on the basis of communist ideals, the working class is interested in the most adequate and precise reflection of the laws and tendencies of historical development.

The party character of historical materialism is distinguished by uncompromising *constant struggle against bourgeois sociology and all kinds of modern revisionism* and against any indifference towards hostile ideology.

The party character of historical materialism is inseparable from the *creative nature* of that science. Reflecting the objective course of history and revolutionary practice, historical materialism constantly develops and enriches itself. The creative approach to studying society is brilliantly illustrated by Lenin's development of the fundamental problems of historical materialism, namely, the interaction of the economy and politics, social being and social consciousness. Lenin creatively developed the theory of socialist revolution, questions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the building of socialism and others. Historical materialism constantly develops through summing up theoretically the vast experience of revolutionary struggle and the building of communism.

Like Marxism-Leninism as a whole, historical materialism is a philosophical doctrine, international in its essence, class goals and development tendencies. Its laws, categories and principles form a consistently scientific philosophical theory and a method of studying history, the revolutionary transformation of society and people's activity. This makes unacceptable any idea of some national style of Marxism

as well as any attempt to dissolve Marxist philosophy in some national aspects of its manifestation. Historical materialism is the philosophy of social optimism, the philosophy for our day and the years to come.

11. SOCIETY AND NATURE

Marxism views society functioning and developing in its organic unity with nature.

Relationship between the history of society and the history of nature. The recognition of the *organic unity between nature and society* is a basic principle of the materialist understanding of history. Contrasting society to nature and excluding the relation of man to nature from social history, Marx and Engels emphasised, is a favourable source of idealism. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, "The German Ideology", *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 55.)

To begin with, man and society are linked with nature by their origin. Society evolved out of nature as a result of its prolonged evolution. Labour and the production of material benefits had a decisive role to play in man's emergence in nature. The question was analysed by Engels in his work *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man*.

The appearance of society was a leap forward, a transition to the higher, social form of the motion of matter and at the same time it spelt the emergence of qualitatively new, social laws.

In studying the given problem one would do wrong to sever society from nature and would likewise err against science to identify naturalistically society with nature.

A product of nature, human society has to a certain extent isolated itself from it and acts as a new quality in the historical development of the objective world. The conclusion is that this connection between society and nature is the dialectical unity of the qualitatively different phenomena.

Natural environment and its role in social development. Though it has indeed emerged out of nature and has to a certain extent isolated itself from it, society nevertheless does not lose its links with nature. What is more, a *constant link between society and nature and their interaction are a*

prerequisite and an indispensable condition of the existence and development of society.

This link is ensured first and foremost through production which, taken in the most general form, was characterised by Marx as an exchange of matter between society and nature. In the course of production natural things and phenomena are transformed into things required for human needs to be satisfied.

This interaction between society and nature is important to man not only from the point of view of production but also from the point of view of his physical and moral health, aesthetics and science.

It should be borne in mind that mankind interacts only with that part of nature which is involved in its activity rather than with the entire infinite universe. The bulk of natural factors affecting the historical process changes with society's progress. In the present-day circumstances these include not only the earth's crust, atmosphere, topsoil, flora and fauna but also the mastered part of outer space.

The geographical environment can have both a favourable and unfavourable effect on social development. However, that effect is not decisive for the historical process and the radical changes taking place in it.

In this context it should be made clear that the so-called geopolitics as expounded by Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst) which justifies different forms of imperialist expansion is untenable from the scientific point of view.

Society's impact on nature in the present-day circumstances and its social problems. Society and nature interact with each other. Unlike animals which merely use nature and bring about changes simply by their presence in it, human beings by their purposeful changes make it serve their ends (see Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 179). The scientific and technological revolution of our day augments colossally the scale of society's impact on nature and poses a lot of new acute problems for mankind. For example, disregard for the consequences of the spontaneous utilisation of nature may cause real damage to the economy, people's health and their living conditions. Science faces the problem of studying and forecasting certain results of man's mastering nature and of planning and taking radical measures to neutralise the negative consequences of that mastering.

The main source of an impending ecological crisis

today is capitalism with its production geared to gain maximum profit, the rapacious exploitation of the natural resources, the militarisation of the economy and egotistical acquisitive mentality. It is therefore only natural that the working people in the capitalist countries are joining the mass movement in defence of the natural environment, the movement which is democratic and anti-monopolist by nature.

The truth is that in the present-day conditions the problem of the environmental protection and the rational utilisation of natural resources is rather acute under socialism, too. But the latter adopts an essentially different approach to its solution compared to the one used in the conditions of capitalist society. For instance, the Soviet Union puts into practice the ideas expounded by Lenin in his "Draft Plan of Scientific and Technological Work", in the Plan for Electrification of Russia, the first state long-term plan for the economic development of the Soviet Republic on the basis of electrification, and also his ideas on the systematic study and exploration of natural resources, and taking stock, conserving and developing the country's natural resources; the USSR has legally formalised a system of nature protection measures.

Justly rejecting Western futurologists' pessimism, the Marxists are at the same time aware of the urgent and poignant problems facing mankind, such as raw materials, energy, food, ecological and other problems. The cardinal solution of these problems is only possible along the lines of the communist restructuring of society. However, real opportunities exist today for progress in coping with these problems through international cooperation. International cooperation, joint scientific research and coordinated environmental protection measures are becoming ever more urgent in the present-day circumstances. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries actively participate in different intergovernmental programmes sponsored by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the United Nations and UNESCO. Much is being done in the same vein through bilateral agreements signed by the USSR with the US, France, Sweden and other countries.

Population growth as a key condition for the development of society. Population, that is, the community of people living in definite countries and on the earth as a whole, which is an indispensable component of all social

systems, an objective prerequisite and the subject of the historical process, is a necessary condition for the normal functioning and development of society. Population growth is not a factor determining the historical process but the density and structure of the population and its growth rates greatly affect the development of the productive forces and other social processes.

Karl Marx showed that each socio-economic formation is characterised by its own population growth laws. He discovered the operation of the demographic law in capitalist society. Works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism contain criticism of the Malthusian theory which explains demographic growth by purely biological laws and considers population growth the main cause of all social conflicts (see K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Ch. XXV and V.I. Lenin, *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book*, Ch. IV, and *The Working Class and Neomalthusianism*).

Today, when fast population growth on earth has become a fact, analysis of the demographic processes and their socio-economic consequences acquires exceptional importance. Marxism does not deny the possibility and even the need to pursue an active demographic policy under certain circumstances.

12. MATERIAL PRODUCTION AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Insight into the essence of the materialist conception of history inevitably presupposes analysis of the role played by material production in social life.

Constant material production as a condition of the existence of society. The mode of production of the material wealth. Marx and Engels were the first to introduce in sociology the concept of the *mode of production of the material wealth*, reflecting the existence of material production in concrete historical forms. Several modes of production—primitive communal, slave-owning, feudal and capitalist—have existed and succeeded one another ever since society came into existence. Nowadays the communist mode of production is coming to replace outgoing capitalism.

The mode of production of the material wealth exists

as a unity of its two components—the productive forces and production relations.

The elements of the productive forces are the means of production, first and foremost *instruments of labour* and also *people*, the makers of the material wealth. By constantly improving and developing instruments of labour, enriching his production experience and raising labour productivity, man functions as a creative element and the active subject of labour.

The productive forces reflect the people's relation to nature. Their development level—from primitive stone implements in ancient times to modern unique machines—demonstrates the degree to which man has mastered nature. The development of the productive forces means not only the improvement of implements of labour but also of the personality itself (its abilities, working skills and professional know-how).

When analysing the structure of the productive forces, it is also necessary to consider the *material and technical base of society* and technology as a certain social phenomenon (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Preface); *Capital* (Vol. I, Ch. VII, Section 1); Lenin's speeches at the First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education, May 6-19, 1919).

Production relations, which form the other element of the mode of production, are relations taking shape among people in the course of production, distribution and exchange. Production relations also include relations of ownership of the means of production, relations established among classes and social groups during production and also the forms and methods of distributing material benefits.

The main element of production relations is the *form of ownership* which determines different types and forms of production relations.

Dialectics of the development of the productive forces and production relations. The productive forces and production relations can be viewed separately only in the abstract. In practice they exist as two inseparably linked aspects of the single mode of production. Their inherent dialectical link finds expression in the *law of the correspondence of production relations to the nature and level of development of the productive forces*. It was formulated by Marx in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface.

When considering the dialectics of the productive forces and production relations attention should be drawn to the following points:

a) the productive forces and production relations act as a sort of the content and form of the mode of production. The productive forces cannot function nor develop outside their own socio-economic form—production relations, the latter being nothing but the mode of the organisation and functioning of production;

b) the productive forces are the more flexible, revolutionary element that has a decisive role to play in changing production relations;

c) in their turn production relations are relatively independent and active. Affording greater or smaller opportunities for the development of the productive forces, they either produce certain incentives for the development of production or become a hindrance to the development of the productive forces;

d) the interaction of the productive forces and production relations is controversial in nature. The incessant development of the productive forces periodically and of necessity causes a gap between them and some elements or other of production relations (and in the conditions of antagonistic societies, the very essence of production relations). Old production relations are replaced by new ones only with the help of a social revolution, which opens prospects for historical progress.

In studying the given problem it is necessary to pay attention to the law of the correspondence of production relations to the level and nature of the productive forces in the conditions of present-day capitalism, its worsening general crisis and the mounting scientific and technological revolution, and to show the historical doom of capitalist relations of production.

Under socialism production relations basically correspond to the level and nature of the development of the productive forces. The contradictions that arise within the mode of production under socialism are not antagonistic in nature, they are partial and resolvable.

Modern scientific and technological revolution. The scientific and technological revolution which started in the mid-twentieth century is essentially a radical turn in technology and technological processes through the application of the results of the scientific revolution. Its inalienable

part is a tangible change in the social function of science, its transformation into a direct productive force.

It is necessary to analyse the content of the scientific and technological revolution, namely, its basic characteristic processes, such as automation, the development of computer technology, the initial mastering of outer space, the utilisation of atomic and other promising types of energy and so on; to draw attention to the fact that the introduction of automation and computerised management radically changes man's place in the production process. Remaining the chief productive force, he turns from a direct agent of production into primarily a regulator of technological processes.

The scientific and technological revolution is worldwide by nature but in the conditions of opposite socioeconomic systems it acquires specific, qualitatively different features. While speeding up the development of the productive forces under capitalism, it at the same time exacerbates all the deeply rooted contradictions of capitalism, accelerating the capitalist system's movement towards the social revolution.

Under socialism the scientific and technological revolution is a powerful means of coping with the tasks of building communism, as it creates new opportunities to materialise the advantages of socialism.

As a factor revolutionising the modern historical process, the scientific and technological revolution eventually strengthens the positions of socialism and creates conditions for its victory throughout the world.

The basic sociological law of the decisive role of the mode of production of material benefits in social development. The essence of the law is that "the production of the immediate material means of subsistence and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which they must, therefore, be explained, instead of *vice versa*, as had hitherto been the case".¹ (See also K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface; F. Engels, *Anti-*

¹ Frederick Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, p. 162.

Dühring, Part III, Ch II.)

The discovery of that law made it possible to establish that at every stage of historical development society constitutes an integral organised system rather than a mechanical conglomeration of different phenomena. The mode of production of material benefits, which forms the material foundation of the socio-economic formation, acts as an integrative element.

It follows from the basic sociological law that key changes in society arise first and foremost in material production and are then reflected in the social, political and cultural life. Social history is above all the history of the succession of modes of production of material benefits.

The Marxist doctrine of society is monistic¹ (*Gk monos*—one, single), as it recognises that, despite the diversity and heterogeneity of its constituent processes, historical development has a single material foundation. Marxism resolutely opposes not only all forms of idealism in interpreting society (idealistic monism) but also the "theory of factors" which gained currency in bourgeois sociology in the second half of the nineteenth century and is now espoused by social reformist theoreticians and right-wing revisionists. It boils down to the denial of any single foundation of social development and the recognition of the mechanical interaction of numerous "equal" factors (the geographical environment, economy, morality, technology, culture, etc.). This theory was shown to be untenable from the scientific point of view in a letter written by Engels to W. Borgius on January 25, 1894 (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, pp. 502-504). It should be taken into account that the fact that Marxism recognises the decisive role of the mode of production in the historical process in no way means that the role and importance of other social factors, such as politics, ideology, culture and so on, is ignored or underestimated.

The law of the decisive role of the mode of production of material benefits in social history is of paramount importance for practical activity. The Marxist parties are guided by it in working out their programmes, shaping their policy and making one concrete decision or another.

¹ Monism, a philosophical theory maintaining that all being may ultimately be referred to one category.

13. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATIONS AS STAGES OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The concept of the socio-economic formation was first evolved by Marx and Engels and developed in Lenin's works and documents of Marxist-Leninist parties. It is one of the fundamental concepts of the materialist understanding of history.

The concept of the socio-economic formation. A socio-economic formation constitutes a certain stage in the development of society. Five formations are known—primitive communal, slave-owning, feudal, capitalist and communist.

Before Marx sociologists had no scientific criterion to divide history into its certain periods. Historical materialism takes as such criterion the type of production relations which are pivotal to the social structure, the type which in its turn is determined by the level of the productive forces attained (see V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 139-140).

The category of the socio-economic formation is closely linked with the concept of the *historical epoch*, which should be understood either as the transition from one formation to another or as a certain stage within one formation. For example, the capitalist formation has had the epoch of free competition and that of monopoly capitalism (imperialism). The landmark of the modern epoch is mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism and communism. To describe an epoch, Lenin wrote, it is important to know what class is in the centre, determining the main content, the main trend of development and the main features of the given historical situation. The formation stands for a stage of social history, while the epoch designates a certain period of history in which different formations can coexist.

The concept of the socio-economic formation is closely linked with the concept of the *way of life*, that is, the sum total of the forms of life of individuals, social groups, classes or society as a whole in the conditions of a given socio-economic formation. The way of life is to a large extent determined by the existing type of production relations. For instance, the capitalist formation is characterised by the bourgeois way of life, while socialism by the socialist way of life, whose main features are collectivism, the unity and friendship of all nations and nationalities. It should

be borne in mind that the way of life of opposite classes is qualitatively different in antagonistic class formations.

The structure of the socio-economic formation. Each formation is characterised by its own type of production relations which form the *basis* of society underlying the *superstructure* in the form of political, legal, artistic, moral, religious and other ideas and corresponding institutions. Besides, the superstructure comprises diverse ideological relations.

The special role of production relations accounts for the fact that the *basis determines the superstructure*. Political, legal, moral, artistic and other ideas and institutions corresponding to them are determined by existing economic relations.

Nevertheless the superstructure is relatively independent and actively influences its basis. This finds expression in the fact that continuity has an important role to play in the development of the superstructure, as is exemplified by artistic and philosophical ideas. Dialectical negation presupposes continuity, the retention by the new of the positive aspects of the old. Different elements of the superstructure are differently connected with the basis. Political and legal ideas and institutions are the closest to it. Other elements of the superstructure, such as philosophy, art and religion, are considerably influenced by political ideology. Last but not least, the superstructure actively influences the basis, which is its major social purpose.

Regularities of the development of formations. Why formations succeed one another is explained by Marx in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Preface), Engels in *Anti-Dühring* (Part III, Ch. II), and Lenin in *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats and Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Formations replaced one another because the productive forces developed and their qualitatively new level called for a new type of production relations. By discovering the law of the correspondence of production relations to the nature and level of development of the productive forces, Marx formulated the *economic causes for the succession of formations*. These causes in their turn determine the decisive role played by the mode of production in social life.

All the past antagonistic formations originated within the preceding formations, for example, capitalism within feudalism. The singularity of the communist formation consists in the fact that, being based on the public ownership of the means of production, it cannot take shape within capitalism. The latter merely creates prerequisites for the material and technical base of socialism, primarily in the form of large-scale industry and production socialised by capital.

When analysing the succession of formations, attention should be drawn to the fact that history has so far produced no sample of a "pure" formation, as all of them contained different socio-economic structures, some of which were inherited from the previous formation, while others were the rudiments of the new one. "There are *no* 'pure' phenomena," Lenin wrote, "nor can there be, either in Nature or in society... There is no 'pure' capitalism in the world, nor can there be; what we always find is *admixtures* either of feudalism, philistinism, or of something else."¹

It is necessary to distinguish between the *general* and *specific laws of formations*. For all the qualitative differences between some stages of historical development and others, there are laws common to all of them. They are responsible for the unity and integrity of social life and the continuity of its qualitatively different stages. Among these laws are those of the priority of social being and the secondary nature of social consciousness and also of the decisive role of the mode of production in social life. At the same time there are laws characteristic of only one particular formation or a number of them. For instance, the laws of class struggle are characteristic only of those formations whose economic foundation is the private ownership of the means of production.

Special emphasis should be laid on the problem of the communist formation, the doctrine of which was comprehensively evolved by the classics of Marxism-Leninism. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*; K. Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*; F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part III; V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, Ch. V.)

Socialism and communism are two stages of the communist formation. The road to communist society is only

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 236.

through the all-round perfection of socialist society already built.

The methodological importance of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the formation. It is necessary to proceed from Lenin's assessment that Marx put an end to the interpretation of society as a mechanical aggregate of individuals, which comes into being and changes by accident (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 142, 410.)

The concept of the socio-economic formation conveys the unity of the historical process in all its variety. Historical unity is in great measure determined by the very logic of the productive forces, whose qualitatively different stages are dialectically interrelated. It is manifest also in the continuity of science, culture, art and other social phenomena. The multiformity of the historical process is largely connected with the succession of production relations which determine all other social ties. This is a manifestation of the dialectics of the unity and multiformity of the historical process.

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the socio-economic formation made it possible to compare the consecutive stages of social development and to determine its progressive nature, with the socio-economic formations acting as steps of historical progress.

14. SOCIAL STRUCTURE. CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS

The given topic focusses on the most important aspect of the structure of social relations. It is impossible to reveal the motive forces of social development without analysing classes and relations among them.

The concept of social structure. Classes and class relations. Social structure stands for the sum total of stable communities of people formed in the course of history (classes, nationalities, nations, trade associations, etc.) and the system of their regular links and relationships.

Social structure is determined by the mode of production of material benefits and every socio-economic formation has its own social structure. This thesis is of fundamental importance for understanding the qualitative difference between the capitalist social structure and the socialist one and for exposing bourgeois falsifications of the type of the theory of "single industrial society", the "convergence

theory" and so on.

In antagonistic formations *classes* and *relations between them* form an important element of social structure. Constituting the most radical social differences, they penetrate all the other spheres of social life.

Classes have economic, social, psychological and other characteristics. The former are the chief of them and include the place occupied by a particular class in a historically determined system of social production; relation to the means of production; the role played in the social organisation of labour; and the size and ways of getting a particular share of public wealth. The main class-forming characteristic is the people's different relation to the ownership of the means of production (V. I. Lenin, *A Great Beginning*).

Lenin's definition of classes prompts important revolutionary conclusions. If classes are distinguished above all by their different relation to the ownership of the means of production, then to abolish classes, it is necessary to eliminate private ownership and to place all people in an equal relation to the means of production. For this reason the socialist public ownership of the means of production is the economic foundation of socialism.

The origin of classes is analysed in detail by Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* and *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. After showing that the emergence of classes depends on the development of material production, that is, on purely economic factors, Engels analysed the process of class formation proceeding from the materialist understanding of history.

Classes came into being during the disintegration of the primitive communal system. Students of the topic should know the specifics of class structures and class relations in different socio-economic formations, in other words, to be able to distinguish between the main and secondary classes, social groups, estates, castes, and also to observe certain social heterogeneity of classes themselves.

The Marxist doctrine of classes and class differentiation of society is disputed by today's bourgeois sociologists with the help of the theory of "social stratification" and "social mobility" (which is also supported today by many social reformist and right-wing revisionist theoreticians). Criticism of that theory should centre on its scientific untenability, its apologetic and anti-Marxist nature.

The appearance of classes entails the emergence of social *class relations*, among which we should differentiate economic, political and ideological relations. By their nature relations between classes can be those of cooperation, alliance or class struggle.

Class struggle is the motive force of the historical development of the antagonistic formations. Marxism was the first to give a scientific explanation of the causes and sources of class struggle and to prove that it is natural and unavoidable at certain states of social development.

Of paramount importance in understanding the basic causes of class antagonisms is the *category of interest*, which sheds light on the mechanism of operation of the objective laws and the incentives of people's historical activity. Among all sorts of interests *class interests* have the prime role to play in class society. They may be basic or secondary, longstanding or fleeting, ultimate or immediate, economic, political and so on.

Irreconcilable fundamental interests of the propertied classes and the have-nots are a source of struggle between them. When a class becomes aware of its interests it gets an incentive for historical activity, turning from "a class in itself" into "a class for itself".

Class interests are upheld by *parties*. Marxist, communist and workers' parties defend the vital interests of the working class and in the final analysis of all the working people. To understand the role played by the party in the proletariat's class struggle, we recommend students to read K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*

Marxism has proven scientifically that *class struggle* is the *motive force of social development of the antagonistic socio-economic formations*, the only means of resolving the pending tasks of social development. Social revolution is the pinnacle of class struggle through which the outdated socio-economic formation is replaced by a new and more progressive one.

When studying the basic forms of the proletariat's class struggle against the bourgeoisie (economic, political and ideological), it is necessary to see their interrelationship and to stress the prime importance of political struggle because it results in coming to political power and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political*

Economy (Preface); K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*; V. I. Lenin, *Karl Marx; Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle*).

To see *class struggle in our epoch* in the right perspective, we should take into account the real changes that have taken place in the world as a whole and also in capitalist society, its social structure and the alignment of the combatant forces. It is necessary to analyse the world revolutionary process as a whole and to take into account the worsening of all the contradictions characteristic of capitalism and the emergence of new ones and the revolutionising influence of the successes of the world socialist system.

The paramount characteristics of present-day class struggle in the capitalist countries are its general and large-scale nature, fruitfulness, closely intertwining economic and political forms of struggle, the combination of struggle for democracy with that for socialism, the involvement of broad non-proletarian masses in revolutionary struggle, etc.

In the countries which are still fighting for or have won their national independence class struggle is combined with the struggle for national independence. Different classes can form a single front in their national liberation struggle against imperialism, the struggle democratic by nature. Nevertheless only the working class is the most consistent champion of fully implementing the tasks of the national liberation, anti-imperialist and democratic revolution.

When studying the given problem, it is necessary to animadvert upon the bourgeois opportunistic theories of class struggle "slackening" in the present-day circumstances (the theories of "social partnership", "human relations" and so on), to show the bankruptcy and political harm of leftist slogans, namely, their negative attitude to democratic movements, rejection of the economic form of struggle, advocacy of a spontaneous rebellion, etc.

It is important to be aware of the fact that both right-wing and "leftist" opportunists are seeking today to belittle the vanguard role of the working class and to replace it in this role by other social forces, such as the intelligentsia, the peasants, the students and even *déclassé* elements.

Special attention should be paid to the problem of the *present-day relationship between class struggle and the peaceful coexistence* of states with different social systems. Peaceful coexistence should be understood as a special form

of the proletariat's class struggle against the bourgeoisie on the world scene characteristic of the present-day period.

The historical prospect of building a classless communist society. Classes and class relations are historically transient social phenomena. Complete social homogeneity and the elimination of all class distinctions can only be ensured by the eventual building of communism.

Nevertheless already while perfecting existing socialist society—during the stage of developed socialism—a tangible step forward towards a classless society is made through the active drawing closer together of friendly classes and social groups and the eradication of essential differences among them. The process centres on the building of the material and technical base of socialism, the perfection of the entire system of social relations and the all-out development of the scientific and technological revolution. The process of eradicating class distinctions is not spontaneous: it is organised and guided by the ruling communist party.

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class relations is of great methodological importance. It prompts the conclusion about the *need to analyse social phenomena in class society from class positions*. To understand and assess correctly one social phenomenon or another in class society, it is necessary to reveal its class content, the class interests behind it (who stands to gain) and the place occupied by the given phenomenon in class struggle, and to analyse what changes in the alignment of class forces the given phenomenon would cause in its development. Class approach in understanding and assessing social phenomena in no way contradicts scientific objectivity but, on the contrary, is its indispensable prerequisite.

Class approach to all factors and phenomena of social life for the Marxists means viewing them from the positions of the working class.

15. HISTORICAL FORMS OF HUMAN COMMUNITY

Every socio-economic formation is characterised by a certain historical form of human community, which embodies a concrete system of social relations and a certain form of historical social development.

The concept of the historical forms of human community denotes stable historically formed associations of people

whose interrelationships are determined, first and foremost, by the objective conditions of their existence and development. People are brought into these groups primarily by more or less similar conditions of their material life, including the natural environment, and the resultant uniformity of social links, language communication, forms of family and culture. These forms of community are the clan, tribe, nationality, nation and internationalist socialist communities arising in the present-day period. The *historical forms of community* are groups of people that come into existence objectively and independently of consciousness and that are characterised by some basically uniform forms of life.

By determining the nature of society as an integral social organism, the mode of production of material goods also affects in a decisive manner the historical forms of community. The level of development of the productive forces determines the shaping of the corresponding economic links among people and of a certain way of material life. On its basis certain historically expedient social forms of communication and culture take shape, in other words, one historical community or another comes into being (see F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Chs. III-V; V. I. Lenin, *What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*). In class social systems historical communities are not socially homogeneous: they comprise different classes, which determines the nature and regularities of the development of those communities.

While stressing the fundamental importance of the mode of production of material goods in the emergence and development of communities, historical materialism also takes into account the influence of other phenomena on the process, among them language communication, common elements of culture and emergent group self-consciousness.

Precapitalist forms of community. The clan and the tribe are the most ancient forms of community of people. The *clan* came into existence along with the evolution of man. The *tribe*, an association of several clans, appeared later. The material basis of the clan-tribal organisation of life was a primitive form of production characterised by the joint ownership of the implements of labour, dwellings and consumer goods. Because of the extremely low level of the development of the productive forces social

links within tribes were underdeveloped. Survivals of the clan-tribal system exist to this day in some countries as a result of the unevenness of the historical process.

The clan-tribal form of people's association was replaced by *nationality*. Nationalities are much greater communities of people than the clan or the tribe and are characteristic above all of the precapitalist class formations. Nationality has the following essential features: poorly developed economic ties among its members, transition from clannish ties to people's association on the basis of common territory, consanguineous ties playing an insignificant role or losing it altogether; a common language; the ousting of ancient religious beliefs by world religions that sanctified and strengthened the division of society into classes; spontaneously emerging ethnic self-consciousness (people's awareness of their belonging to a nationality plus certain customs). In different regions of the globe nationalities formed in different historical periods. As a historical community, nationality is to be found in many countries to this day. The present-day period knows of the existence of *capitalist nationalities* (for example, the US Blacks) and *socialist nationalities* (in socialist countries).

Nations and national relations under capitalism and socialism. Compared to nationality, the *nation* is a more developed historical form of community of people. The nation is a complicated social organism based on the unity of objective and subjective factors, socio-economic and ethnic traits (connected with the influence of the geographical environment, common origin and prolonged living together). The social aspect is pivotal in the nation, while the ethnic one plays a subordinate role. A characteristic method of bourgeois ideologists is to overemphasise the ethnic aspect to the detriment of the social one in describing nations.

Nations come into being in a natural fashion, being an inevitable product, an inevitable form, in the bourgeois epoch of social development (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 72); as the socio-economic system changes, the nation changes its essence and is bound to wither away under communism.

Economic factors play a decisive role in the shaping and development of nations. Marx and Engels pointed out in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* that the capitalist mode of production did away with the scattered state of the means of production, property and population. It agglome-

rated population, centralised means of production, and concentrated property in a few hands. That led to political centralisation (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 488).

Political organisation of society is a key factor of the emergence and development of nations.

As a community of people, the nation is inseparable from classes. With this in mind Lenin wrote of two nations within one nation (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 32). Many bourgeois theories ignore the class character of the structure of the nation.

The development of nations is largely affected by the peculiarities of culture, national consciousness and national socio-psychological traits which are paramount aspects of the national community of people.

To sum up, the *nation* is a stable historical community of people formed on the basis of common economic life complemented by a common territory, language, cultural characteristics, consciousness and psychological make-up.

The class nature and concrete historical character of nations are most forcefully manifested in the existence of *two types of nations in the present-day period—capitalist and socialist*—which have opposite socio-economic foundations, class structure, political system and cultural make-up.

National relations are contacts within a nation reflecting the relative unity of a nation, its existence as a whole; contacts among nations and nationalities, national and ethnic groups. National relations take shape and develop along with the emergence of nations. The higher the level of development of a nation the richer and more varied national relations. In its turn the development of national relations spells progress of a nation.

National relations reveal the class nature of the nation. *Capitalist nations* which are dominated by the bourgeoisie are characterised by the antagonistic relations of domination and subjection. In the conditions of imperialism their hallmark is growing national enmity, racial hatred and oppression of some nations and nationalities by others. These relations engender the ideology of bourgeois nationalism. The essence of national relations of the capitalist type finds expression in the *national question*, the question of national self-assertion, the elimination of national oppression and inequality and of free national development. The national question arises with the emergence of a nation

under capitalism and can only be resolved on the basis of socialism which brings to naught hostile relations within and among nations and establishes the relations of socialist internationalism.

Socialist nations are formed on the basis of economic relations of cooperation and mutual assistance among friendly working classes and social groups that have common vital interests and that are united by socialist internationalism.

The fundamental difference between the capitalist and socialist nations is expressed in the distinctive world laws of national development.

The world law of the development of nations under capitalism was formulated by Lenin and consists in the unity of two interrelated and antagonistic tendencies of social development. One of them—the awakening and shaping of nations and national relations, struggle against national oppression and for the establishment of national states—is represented by the ideology of bourgeois nationalism. The other is manifest in the establishment of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, culture, science and so on (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27). The given tendency means the internationalisation of social development in the capitalist form. It forges ahead through the expansion of the sway of the more powerful capitalist nations over backward or developing ones. However, in effect internationalisation “is one of the greatest driving forces transforming capitalism into socialism” (ibid., p. 28).

In our time the aforementioned historical tendencies in national development operate simultaneously rather than separately. National liberation of peoples is now impossible without their joint struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Socialist society is characterised by its own law of the development of nations and national relations, which is also represented by two tendencies, though qualitatively different in content and form, namely, 1) the rebirth of nations and nationalities and their free development through the emergence and development of national states, new economies, national cultures and social consciousness socialist in content, and 2) the drawing closer together of nations and nationalities on the basis of socialist internationalism,

leading to the full equality of nations, stronger friendship among them and, eventually, to the gradual obliteration of national differences and the merging of nations into a single communist people.

16. POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SOCIETY

The following basic problems should be singled out in the given topic.

The concept, structure and the laws of development of the political system of society. The concept *political system of society* covers a system of special institutes, organisations, unions and establishments which regulate the sum total of socio-political relations of a given society.

The structure of the political system of society comprises the state, political parties, social organisations, all sorts of unions and societies. Some of the aforementioned organisations and establishments have a pronouncedly political nature, while in others it is less noticeable. The former include the state with all its attributes, political parties, workers' trade unions, peasant unions, youth organisations, etc. They play the central role in the entire system of political organisation. As for other elements, such as creative workers' organisations (unions of artists, composers, writers and so on), cultural, sports and other societies and organisations, they retain their class nature, even though they are not patently political.

The political system comes into being when society splits into classes and, depending on the nature of class relations, it can be antagonistic (in antagonistic formations) or non-antagonistic (under socialism). The political system of society forms part of the superstructure and for this reason the development of the political organisation is determined by the laws of the development of superstructure. At the same time it reflects changes in the basis quicker than other elements of the superstructure and any change in it affects considerably the functioning of other parts of the superstructure: it creates certain conditions for the activity of classes and their organisations.

The main function of the political system is to mobilise society's forces and resources to meet the aims and interests of the ruling class. For this purpose it has a special mechanism, apparatus, the body of coercion as represented

by the state. The *state* is therefore the main element of the political system of society.

Characteristic peculiarities of the political system of present-day bourgeois society. Possessing a complicated and controversial structure, it includes the system of state (the state apparatus) and non-state (political parties, unions and associations, all sorts of societies) organisations of the ruling classes and also organisations and establishments of the oppressed classes. The organisations and establishments of the ruling classes have a dominant role to play in it.

The present-day bourgeois state is characterised by a narrowing social base because it primarily serves monopoly capital today; an active shift towards reaction along all lines accompanied by the degeneration of political institutes, subversion and emasculation of bourgeois legality; and the desire to maintain the capitalist mode of production, to mitigate the innate evils of capitalism, to use the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution in the interests of monopolies, to suppress the working people's struggle, to weaken the world socialist system and to contain the world revolutionary process and the national liberation movement.

When describing the political system of imperialism, it is important to show the class nature and limitations of bourgeois democracy, to reveal the essence of its crisis, which is manifest in the monopoly bourgeoisie's increasing renunciation of democracy and its replacement by dictatorship and methods of fascistic rule and in the growing influence of the military-industrial complex on state policy.

The dictatorship of the proletariat as the state of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Justifying the historical inevitability for the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin pointed out that it was necessary to suppress the opposition of the overthrown exploiting classes, to consolidate the alliance of the working class with the mass of the working people and the non-proletarian strata of the population and to guide them, and to organise the people to build a socialist society (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 185-186).

The supreme principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, with the former playing the guiding role. Lenin wrote about that in his works *The State and Revolution*, *A Great*

Beginning, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky. The dictatorship of the proletariat can exist in various forms (the Paris Commune, the Soviets, people's democracy), which depend on the peculiarities of the country's historical development, the alignment of class forces and the poignancy of their confrontation. All the diverse forms, however, have the same essence—the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, far from excluding, on the contrary, presupposes democracy; the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a qualitatively new type of democracy, democracy for the working people. The main thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat is not violence but construction, the building of a social organisation of a higher type (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 298-307; Vol. 29, pp. 372-373 and p. 419). In practice this finds expression in the economic, organisational, cultural and educational functions of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The socialist state develops with the development of new society, which is borne out by the emergence of the socialist state of the entire people out of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The political system of socialist society is not merely a sum total of certain establishments. First and foremost, it is a system of political relations, that is, social relations among classes, social groups and nations (with regard to the organisation and application of state power). It is precisely these relations that are manifest in the nature of the operation of the organisations and establishments that form the content of the political system and run the affairs of society.

The ruling communist party forms the core of the political system of socialist society.

In the course of perfecting socialist society—at the stage of developed socialism—its political system has a general national character, as by that time the socialist state has grown into the state of the entire people representing the will and interests of the workers, the peasants, and the intelligentsia, i.e., the working people of all nations and nationalities. While remaining the party of the working class, the communist party becomes the vanguard of the entire people. Mass public organisations and voluntary associations of the working people develop extensively, and their role and activity in tackling all the tasks of building communism become

bigger and more varied. The working class continues to be the leading social force, with all the other social strata and groups of the working people adopting its positions and ideology. The entire activity of the political system is carried out in keeping with the principle of democratic centralism, which makes it possible to combine to the utmost extent a single leadership with local initiative and creative activity.

17. SOCIAL REVOLUTION

The Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution shows the historical process as the law-governed development of society in which transition from one class socio-economic formation to another indispensably occurs through social revolution.

Social revolution as the law of transition from a lower socio-economic formation to a higher one. "Revolution is a profound, difficult and complex science..."¹ with class, national and inter-state contradictions intertwining in it. The alignment of class forces changes in the course of a revolution more than once.

Social revolution is a qualitative leap in the development of society resulting in the replacement of one class socio-economic formation by a higher one. Social revolution radically changes the entire social system—the mode of production, social structure and the spiritual life of society (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, 1973, p. 110).

In a narrower sense of the word the concept of "social revolution" means transition of power from a reactionary class to a more progressive one. This phenomenon is usually referred to as "*political revolution*". The concepts "social" and "political" revolution are interrelated but not identical. The scale of transformations carried out by social revolution is much broader than the gaining of political power by a new class.

The chief, fundamental indicator of any social revolution, its *chief question* is that of coming to power in the state. It determines the entire development of the revolution, its domestic and foreign policy (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, 1977, p. 370; Vol. 24, 1980, pp. 38, 48-49).

Social revolution is a historically natural and inevitable

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, 1977, p. 198.

phenomenon caused by the objective needs of social development to resolve pending contradictions. The main cause, the *economic basis of the social revolution* is the conflict between the productive forces and obsolete production relations which put a brake on the development of the productive forces and on social progress. Certain classes stand behind production relations and for this reason the conflict between the two sides of production is embodied in class contradictions and class struggle (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 21).

The *nature of social revolution* is determined by the economic and political tasks it implements, the contradictions it resolves and the social system it establishes.

The *motive forces of revolution* are those revolutionary classes which overcome through fighting the opposition of the ruling classes and promote the revolution.

Objective conditions and subjective factors of social revolution. A revolution can be victorious only when the necessary *objective conditions* and *subjective factors* have matured. The *objective conditions of a revolution* include economic and socio-political prerequisites, which take shape independently of the will of the people or political parties. Lenin worked out the concept of the *revolutionary situation* (the sum total of objective socio-political conditions). The concept has three major characteristics:

first, the suffering and want of the oppressed classes grow more than usual;

second, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses unwilling to reconcile themselves to enslavement and deprivation of political rights;

third, there is a crisis among the "upper classes", a crisis of the policy of the ruling class which is unable to maintain its rule using old methods (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 213-214; Vol. 31, pp. 84-85).

The *subjective factor* is the readiness of the revolutionary class to take resolute mass actions to destroy the old state machine (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 85). The subjective factor of a revolution means the organisation and discipline of the revolutionary forces, their consciousness and ideological equipment, lofty moral qualities, such as resolve and staunchness in struggle, revolutionary zeal and fervor; the allies' readiness to follow their vanguard and the neutralisation of the hesitant ones.

With the emergence of the proletariat on the scene of class struggle the role of the subjective factor in revolution grows because today's capitalism is objectively ready for a socialist revolution.

An important element of the subjective factor is the existence of a Marxist-Leninist party. The latter should be equipped with a scientific theory, be disciplined and organised, maintain close contact with the masses and pursue consistent internationalist policy.

To be able to spot a revolutionary crisis and to choose the right moment to deal a blow at the ruling class calls for great skill in politics and in class struggle. Any disregard for the requirements of the fundamental law of the revolution leads to adventurism in politics and a possible defeat of the revolutionary forces.

Socialist revolution as the highest type of social revolution. By its class content and historical mission socialist revolution radically differs from all the preceding revolutions. In the past all revolutions were limited in their economic and social results: they merely replaced one form of private property by another. Socialist revolution abolishes all private ownership of the means of production and establishes new, public property, putting an end to any exploitation and any form of social or national oppression.

In the past revolutions usually began when new economic relations took shape within old societies. With the transfer of power into the hands of a new class revolutions ended. Socialist revolution begins with the seizure of political power and comes to an end with the building of the socialist economic basis. It transforms dramatically the economic and political life of society, its ideology and culture. "New incredibly difficult tasks," Lenin wrote, "organisational tasks, are added to the tasks of destruction."¹

Classics of Marxism-Leninism scientifically substantiated in their works the theory of the socialist revolution (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*; K. Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*; *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*; F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*; V. I. Lenin, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*; *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*; *The State and Revolution*; "Left-Wing" Communism—an

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 89.

Infantile Disorder; "Our Revolution", etc.).

Marx and Engels scientifically substantiated the historical inevitability of the transition from capitalism to socialism. They showed capitalism's emergence, maturing, development and impending demise, revealed the great historical mission of the proletariat and justified the need for breaking the bourgeois state machine and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Marxist theory of socialist revolution was further developed creatively by Lenin. After analysing the laws of imperialism and the characteristics of the revolutionary process, he evolved the doctrine of the hegemony of the proletariat and the theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into the socialist revolution. Lenin came to the conclusion of the possibility for socialism to win first in some and even one, individual country and the impossibility of socialism winning simultaneously in all countries (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, 1977, p. 78).

One of the complicated problems of the theory and practice of the revolutionary process is the *relationship between reform and revolution*. The Marxists view reforms as a means of preparing for a revolution and subordinate struggle for reforms, as a part to the whole, to the revolutionary struggle for freedom and socialism (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, 1977, pp. 405-406).

A natural consequence of social development, class struggle in the period of imperialism was the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917—the main event of the 20th century. It ushered in a new epoch, that of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism. The historic importance of the October 1917 revolution is discussed by Lenin in his "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.

The historical experience of the revolutionary movement confirms that there exist *two main ways of gaining victory in a socialist revolution—by peaceful means and by resorting to violence*. The classics of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly pointed out that it is more preferable for the proletariat and the working masses to carry through a victorious revolution by peaceful means (see F. Engels, "Principles of Communism", in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 350; "Record of Marx's Interview with *The World Correspondent*", *ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 602; "Record of Marx's Speech on the Political Action of the

Working Class", *ibid.*, p. 618). "...Violence is, of course," Lenin wrote, "alien to our ideals".¹ At the same time, while stressing the exceptional value of developing a revolution by peaceful means, Lenin pointed out that that was "an opportunity that is *extremely rare*".²

The relationship between the peaceful and non-peaceful development of the revolution is relative by nature. The peaceful development, far from excluding, on the contrary, presupposes the use of violent means, social coercion towards the forces of counter-revolution. Peaceful development means not class collaboration but the exclusion of certain forms of coercion, such as armed uprising or civil war. The choice of the means of carrying out the revolution depends on the alignment of class forces in the country and on the international scene, the strength of the opposition mounted by the ruling class, economic and cultural development level and revolutionary traditions.

Lenin constantly drew attention not only to the diverse forms of struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat but also to their dialectical flexibility. This means that the working class and its party should be able to use all forms of struggle (peaceful and non-peaceful, parliamentary and non-parliamentary) and be ready to shift from one form of struggle to another quickly and unexpectedly (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 96).

The essence of the present-day world revolutionary process, the laws of its development. The world socialist system is the centre of the world revolutionary movement and the decisive force in anti-imperialist struggle. The progress made by socialism in developing the economy, science, technology, culture, democracy, human rights and freedoms accelerates the revolutionary process. The socialist countries give internationalist aid to the progressive liberation movements and resolutely come out in defence of peace.

An important component of the world revolutionary process is the *struggle waged by the working class in the developed capitalist countries.*

The *national liberation movement* forms an inalienable part of the development of the present-day revolutionary process. It acts as a natural ally of world socialism in the

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, pp: 310-311.

struggle against imperialism. Struggle for social emancipation is a qualitatively new stage in its development when national liberation struggle in fact transforms into struggle against exploiter relations.

Mass democratic movements also form an important part of the world revolutionary process.

The socialist countries side with the forces of progress, democracy and national independence and resolutely support the young states' determination to free themselves completely from imperialist exploitation and to be the masters of their own national wealth.

Today's right-wing revisionists deny the existence of any general laws of the revolution and absolutise national peculiarities by setting forth different "models of socialism" which envisage the renunciation of the leading role of the working class and the Marxist party. Right-wing revisionists have subscribed to the assertion by bourgeois sociologists that the scientific and technological revolution supplants social revolution.

The communist and workers' parties are guided in their struggle by the *general laws of the development of the revolution and of building socialism and communism*, which determine the main ways and means of building a new society, and oppose any absolutisation of or contrasting to each other of general laws and specific conditions or peculiarities of the revolution.

18. SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS STRUCTURE. FORMS OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Analysis of the problems of social consciousness makes it possible to explain the causes of the emergence and the laws of development of society's spiritual life, to show its role and to carry out purposeful ideological work to nurture communist social consciousness.

Social consciousness as the reflection of social being. The structure of social consciousness. Social consciousness includes feelings, volition, concepts, ideals, interests, views and theories which of necessity appear among big social groups of people at a certain historical period. From the point of view of its content social consciousness is an ideal reflection by the mind of social being, first and foremost of

the material conditions of the life of the people.¹

Social consciousness has complicated structure: it consists of different *forms* and *levels*, which are interrelated and interact with each other. Among the different *forms* of *social consciousness* is political, legal, moral, aesthetic, religious and philosophical consciousness. In actual social consciousness, however, these are amalgamated because social groups of people reflect social phenomena in an integral form.

Social consciousness and all its forms exist at different *levels*, namely, *ordinary, everyday consciousness* (social psychology and empirical knowledge) and *theoretical consciousness* (ideology and scientific knowledge). These also form one whole: social groups possess simultaneously both ordinary and theoretical consciousness.

Social psychology includes different (political, moral and other) sentiments, feelings, moods, ideals and interests of the people in which their needs are manifested. Recognised needs—interests—become mental stimuli for practical activity.

Empirical views refer to the everyday, ordinary understanding by the people of various social phenomena, for example, ownership, classes, etc.

Theoretical consciousness stands for ideology and scientific knowledge of theory. Ideology incorporates philosophy (fundamental to the whole of ideology), political economy, sociology, political science, goals and tasks of parties, ethics, aesthetics and so on. *As a whole, ideology* is an expression in theory of the vital interests of classes, their parties, states and nations. For this reason ideology acts as self-consciousness of a class or a nation. Ideology emerges and exists only in class society and has class and historical nature.

Ordinary consciousness, as a rule, takes shape spontaneously, whereas ideology is evolved consciously and purposefully. However, ordinary consciousness, especially social psychology, influences ideology: when laying bare vital class interests and justifying them theoretically, ideologists (the more experienced and loyal representatives of a class) take into account changes in the class position and interests, which results in the development of ideology. On the other hand,

¹ Distinction should be drawn between social consciousness and society's spiritual life. The latter incorporates all mental processes connected with perception, cognition and activity aiming at transforming nature and society.

ideology affects ordinary consciousness (through agitation, propaganda and so on) and elevates class consciousness to the level of theory. Social consciousness is the product of the spiritual activity of the people, who have individual consciousness, and does not exist outside or independently of the latter. Furthermore, ideology, scientific theories first emerge and take shape in individual consciousness (of ideologists and scientists) and then are made available to society. Through upbringing, education, communication and the mass media social consciousness influences man's individual consciousness and enriches it. In class society individual consciousness is affected by social consciousness of various classes and groups, as a result of which man's individual consciousness can include elements of social consciousness of social groups, to which he does not belong.

Law-governed development of social consciousness. The materialist interpretation of the fundamental question of philosophy with respect to society suggests the conclusion that social existence determines social consciousness (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 21).

Different social being in every socio-economic formation brings to life different types of social consciousness. Attention should be drawn to the contradictoriness of social consciousness in the antagonistic socio-economic formations and to the qualitative difference of social consciousness among different classes and social groups.

However, social being affects social consciousness through the material and spiritual needs of the people arising in the course of life and their practical activity rather than mechanically. These needs (private and public) are manifest in the people's sentiments, are recognised by them and give birth to personal and social interests. Different forms of social consciousness come into existence because in the course of life and diverse practical activity social being, first and foremost the economic basis of society, awakes in the people not only material (production) needs but also diverse spiritual needs—political, moral and aesthetic.

It is only in the final analysis that social being determines social consciousness: in its development social consciousness is relatively independent of social being (see Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 395-396, 398-401).

The relative independence of social consciousness in its development is manifest in that social consciousness and its

forms may not correspond to the level of the development of society, primarily its material foundation, and also in that it may develop unevenly. Its uneven development is explained by the fact that social consciousness is shaped not only under the impact of social being but also under the influence of ideological relations and establishments that "shadow" economic relations in an antagonistic society.

The continuity of social consciousness and its forms also accounts for their uneven development.

Forms of social consciousness. Social consciousness has certain levels and forms in different socio-economic formations.

Political consciousness refers to diverse sentiments, ideals, interests, views, goals and tasks, action programmes of classes, their socio-political theories connected with the struggle of classes and parties for state power and with the activity of and relations among parties, states and nations. Political consciousness reflects the material conditions of the life of classes and social groups, their economic relations and also political relations and organisations. For this reason it always has a class nature.

Political ideology refers to social theories reflecting the vital interests of a class and accounting for its position, the social structure of a concrete socio-economic formation, its political organisations and political relations. On the basis of these theories political ideology determines the programme of activity and struggle by a class, its party, the state or a nation.

The topic should reveal the reactionary nature of today's bourgeois political ideology which is designed to justify the sway of the capitalists.

Political ideology of the working class has in its theoretical foundation three components—philosophy, political economy and scientific communism—and is therefore based on the scientific materialist understanding of social development. It provides a scientifically substantiated programme of activity of the working class and its party in capitalist and socialist societies.

Political consciousness, just like social consciousness as a whole, has a class nature and undergoes a change in history: social being, primarily the economic basis of society, determines political consciousness, too, and through it the policies of classes; as social being changes and new classes appear, they develop their own political consciousness. It

should be borne in mind that political consciousness, too, is relatively independent in its development.

Legal consciousness stands for the sense and understanding of freedom, justice and injustice, rights and duties of the people in the state, their interests connected with equality or inequality in society and also the knowledge of the rights of establishments and of legal relations in society. Legal consciousness reflects the social (economic, political and cultural) position of classes and other social groups. It comes into being and exists only in class society and has class nature.

Distinction should be drawn between ordinary legal consciousness (sentiments, interests and ideals) and theoretical legal consciousness, especially legal psychology and ideology. *Legal ideology* is the theory of law, which by reflecting vital class interests justifies social equality or inequality of the people.

It is necessary to show that legal consciousness of the bourgeoisie differs qualitatively from that of the proletariat.

Discussing the historical nature of legal consciousness, it is necessary to show how legal consciousness of classes changes with the transformation of being.

Analysing the *role of legal consciousness in social life*, attention should be paid to its link with law and legal relations in society. Legal psychology of a class, for example, its sense of injustice and dream of freedom and equality serve as an incentive for the mass of the working people to fight for freedom and equality; this struggle is, however, spontaneous. If under the impact of its political ideology the class gets consolidated, forms its political party and comes to power in the state, it sets up its legislative bodies, its law and legal institutions (the public prosecutor's office, court, prisons and so on) in keeping with its legal psychology and ideology; legal relations take shape in society on their basis. In this way law becomes the will of the ruling class formalised in state law (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 501).

Law includes the sum total of norms or laws of the state formalised in the Constitution (the Fundamental Law) and other acts. It should be made clear what class interests find expression in law. It formalises social equality or inequality of classes or social groups. Using the legal institutions set up and the armed force of the state, law in exploiting societies acts as a coercive regulator of people's

relations towards property and the state.

The main tenets of legal consciousness and law, their class and historical nature are to be found in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Ch. II; F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Chs. X-XI; letters written by Engels to Joseph Bloch on September 21[-22], 1890, and to Conrad Schmidt on October 27, 1890 (see Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 394-396, 396-402).

Moral consciousness incorporates sentiments, ideals, interests and views of the people connected with public weal and also the knowledge of the norms, rules of behaviour in society, customs and traditions, and the evaluation of people's behaviour in the public opinion. Moral consciousness reflects social being, economic, political and other relations in society.

Ordinary, everyday consciousness or morality refers to the moral image of society, including first and foremost the sense and understanding of public duty, good and evil, honour, dignity, conscience and happiness. Morality also includes the understanding of the norms and rules of behaviour, customs and traditions existing in society, the public opinion of the activity of an individual or a class and the moral ideal of a class or society.

Moral ideology (ethics) is an expression in theory of the moral interests of a class and the doctrine of morality and man's norms of behaviour in society (morals).

Changes in social being lead to the transformation of moral consciousness, which is historical in nature. With the appearance of classes with opposite interests, morality of primitive society gives way to class morality and ethics. Historical facts should be used to illustrate the peculiarities of morality and ethics in different socio-economic formations. Class morality connected with political consciousness of a class gives rise to struggle for putting into effect its moral interests and ideals. It is necessary to take into consideration the relative independence of moral consciousness in its development and the influence of political, legal and religious consciousness upon it. Special attention should be paid to the radical difference between bourgeois and socialist moral consciousness.

Morality is a spiritual incentive of people's deeds and activity. In keeping with their sense and understanding of public duty, people evolve the *morals*, that is, a sum total of

the commonly accepted norms and rules of behaviour in society.

The emergence of the morals in society leads to the development of moral relations, in other words, people's behaviour with respect to property, the state and so on regulated by the morals. These moral relations are manifest in customs, traditions and habits, the totality of which constitutes the morals of society or a class. Class theorists substantiate the morals of their class in moral ideology (ethics), thereby giving moral relations an ideological nature.

When showing the *role of morals in social life*, one should bear in mind that morality of an individual or a class takes shape not only under the influence of social being but also under the influence of morals. It is the morals of society or a class that develop in people the sense and understanding of public duty, good and evil and so on, and in this way ensure the combination of private and public interests and work for the sake of public weal.

The main ideas of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on morality and morals are expounded in the following works: F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Chs. IX-XI; V.I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues" and "To Inessa Armand" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 144-145).

Aesthetic consciousness covers special sentiments, tastes, interests, concepts, ideals, views and theories. *Ordinary aesthetic consciousness* incorporates aesthetic feelings (the feeling of the beauty of colour, shapes of objects, movements, speech, man's actions and deeds, the sense of the beautiful and the ugly, of the lofty and the base, the tragic and the comical, the exquisite and so on), tastes, concepts and ideals and also the everyday understanding of beauty, the beautiful and the ugly, knowledge of how to produce beautiful objects and works of art, and people's ability to perceive, comprehend and appreciate art, etc.

Aesthetic consciousness exists in class society at the *theoretical level* in the form of aesthetics. *Aesthetics* includes theories which, reflecting class interests, explain in their categories the aesthetic value of phenomena (in nature and society), give an understanding of art, everyday aesthetic consciousness and aesthetic activity and analyse the laws of their development, the reasons for the emergence of and the role of aesthetic consciousness and art in the life of society. Marxist-Leninist aesthetics is a science which gives expres-

sion to the aesthetic interests of the working class and all the working people.

Aesthetic consciousness reflects social being, its special public value.

When considering the *role of aesthetic consciousness in social life*, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the emergence and development of aesthetic consciousness, which came into existence in primitive society, give birth to different types of aesthetic activity. These include primarily aesthetic activity in the sphere of production aiming at transforming production and everyday life in keeping with the laws of beauty.

Aesthetic feelings, tastes, ideals, interests and views which take shape and develop under the influence of various types of people's practical activity (such as hunting, games and so on) lead to the appearance of artists. Hence, artistic creativity comes into being.

It is worth considering in this connection the question of *art as a special form of reflecting reality*. People (the public) perceiving art view it as a certain conglomeration of works of art subdivided into different kinds (painting, sculpture, music, literature and so on), historical artistic periods (for instance, primitive art, art of the Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance) and trends (Baroque and Rococo art, Classicism, Romanticism, critical realism, socialist realism), national schools, styles and genres. Any work of art is inimitable and yet it also has features common for that kind or trend of art and for art as a whole. Art is the reflection of reality in artistic images giving expression to society's spiritual world. Art conveys not only the spiritual world of artists, but in fact all the social feelings, interests and volition characteristics of people, social psychology as a whole and certain aspects of ideology.

The artists' world outlook, which is conveyed in art, is linked with the ideology of certain social groups, classes. On this basis art acquires an ideological purpose. Here it should be borne in mind that reactionary social classes or groups are interested in art which would conceal their true "image". Progressive social groups and classes need art that truthfully reflects the spiritual world of society. Such is democratic, socialist art.

An important characteristic of a work of art and a principle of evaluating it is the correspondence between form and content and also that between fabric (colours, sounds, words,

etc.) and artistic image. The hallmark of art is the manifestation of this unity.

Knowledge of the general characteristics of art also makes it possible to clarify the *role of art in social life* and to show its purpose and main functions. The social role of art is revealed in its various functions—cognitive, ideological, educational, communicative, creative and so on.

When analysing the *laws of the development of aesthetic consciousness and art*, it is necessary to take into account the fact that changes in social being and various practical activities lead to changes in aesthetic consciousness and to the appearance of a new method of artistic creativity. The latter in its turn transforms art. The development of art is the succession of epochs and trends in art, the process eventually depending on the economic development of society (see Engels's letter to W. Borgius of January 25, 1894, in: Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 441-442). At the same time art is relatively independent in its development, which is borne out by the uneven development of art with respect to the material basis of society (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, pp. 215-216).

The advent of imperialism brings about a crisis of bourgeois consciousness, which is graphically manifest in bourgeois aesthetic consciousness. Art is dominated by new trends—bourgeois mass art and modernism. The same crisis leads to the appearance of new trends of bourgeois aesthetics designed to justify bourgeois art.

Already in bourgeois society the proletariat develops new aesthetic consciousness—fine aesthetic tastes, ideals and socialist aesthetic interests—giving rise to new scientific aesthetics as a component of Marxist-Leninist ideology. On this basis a new method of artistic creativity—socialist realism—is evolved, which gains dominance in socialist society in the form of new socialist art.

Religious consciousness covers social sentiments, ideals, interests and views, which have to do with the recognition of the supernatural, other world. Everyday religious consciousness or *religion* is the lowest level of religious consciousness. Religion is characterised by belief in the existence of, apart from nature, the supernatural, other world in the forms of different creatures (gods, spirits, etc.), in the ability to make miracles and so on. People have different religions but the belief in the supernatural is one.

Like other forms of social consciousness, religion changes historically. Among the early forms of religion evolved in primitive society were totemism, fetishism, animism and magic. Polytheism (belief in many gods) prevailed in slave-owning society, while feudal and capitalist societies have monotheistic religions, among them Christianity (Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism), Buddhism and Islam. Religion too, is relatively independent in its development which can be exemplified by the fact that African peoples have early forms of religion along with Catholicism. For instance, until quite recently animism (belief in the existence of souls of the dead, worship of some forces of nature and so on) and magic (belief in the supernatural power of amulets and talismans) were dominant among the natives of Angola.

In the difficult conditions of life of the people who knew nothing of the laws of nature and did not understand the true causes of diseases, famine and death, magic helped man to become sure of his own powers and overcome the fear he might have experienced when hunting, the fear of diseases, drought, famine and so on. Even though that confidence of his was illusory and based on his belief in supernatural forces, it promoted cheerfulness and optimism among African peoples at a certain period. At the same time this belief in magic and amulets often intertwined in people's minds with elementary knowledge accumulated by them in their practical activity: production magic helped them to prepare for work and hunting, while medicinal magic was connected with folk medicine.

The highest, theoretical level of religious consciousness is *religious ideology*—theology cultivated by the professional clergy to substantiate in theory the existence of gods and the supernatural. It evolves in class societies and serves the interests of the ruling exploiter classes.

The communist party rallies the working people, both believers and atheists, to fight exploitation, racial and national oppression, to establish social equality and to build socialism and communism. This equality also presupposes the freedom of conscience, that is, the freedom to profess any religion or to be an atheist.

Scientific atheism considers religion an imaginary, distorted reflection of the spontaneous forces of nature and society dominating the people (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 374). Of decisive importance are the social, class roots of religion.

When assessing the role of religion in social life, Marxism proceeds from the fact that religion has a compensatory function by giving believers an illusion of meeting their needs to overcome the fear of death and suffering through the faith in the immortality of soul and trust in God's help and a better life in the other world. Religion leads the believers to renounce struggle to satisfy their needs in this world, reconciles them to social evil and engenders submission. Religion divides the working people who may profess different faiths.

Religion affects people's morality and produces religious morals (norms and rules) which regulate the behaviour of the believers. These morals account for the emergence of a religious cult (prayer, sacrifice and so on). The church has always been hostile to science, even though it is trying at present to reconcile science and faith. In exploiter societies the church expresses the interests of the ruling classes and is being used by the bourgeoisie in ideological and political struggle against Marxism-Leninism and socialism.

It is not until the socialist revolution takes place that, in keeping with the interests of all the working people, the socialist state formalises in its constitution the true freedom of conscience, which is ensured by a legislative act separating the church from the state and school from the church, by establishing equality of believers and non-believers before the law, outlawing enmity and hatred in connection with religious beliefs or the discrimination of the believers and granting the organisations of believers church buildings and cult objects for free use, and the right to build new church buildings and to publish religious literature.

At the same time citizens should not use freedom of conscience to the detriment of the interests of society and the state or other citizens' rights. Freedom of conscience cannot be used with the aim of whipping up hostility towards the order and laws of socialist society or of committing anti-social acts under the cover of religion.

Freedom of conscience also envisions freedom to have atheistic convictions, to explain the essence of religion and to carry out atheistic propaganda without insulting the religious feelings of the believers. Freedom of conscience is a basis for the gradual withering away of religion and the renunciation by the people of their religious convictions.

A correct understanding of religion is offered by *scientific atheism*, which is a system of views rejecting religion

or any belief in the supernatural and criticising religion. Atheism is inseparable from the materialist world outlook and develops on the basis of Marxist philosophy.

19. SCIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIAL LIFE

Science has an important role to play in the life of society, as it promotes its development in all spheres.

Science as a social phenomenon. The major purpose of science is to discover the laws of the material world. As a result of this cognitive process scientific knowledge takes shape and is made available with the help of signs of natural and artificial languages. As a social phenomenon, *science* can be represented, first, as a system of knowledge of the world and, second, as a special type of activity to generate knowledge.

Scientific knowledge has a number of characteristics.

To begin with, it constitutes objective truth, which means that the content of this knowledge corresponds to objective reality.

Science presupposes the accumulation and description of empirical facts, which form the initial base of study. This empirical material helps to establish contact with the objective world and contains information about the phenomena under study. True, that information is restricted to the sphere of the outward and inessential. But if science had stopped at the collection of empirical facts, it would not have been science: everyday consciousness would have been suffice for the task of merely amassing facts. There is a need in science precisely because it is necessary to see the innermost regularity behind the external, the phenomenon, which is the purpose of science.

Scientific knowledge is conveyed with the help of logical concepts which best correspond to the nature of the essential in the phenomena.

Knowledge accumulated within every particular science forms some logically cogent system of ideas called *theory*. Of decisive importance in evolving a theory of some science is a small number of fundamental ideas, principles, that are expounded and concretised in a multitude of more particular ideas. To build a theory means to find new opportunities to explain phenomena of the objective world and to understand regular relations.

An important characteristic of scientific knowledge is

its function of prognostication, which is materialised in the form of veritable judgments about the phenomena not given empirically. The prognosticating function of scientific knowledge is objectively rooted in continuity between the present and the future that exists in reality itself.

Scientific activity forms the other side of science. When engaging in research, scientists eventually proceed from the nature of the objects of their studies. That is why certain differences exist in the methods of research conducted in physics, chemistry and other sciences.

Cognitive activity in science is closely linked with *practical activity*. Through practice scientists come into contact with the phenomena of the objective world and cognise them. It also enables them to check the veracity of knowledge obtained. Different instruments ensuring the carrying out of an experiment are produced in the course of practice.

It is necessary to draw attention to the connection between science and other forms of social consciousness, especially philosophy and political ideology. Emphasis should be laid on the methodological role of philosophy. All the ideas of social sciences are of class, party nature: they reflect the interests of certain classes and social groups. The philosophical interpretation of the ideas of natural sciences constitutes their class aspect.

Every branch of science has its own object of study. Speaking in a wider context, nature and society can be singled out as objects of study, which gives ground for drawing a distinction between the science of nature and the science of society. Knowledge is not an aim in itself but is gained to be applied in practice. Some knowledge forms applied sciences which are directly involved in man's practical activity, while other branches of knowledge form fundamental sciences, which provide the underlying basis for applied sciences.

The motive forces of the development of science. The main reason for the development of scientific knowledge are the needs of the people's socio-historical practice, primarily, the needs of material production.

The needs of production directly affect natural sciences and indirectly social sciences through the system of above all economic relations.

At the same time it should be borne in mind that in its development science enjoys relative independence which

becomes greater as the amount of knowledge expands.

The relative independence of science is corroborated by the existence of a logical connection within scientific knowledge itself, the obvious continuity which makes new discoveries a logical consequence of preceding achievements. The logical coherence of scientific knowledge finds expression in the natural movement of thought from the simple to the complex, from the essence of the first order to that of the second order and so on.

The relative independence of science is also manifest in the current process of differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge. *Differentiation* presupposes the emergence of new scientific branches which, as a rule, bring together a new object and new methods of research. *Integration* of sciences means that general characteristics and laws have been found for a number of fields of reality that are studied by different sciences.

Correlation of scientific and technological progress with social progress in the present period. As a result of the present-day scientific and technological revolution the role of science in social life grows immeasurably and its impact on all aspects of social life is heightening.

Scientific and industrial revolutions repeatedly occurred in the past but they were always independent of one another. The integrated scientific and technological revolution of our time as a unique phenomenon produced by the vast amount of knowledge, the industrialisation of science in its experimental part and, as a consequence, the sharp narrowing of the gap between the date of a scientific discovery and the time of its industrial application. Two points should be singled out in the given problem: first, the essence of the processes taking place within science itself and, second, the resultant changes in the role and place science has in society.

Speaking about the first point, mention should be made of the radical shift towards integrating scientific knowledge: an integrated synthetic view of the world takes shape. The gap between natural and social sciences is bridged through the extensive use of mathematical techniques. It becomes obvious that natural sciences are close to each other.

The technical, experimental apparatus of science has undergone a dramatic change: the equipment of modern scientific laboratories, far from being inferior, is sometimes superior to that of industrial enterprises.

For a long time science developed to a certain extent in isolation from the other sides of social life. Now it has penetrated all the spheres of social life, affecting industry, agriculture, transport, communications, social structure, the systems of education, information, management, planning and financing and, finally, politics. The process of science "conquering" society brings about changes in the essence of labour, which is becoming increasingly creative.

Broad industrial application of latest discoveries in science entails a considerable rise in labour productivity and intensive production development. At present the economic might of one country or another depends on the level of its scientific and technological progress and the effective use of its achievements.

The present-day scientific and technological revolution is characterised by the *process of science turning into a direct productive force of society*. Science is responsible for the appearance and development of modern industries, such as electrical engineering, the atomic power industry and the electronic industry. Restructuring on the basis of scientific ideas is ever more seriously affecting traditional sectors of industry and agriculture.

The turning of science into a direct productive force of society is also manifest in the sharp reduction of the share of man's physical labour in technological processes and especially in the transfer of control and management functions to automatic devices and means. Bourgeois ideologists exploit the tremendous importance of the scientific and technological revolution to substantiate their apologetic conceptions (see Section 22 of the present publication).

Revolution in science develops differently under capitalism and under socialism. Under capitalism science is restricted by the straightjacket of bourgeois production relations, which engender the uneven development of sciences, prevent the full utilisation of scientific accomplishments and direct scientific and technological progress against the producers themselves—the mass of the people. Science is being militarised to an ever growing extent. Scientific and technological progress intensifies concentration of capital and exacerbates the contradictions of capitalism which are laid bare by the general crisis experienced by the capitalist countries.

Under socialism the development of science is of an entirely different nature. Socialism offers broad opportunities

for creative activity and produces the necessary material and intellectual prerequisites. The unified state organisation of education, research and training of scientific personnel and the party guidance of scientific development ensure scientific progress in the interests of the mass of the people and in harmony with the aims of their struggle for socialism and communism.

20. CULTURE AND THE LAWS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT

Present-day Marxist sociology attaches ever growing importance to the problems of culture.

The Marxist-Leninist concept of culture and the laws of its development. In contrast to the interpretation of culture as an exclusively spiritual realm, Marxism-Leninism viewed it as a field of social labour (of the mass of the working people, progressive classes and social strata), including its both material and spiritual forms. From the point of view of Marxism correct understanding of culture is only possible on the basis of the theory of socio-economic formations through an analysis of the development of the productive forces, production relations and the superstructure of a given society. But the concept of "culture" cannot be replaced by the aforementioned concepts because it incorporates the achievements in all spheres of man's activity, the fruits of mental and physical work in their unity and reveals the specifics of these achievements characteristic of certain historical epochs, concrete societies, nationalities and nations. The source of culture is in man's creative and constructive work in all areas of life and an attitude to work is key indicator of the level of progressive social development.

Lenin's pronouncements on culture characterise it as a phenomenon encompassing social life as a whole. The multifaceted approach leads to the conclusion that analysis of the concept of culture will be complete only when it includes the sum total of relations between spiritual and material culture, the entire process of intellectual production and also the process of handing over intellectual and aesthetic values, their perception and functioning in society.

The above makes it possible to give the following *definition of culture*: culture is the sum total of qualitative achievements of society in its material and spiritual development, which are used by society, form cultural traditions and serve

mankind's further progress. In societies with antagonistic classes it is inevitably of class nature.

As a rule, distinction is drawn between the material and the spiritual aspect of culture which are dialectically inter-related and interdependent.

The *material aspect of culture* stands for the qualitative achievements that characterise the degree to which man has mastered the elements, the effectiveness of the instruments of labour, the technical level of production, people's skills and abilities in using the technology, scientific organisation and culture of labour, the satisfaction of the people's material and everyday requirements and so on.

Spiritual culture refers to the qualitative achievements that demonstrate the level and profundity of the cognition of nature and society, the breadth of the outlook attained and the introduction of progressive ideas and positive knowledge into social life. In other words, spiritual culture is the sum total of qualitative achievements in science, philosophy, education, enlightenment, morals, literature and arts. It also finds expression in political ideas, the political development of the people and their legal relations.

The Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the organic unity of material and spiritual culture. The latter, being of secondary and relatively independent nature, on the whole progresses in organic unison with material culture. As an integral process, spiritual culture, developing on that basis, at the same time affects it to a certain extent.

The *laws of the development of culture* include:

- 1) the interrelationship and interaction of its components;
- 2) the intrinsic contradictory nature of culture in the antagonistic formations;
- 3) the uneven development of certain aspects of culture;
- 4) the continuity of culture, stemming from its relative independence.

Like any historical category, the concept of culture is a product of certain historical conditions. Every socio-economic formation has its own, special type of culture which is accordingly succeeded when the obsolete formation is replaced by a more progressive one.

In the antagonistic formations culture has a class nature. Lenin analysed the class content of culture in his works, such as "The Heritage We Renounce", "In Memory of Herzen", "On the National Pride of the Great Russians", "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues", and "On Proletarian Culture". Of great methodological importance are his conclusions of the

existence of two opposite cultures in bourgeois society. The content of culture common to the whole of mankind is accumulated within the narrow boundaries of class-restricted intellectual production. For this reason, despite the existence of some elements common to entire humanity, culture cannot be that of the whole people in those conditions. Furthermore, even that content of culture that is common to entire humanity, if adapted to the ruling class's interest, is often deformed in the capitalist countries.

Bourgeois culture. During the early bourgeois revolutions culture met the interests of the mass of the people. It reflected the needs of social progress and those of the development of bourgeois society which was about to replace outdated feudalism. Transition of capitalism into the stage of imperialism marked the beginning of the crisis of bourgeois culture.

The decline of present-day bourgeois culture is borne out by its rejection of lofty cultural values, by the anti-aesthetic forms of its art, the spread of amoralism, pseudo-scholarliness, the reactionary social tendency of its political and economic doctrines, philosophy, sociology, ethics and aesthetics. The crisis of bourgeois culture is also manifest in the bankruptcy of bourgeois humanism, which is incapable of finding in the new conditions the ways and means to defend human freedom or of creating conditions for man's all-round and harmonious development.

The overwhelming part of the population stands aloof from the cultural achievements; it is imposed sham designed to enslave the people spiritually, which is the main function of "mass culture", a low-grade substitute for genuinely artistic cultural values.

Rejecting the principle of class culture, bourgeois ideologists spread theories of a "single current in culture", of the "drawing closer together" and convergence of bourgeois and socialist culture. Instinctive, unrestricted "freedom of self-expression", political indifference and unbridled spontaneous creativity are advertised by them as ultimate artistic freedom. On the whole all bourgeois conceptions reject any connection between culture and a certain system of social relations, a concrete mode of production, and approach problems of culture from idealistic, "technocratic" positions, performing in this way an apologetic social function.

Socialist culture. Genuine cultural progress can be en-

sured only be socialism. The experience of Soviet cultural development shows that socialist society inherits, assimilates discriminately and brings back to life everything of the best from old cultures and on a planned basis and purposefully develops new culture. Of decisive importance in this grandiose endeavour is the great cultural revolution begun in keeping with Lenin's plan and under his direct guidance.

Lenin saw *cultural revolution* as a general law of the development of all countries and nations building socialism and communism. For him cultural revolution was such a qualitative transformation of society's spiritual life that, once started on the basis of political and economic socialist transformations and actively affecting them, aims eventually at turning the people into the actual makers of culture and at moulding versatily developed personalities out of the working people of socialist society.

In the course of life of one generation the Soviet Union has freed itself completely and forever from the onerous yoke of illiteracy. The working people became active participants in cultural life and makers of cultural values. Soviet culture is socialist in content, of diverse national forms and internationalist in spirit and nature. It is an organic amalgamation of cultural values created by all the Soviet peoples.

When determining the criteria of the relationship of *the international and the national in spiritual socialist culture* it is necessary to proceed from the following fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism: the genuine free development of nations and of the totality of national characteristics, far from contradicting the international, enriches its essence; internationalist culture is not devoid of any national trait, what is more, it is rooted in the all-round development of national cultures: the drawing closer together of nations and nationalities under socialism intensifies manifold mankind's differentiation, as far as the richness and variety of its spiritual life are concerned. The essence of the dialectics of the relationship of the international and the national is the international, which is inevitably embodied in national forms.

Socialist policy and culture are opposed in the present-day world by the policy and culture of militant reaction, chauvinism and militarism. Their reactionary policy jeopardises entire civilisation and culture in general. It is for this reason that culture cannot be apolitical. Those who cherish culture and civilisation and seek to promote their further

blossoming cannot stay apart from world efforts, from vigorous and resolute actions in defence of the lofty ideals of the truly humane way of life.

The all-round blossoming of socialist culture leads to the shaping of genuinely humanistic culture common to all mankind. Progress of socialist culture and its stronger influence upon social life turn culture into an active factor of building communism, educating the people in the spirit of communism and spreading the truth of socialism, and an important means of struggle for peace and friendship among peoples and for the triumph of the ideas of humanism and social progress.

21. THE ROLE OF PEOPLE AND PERSONALITY IN HISTORY. PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF HUMANISM

Marxism-Leninism views history as the result of the activity of the people and approaches the problems of the relationship of historical necessity, objective social development laws and the people's conscious activity from scientific materialist positions.

The people are the makers of history. The teaching of the mass of the people being the decisive force of social development is a key aspect of Marxism.

Marx and Engels were the first to reveal the *scientific, concretely historical content of the concept "people"*. Their teaching of the materialist understanding of history, of material production as the basis for the existence and development of society and of the people as the makers of material and cultural values served as the methodological foundation in solving the problem of the people as the makers of history.

Adopting the concretely historical approach to defining the content of the concept "people" and the "mass of the people", Marxism established that in different historical periods the concept had different content. In the primitive communal system when society was not divided into classes, the term "people" denoted the entire population. The two terms also coincide under socialism, after the exploiter classes are eliminated. However, Marxism resolutely rejects all arguments about the people as a whole in the conditions of antagonistic societies.

Analysis of the problem often leads to the question

whether the bourgeoisie makes part of the concept "people". When the bourgeoisie was a progressive force it was, doubtlessly, included in the concept "people". Later on, when it began to transform into a reactionary class, the founders of Marxism-Leninism thought that only the petty bourgeoisie retained the right to be considered part of the people (see V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, 1962, pp. 297, 298; Vol. 9, 1977, pp. 56, 133, 134). The national bourgeoisie, which struggles together with the working people to free the country from colonial yoke, is also included in the concept "people". Whenever the bourgeoisie comes out against its people, it deprives itself of the right to be called the people.

To sum up, *the people* constitute an historically changing community of classes and other social groups which by their objective position solve at a given period the tasks of progressive social development. First and foremost, throughout history the *people* have been referred to the labouring classes, yet at the same time at certain historical stages the concept also covers other strata of the population (for example, the bourgeoisie during the period of the revolutions of the 18th-19th centuries) which join the struggle for progressive changes.

The decisive role of the mass of the people in the historical process is to be shown through their three major characteristics: a) as the main productive force of society; b) as the carriers and producers of social relations and the major socio-political force; c) as the makers of spiritual culture.

The working people produce all the instruments of labour and all the material values needed for life. In all the socioeconomic formations they built dwellings, fed, clothed and shod all the social strata.

No important historical event would have taken place without the decisive role of the people. They are the leading force of social revolutions and all the national liberation movements. Today the people are the major force in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism (see V.I. Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*).

The people are the makers of culture because their life provides the material for art, because they themselves produced the paramount element of culture—language—and make epic poems, music, dances and, last but not least, they are the chief judges of the works of art.

When criticising the bourgeois conceptions of the role of

the people and the personality in history, it is necessary to understand that all of them stem from an idealistic world outlook and a metaphysical method of thinking. Their main aim is to impose upon the working people the idea of their inability to lead an independent life without the exploiter classes, to cloak the real class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the working people and to present it as the "ultimate" contradiction between the mob and a few outstanding personalities.

Examination of the *law of the people playing ever bigger role in the historical process* should show how the development of the productive forces and production relations changes the role of the working people in different socio-economic formations and raises their responsibility for the destiny of history. Describing the essence of this law, Lenin wrote: "The greater the scope and extent of historical events, the greater is the number of people participating in them, and, contrariwise, the more profound the change we wish to bring about, the more must we rouse an interest and an intelligent attitude towards it, and convince more millions and tens of millions of people that it is necessary."¹

Special attention should be paid to elucidating the role of the people during the present-day period, the period of the transition from capitalism to communism on a world scale. In so doing it is necessary to understand the reasons for and the concrete manifestations of their role both in quantitative and qualitative respects.

The working people have a qualitatively new role to play after the victory of the socialist revolution, which puts an end to the exploitation of man by man and replaces spontaneous social development by the planned development of all areas of social life under the guidance of a Marxist-Leninist party.

The role of the personality in history. A truly scientific explanation of the role of the personality in history was given by Marx, Engels and Lenin, who considered it in dialectical relation to historical necessity, to the decisive influence of the people upon social development and to the activity of classes and parties. The founders of Marxism-Leninism proved scientifically that the influence exercised by one personality or another on the course of historical events depends on whether it expresses the interests of

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 498.

progressive or reactionary classes, whether it understands the action of objective laws of social development correctly and to what extent it can personally influence the mass of the people. Opposing the fatalistic views of the idealists, Marxism-Leninism rejects the idea of the decisive role of the personality in history, while at the same time according it a significant role in the course of historical developments. (See Marx's letter to Wilhelm Blos of November 10, 1877 and Engels's letter to Joseph Bloch of September 21 [-22], 1890 (Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 291, 395-396) and Lenin's works *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, "Fr. Engels", "Karl Marx" and "*Left-Wing*" Communism—an Infantile Disorder, Ch. 5.)

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the personality. The scientific solution of the problem of the essence of man became possible only with the discovery of the materialist conception of history by Karl Marx. Animadverting on Feuerbach's anthropological approach to understanding the essence of man, Marx pointed out that "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations".¹

The classics of Marxism-Leninism use the notions "*individual*", "*man*" and "*personality*". *Individual* denotes man as a representative of the human race, omitting the specificities of his real life and work. The concept "*man*" refers to a representative of the human race, focussing on the characteristics distinguishing him from animals. *Personality* stands for any concrete man with his features that are determined socially and find individual expression.

The concept "*personality*" expresses the human essence, which is a derivative of the concrete historical social conditions in which man develops as a personality. The essence of the personality is manifest in different spheres of activity (material, socio-political, spiritual and so on). By transforming the surrounding reality man also changes the conditions of his existence and, consequently, transforms himself.

In keeping with the two main types of production relations Marxism singles out two main types of relations between society and personality. Society based on private property is

¹ K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 4.

characterised by relations of exploitation and submission, while society with public property is characterised by relations of cooperation and mutual assistance among people. The antagonistic formations have two basic types of personality, that of an exploiter and that of a working man (a slaveowner and a slave, a feudal lord and a serf, a capitalist and a worker). A new type of personality—the personality of communist society—is formed in the conditions of socialism.

Attention should also be paid to the *place and role of interest in the interrelationships between society and personality*. Different social relations have to do with different interests. As every personality is a member of a certain class in class society, the question of the relationship between the interests of a personality and those of society can be viewed only from class positions.

Philosophic problems of humanism. In the past few years problems of humanism have moved to the fore in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism.

Humanism is an historically changing system of views which recognises the value of man as a personality, his right to freedom, happiness, the development and manifestation of his abilities and which regards the well-being of man to be the criterion in evaluating social institutions and the principles of equality, justice and humanity to be the desired norm of relations among people.

The doctrine of humanism has a long history: it was developed by representatives of philosophic thought of the Italian Renaissance, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century materialist philosophers in France and England, utopian socialists, Russian revolutionary democrats and thinkers of many countries and nations.

Nevertheless, a truly scientific concept of humanism was worked out by Marx and Engels. They adopted a concrete historical class approach to the doctrine of humanism and worked out the concept of proletarian or socialist humanism, tying the doctrine of humanism to the scientific theory of social development, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the struggle for communism.

Marx and Engels substantiated the idea that it was wishful thinking to re-educate the people on the basis of universal love (which was the fallacy of most of the philosophers concerned with the problem of humanism before Marx) and that even the most benevolent ideas were not

espoused by the people in the absence of the corresponding objective conditions and that, consequently, for the humanistic ideas to be translated into reality it was necessary to make the people's living conditions humane. For these conditions to be created, it was necessary to abolish all relations which humiliate and enslave people.

They rejected both Machiavelli's maxim "the end justifies the means" and the Christian dogma of "non-resistance to evil by violence". Corresponding means are required for one aim or another to be reached. And yet, on the one hand, not any aim is justified (if the aim is inhuman all the means would be inhuman as well) and, on the other, even if the aim is justified not all means are appropriate for it.

The Christian dogma of "non-resistance to evil by violence" is likewise untenable. It is known that not every evil can be eliminated through violence under any circumstances. Socialist humanism, without rejecting persuasion as a means of fighting evil, does not exclude coercion when the evil doer does not heed persuasion.

22. CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY BOURGEOIS SOCIOLOGY

Lenin exposed in his work *Karl Marx* two chief shortcomings of sociology before Marx. The first is that sociology considered only the ideological motivation of the historical activity of people, i.e., remained idealistic. Its second chief shortcoming was that it did not embrace the action of the mass of the population or examine the social conditions of its life or changes in them. Idealism and disregard for the decisive role of the mass of the people in history are shortcomings which are intrinsic in contemporary bourgeois sociology.

The most important methodological principle in the analysis of bourgeois concepts is the *party approach*, which means the exposure of their objectively class role in contemporary ideological and political struggle.

The more important schools and trends in contemporary bourgeois sociology deserve our attention.

Empirical sociology emerged in the 1920s and constitutes the most representative school in the number of its followers.

Empirical sociologists have special procedures and techniques, including observation, interviews, question-

naires, studies of documents, social experiments, modelling, statistical processing of material, charts, scales, etc. These studies are considered concrete in the sense that they cover particulars, individual aspects and details of society as a whole. Such studies are also called empirical because they proceed from experience (*L empiricus*) and rely on facts, which, however, are not a base for broad general conclusions leading to the cognition of the substantive aspects and regularities of social life.

From the point of view of empirical sociologists, all the general concepts, such as "law of social development", "class", "capitalism", "socialism" and "democracy", have no meaning.

Empirical sociology is based on the idealistic philosophy of positivism and pragmatism. Like neo-positivists, empirical sociologists interpret facts in the spirit of subjective idealism, as "the results of experience" or "languages of science", i.e., the totality of human sensations, or logical structures.

Industrial sociology (sometimes called sociology of enterprise or labour sociology) also has a pronouncedly applied character. That branch of empirical sociology aims at studying the relationships between workers, engineers, technicians and managers. It is designed primarily to influence the consciousness and mentality of workers. The doctrine of "human relations" is being used extensively for the purpose, its goal being to strengthen the cooperation, and the mental and moral community of the personnel of any given enterprise. A worker included in the system of "human relations" is being oriented to consider the interests of his enterprise as his own and take care about its profitability and higher labour productivity. Yet no system of "human relations" can resolve the contradictions between labour and capital or abolish class struggle in bourgeois society.

Exposing the subservience of many empirical sociologists to the bourgeoisie, Marxist sociology at the same time does not reject anything valuable that is contained in their papers. It is possible to use factual material, often rather substantial, which, with correct theoretical analysis, helps better to study the life of today's capitalist society. Some techniques of examining and processing factual material also have certain scientific validity. It goes without saying that Marxism does not overlook the problems which have been raised, although incorrectly explained, in the works of bourgeois sociologists.

Bourgeois empirical sociology is going through a serious crisis. A large part of empirical studies today deal with trifling subjects. Moreover, the victory of the empirical school and the ultimate eviction of theoretical problems from sociology would have been dangerous to the bourgeoisie. That is why narrow, "creeping" empiricism is being criticised ever more frequently by bourgeois sociologists themselves.

Structural-functional theory of society. The desire to overcome the one-sided and superficial character of empirical sociology has led to the establishment of a school of structural-functional analysis. The leader of that school, American sociologist Talcott Parsons, claims that the empirical sociologists, who have once wandered in the dark, can now avail themselves of a general sociological theory.

Society, Parsons claims, is similar to a biological organism. It has a certain structure, consisting of functioning organs or parts. The analogy between society and a biological organism, which is scientifically fallacious, leads Parsons to reactionary political conclusions: the bourgeoisie is likened to the higher nervous system while the working class is assigned the role of the "muscles" and in general it is "proved" that the exploiter social system is inviolable and natural.

As distinct from the "organic" concepts of the past, Parsons combines a biological understanding of the function with a mathematical one. This attempt to substitute mathematical relations for social regularities cannot but lead to failure, as it happened to Parsons, who substituted functional dependence for the cause-and-effect relationship in sociology.

After ousting causality from sociology, Parsons and other functionalists espoused the theory of factors. According to it, everything is declared equally important—the economy and politics, science and religion: everything influences the course of history to an equal extent.

Calling materialism and idealism "outdated" concepts, Parsons looks for "simpler" elements that would not belong either to material or to ideal social phenomena. He finds these "simple" or "neutral" elements in the people's social actions. From his point of view, a social action is the fundamental cell that makes up the entire fabric of the social organism.

Social action in itself is represented by Parsons with the help of the following model: to begin with, there should be an

agent or "actor", second, a situation in which the action takes place and, third, the aims of the action and means of carrying it through.

What determines the motives or motive reasons of people's actions? What is the inner cause of a social act? According to Parsons, people are guided by commonly accepted models, that is to say, rules or norms of behaviour. Everyone should conscientiously perform one's duties or play one's "social role", for example, be a "production worker" and so on. The system of values, by its origin and content, belongs to the "non-empirical world" and has a sacred divine nature.

As is seen, this "strictly scientific" sociological theory admits its scholarly bankruptcy, openly declares social phenomena unknowable and turns to religion for help.

Parsons interprets the ethical norms or models of behaviour themselves in a highly abstract and formal way. Nevertheless, his abstract model has a fairly concrete socio-political content. Parsons seeks to substantiate the stability of the capitalist system, which is presented as a universal extra-historical model of the social organism. From this point of view, anything that promotes the "normal" functioning and stability of bourgeois society is "moral".

Even bourgeois critics of the theory of structural functionalism observe that it endeavours to obstruct the course of history. Echoing the ideologists of the reactionary classes, Parsons recognises the idea of development for the past alone and tries to do away with this idea in analysing the present and the future.

"Technological determinism". Many bourgeois theories and concepts focus on the interpretation of scientific and technological progress and resort to the methodology of the so-called technological determinism. Among them are the theories of "the new industrial revolution", "economic growth stages", "industrial" and "postindustrial society" and the convergence of the two systems. All of them proceed from the assumption that science and technology are the only decisive factor of social changes. The categories of "production relations" and the "socio-economic formation" are completely ignored, while science and technology are considered in the abstract as extra-historical "factors" of social progress (or regress), whose action is approximately the same both under capitalism and under socialism. *"Technological determinism"* differs radically from truly

scientific dialectical materialist determinism, which sees the change in the modes of production as the main, decisive cause of social development. The strategic goal set by many bourgeois sociologists, including the advocates of "technological determinism", is three-fold.

Firstly, they attempt to prove that capitalism as a socio-economic formation no longer exists. The defenders of capitalism claim that the West is already "past" capitalism, having eliminated its drawbacks through an evolution and grown into some "industrial", i.e., post-capitalist (though not socialist) society. They name the scientific and technological revolution as the magic force that has turned "old classical capitalism" into "industrial society", though in reality it further exacerbates the main contradiction of capitalism.

Secondly, bourgeois sociologists seek to prove that the world has so far seen no real socialism built in keeping with Marx's theory.

And, thirdly, bourgeois sociologists draw a "logical conclusion" from the two preceding assertions, namely, that as capitalism is no more there and socialism has not yet been built nor can be built, according to them, the question of the revolutionary transition to socialism and communism is automatically dismissed.

"Technological determinism" underpins futurology, the bourgeois "science" of the future. Bourgeois futurologists pompously heralded the impending advent of the happy future. At around the turn of the 21st century sciences and technology will transform "industrial society" into a new, previously unheard-of system of universal affluence. To see that future materialise, there is no need either for class struggle or for revolution: everything will be accomplished by new science and technology automatically without the people's activity. At the most a series of small reforms can be envisaged leaving the existing social structure and social institutions of capitalist society intact.

Future society was given different names, among them "technological", "organisational", "mass", "consumer", "active" or "leisure society", or "tertiary civilisation". "Postindustrial society" has become the most commonly used one.

Both the optimistic and the pessimistic version of technological determinism come out in defence of capitalism, as science and technology are equally represented as an autono-

mous force responsible for the destinies of mankind.

The spontaneous development of the productive forces in the conditions of the present-day scientific and technological revolution has come up against the narrow boundaries of production relations based on private property. Both the optimists and the pessimists are doing their utmost to cloak this main antagonism of the capitalist system, which is to blame for the rapacious exploitation of natural and human resources.

The profound economic crisis of the mid-1970s, which was accompanied by unemployment and inflation on an unheard-of scale and aggravated by the ecological, energy and raw materials crises, led to changes in the system of capitalist apologia. A sharp shift took place in the development of entire bourgeois ideology, sociology included, from optimistic projects for the future widespread in the 1960s to the dismal prophecies of the allegedly inevitable demise of civilisation as a result of the spontaneous development of production, technology and science. Fetishism of science (scientism) and technology (technomania) gave way to their criticism (anti-scientism and technophobia).

Pessimism is an indirect (though just as effective) form of defending state monopoly capitalism. Bourgeois ideologists seek to find a scapegoat in science and technology and see social danger in the allegedly too fast production development rate. Concepts suggesting to slow down the rate of scientific and technological progress and to pass from expanded to simple reproduction ("zero development cycle") gained currency together with neo-Malthusianism, which tries to shift the blame from capitalism and colonialism that hindered socio-economic and cultural progress of the developing nations onto the latter and their alleged excessive growth.

Sociological concepts of right-wing and "Left"-wing revisionism. Opportunism (and, consequently, revisionism) is subdivided into right-wing and "Left"-wing. Right-wing opportunism (revisionism) is characterised above all by social-reformism, that is, attempts to substitute small reforms of capitalism for class struggle waged by the working-class movement to attain its final aims. Right-wing revisionism makes a fetish of bourgeois democracy and in fact defends capitalism and in today's circumstances, state monopoly capitalism. Today's right-wing revisionism is quite close to the concept of "democratic socialism" set forth by the

right-wing Social-Democrats who have long refused to recognise Marxism even formally.

In the present-day circumstances right-wing and "Left"-wing revisionism team up on the common bourgeois nationalistic anti-Soviet platform and, as far as their objective class role is concerned, serve as an instrument of imperialism.

Nowadays right-wing revisionists advocate the theory of different versions of Marxism.

This "theory" is directed above all against Leninism, which is declared one of many "versions" of Marxism fit only for backward countries with a big peasant population. In reality, however, Leninism is the Marxism of today's historical epoch. Those who sever Leninism from Marxism betray the latter. Claiming to analyse creatively the specificities of their own countries, they in fact arrive at the denial of general laws (the practice common for all the opportunists), devising national "forms of Marxism" and national "models of socialism". According to the right-wing revisionists, every concrete "model of socialism" is an absolutely inimitable, unique social phenomenon.

From the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, specific peculiarities of the revolutionary development and the building of socialism in individual countries constitute nothing but the form of the manifestation of general laws, which have decisive importance.

Today's right-wing revisionists seek to come out in the name of humanism, propagandising "socialism with human face". In so doing they lean extensively on the bourgeois-reformist falsification of Marx's early works, especially the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. This falsification boils down to an attempt to present young Marx as an advocate of humanism understood abstractly and to twist Marx's interpretation of the problem of alienation. Marx believed that only the revolutionary elimination of private ownership of the implements and means of production would gradually put an end to all types and forms of alienation.

Right-wing revisionists counter these views by echoing the bourgeois ideologists and declaring alienation to be an unremovable attribute of human society and a general anthropological characteristic. What is more, they assert, it is precisely socialism in its existing form that exacerbates the alienation of the individual, sacrificing it to the collective

and society. That is why right-wing revisionists consider alienation to be the "central problem of socialism" and call for making it more "humane".

The revisionists see insurmountable obstacles to the all-round and free development of the personality in the economic and political foundations of the socialist system.

"Left"-wing opportunism (revisionism) merely has leftist pseudo-revolutionary idiom. It is a motley conglomeration of petty-bourgeois views and political slogans cloaked in high-faluting ultra-revolutionary verbiage. This type of opportunism is especially inclined to adventurism, social demagoguery and going from one extreme to another.

Many typical traits of "Left"-wing opportunism were to be found in Maoism which used pseudo-Marxist slogans to disguise its great-power nationalistic, chauvinistic essence, patent betrayal of socialist internationalism, rejection of anti-imperialist struggle, siding with the most reactionary elements of imperialism and aiding and abetting anti-communism. The subjectively idealistic essence of Maoism was manifest in its advocacy of the theory of violence, according to which the course of social development is eventually determined by coercion and armed force. The Maoist tactics of deliberately "pushing the revolution" was akin to the Trotskyist theory of "permanent revolution".

23. MARXIST-LENINIST PHILOSOPHY—THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF SCIENTIFIC COGNITION AND REVOLUTIONARY PRACTICE

When studying the given topic it is recommended to focus on the following issues.

Marxist-Leninist philosophy as general methodology of scientific cognition. Ever since its inception dialectical materialist philosophy has been a form of social consciousness that is closely linked with life. It summarises man's experience in the socio-historical mastering of the world and his spiritual activity.

The laws and categories of dialectical and historical materialism integrate socio-historical experience into a general system of knowledge of the world. As a result philosophical theses contain not merely some general information of the properties and regularities of the outside world (other sciences are also capable of giving that information)

but also general knowledge accumulating the experience of human cultural development as a whole seen through the prism of man's relations with the world, his requirements and interests.

For this reason dialectical materialist philosophy has to do with all forms of the spiritual and practical mastering of reality and occupies a special place in social consciousness. It is the most general theory and simultaneously the methodology of creative scientific thought, serving as the general theoretical foundation for a scientific world outlook and communist ideology.

Any field of scientific cognition rests on philosophical premisses, that is, notions of the world as objective reality independent of people's consciousness, of the objective nature of diverse relationships among the phenomena, of the cognizability of those phenomena, of the socio-practical purpose of knowledge obtained by science and so on. In totality these premisses form the philosophical foundation of scientific cognition. They stem from the general theoretical conception evolved by the philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism. Relying on it, science acquires the fundamental guidelines for its development that correspond to the regularities of the surrounding reality and the requirements of society.

Dialectical materialist philosophy forms the theoretic core of scientific world outlook and serves as the general methodology of scientific cognition.

The *methodological function of Marxist-Leninist philosophy* is seen as the fundamental role of the system of principles (initial propositions and the ensuing general requirements) of cognitive and practical activity formulated on the basis of philosophical knowledge.

The methodology of dialectical and historical materialism is qualitatively different from special methods used in concrete spheres of activity and individual branches of science. Its hallmark is universality.

The universality of the dialectical materialist method consists in the fact that it can be applied to any science, in analysing all fields of reality at all the stages of the cognitive process. It is applicable both to the sphere of theoretical knowledge and the practical transformation of reality.

In its capacity of the universal methodology of scientific cognition Marxist-Leninist philosophy functions as an in-

tegral theory of dialectical and historical materialism. The essence of this theory would be distorted if, say, dialectical materialism were viewed as the methodology of cognising exclusively nature or historical materialism as that of cognising exclusively social life. Even though there is no point denying the specificity of the latter as a social philosophical theory.

It is a matter of principle for Marxist methodology to declare it unthinkable outside the materialist doctrine of social life and of man. It was not until materialism and dialectics were applied to society that a fully consistent scientific philosophical methodology and a truly scientific world outlook could be developed.

All the laws and categories reflecting the general relationships and characteristics of being perform the methodological function in dialectical and historical materialism. All the epistemological, logical and ontological problems of the philosophy of Marxism have a methodological meaning. The entire conceptual apparatus of dialectical and historical materialism functions as a system of propositions of the theoretical and practical mastering of reality.

The philosophical approach to special sciences makes it possible to generalise the knowledge obtained. It reveals the ties and interactions of different branches of knowledge, which helps to understand the tendencies of their development from the lower to the higher.

The general and universal nature of dialectical materialist methodology is brought to light by an analysis of *its role in the development of both natural sciences and the humanities*.

The fundamental importance of dialectical materialism for natural sciences was comprehensively substantiated by the classics of Marxism-Leninism (see, for example, F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*; "On the Significance of Militant Materialism").

For knowledge to be accumulated, new branches of science to appear and different sciences to draw closer together and interpenetrate each other, it is necessary to have a profound philosophical understanding of the nature and tendencies of contemporary scientific progress and to see correctly the relationship between different methods and levels of investigating complicated phenomena of reality. The history of science shows that the bigger progress special sciences make the bigger the need to interpret the

new scientific material from the philosophical point of view and to elucidate dialectics of scientific development. The objective content of scientific progress consists in the further substantiation of the basic propositions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and their creative development.

To approach analysis of social development from the position of historical materialism first and foremost means to discover the objective material economic conditions and factors determining the appearance and existence of one social phenomenon or another. In this way scientific cognition is steered towards discovering the objective laws of social life. The Marxist method makes it possible to understand the nature and essence of socio-historical organisms, to comprehend their entirety and the logic of their development. The historico-materialist approach to social reality is at the same time the dialectical approach: it necessitates that social phenomena, historical systems be regarded as self-developing on the basis of their inner contradictions.

The concretely historical approach to studying the social phenomena is an essential characteristic of the dialectical materialist methodology of social knowledge. Marxist-Leninist methodology includes the need to take into account dialectics of the general and the particular, which is of tremendous importance in analysing contemporary world process.

Unity of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and revolutionary practice. By demonstrating the general laws of being and thought, dialectical and historical materialism lays bare and formulates *the more general principles of socio-historical activity*. The new philosophy emerged out of a generalisation of revolutionary historical practice and immediately became an ideological weapon in the proletariat's struggle for the revolutionary transformation of reality.

Marxist philosophy is effective in all its functions. To begin with, dialectical and historical materialism forms the theoretical backbone of the ideology of the working class. Being objective truth, the philosophical and sociological theory of the proletariat expounds the regularities of the revolutionary transformation of society in the interests of the proletariat and formulates socio-political, moral and other spiritual values uniting the mass of the people in the struggle for socialism and communism. Philosophy, which lies at the heart of world outlook in communist ideology, cannot be isolated from politics.

The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism is at the same time the general theoretical foundation of the world outlook of the working class and its party because the cognition of the more general laws of being and thought promotes the general understanding of not only the surrounding world but also the meaning of human life, reveals the essence and content of communist ideals and generates revolutionary value judgment and the corresponding criteria of the socio-historical activity of groups, classes and individuals. The inseparable connection between scientific objectivity and the party spirit of Marxist-Leninist philosophy therefore demonstrates its unity with revolutionary practice.

Objective approach, i.e., the dialectical materialist approach to the problems of evolving and implementing policy, which is both revolutionary and scientific, ensures the correct analysis of the experience of social development and the working out of a scientifically substantiated policy. Objectivity means that the real state of affairs and the true picture of reality are taken into account in politics. Such an approach precludes the introduction into theory and practice of anything arbitrary or thought up that fails to reflect the existing conditions of the activity of classes and parties. At the same time it stems from real class interests.

The *Leninist principle of concrete historical analysis* is another principle of political guidance of social development important from the point of view of world outlook and methodology. Problems of political guidance are resolved in accordance with the requirement to make a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. A policy can hardly be a success if it fails to take into consideration the peculiarity of the obtaining historical conditions, the specificity of the social development level attained, the composition of the motive forces or the specific tasks set by the objective course of events.

Creative development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a necessary condition of its effectiveness. The creative spirit of Marxism-Leninism is explained by the very essence of dialectical materialism, which serves simultaneously as the methodology of historical activity and a scientific revolutionary world outlook. The *connection between theory and practice* is a dialectical process of the interaction of two fundamental aspects of man's activity. True theory cannot but develop because it serves developing practice. In its turn revolutionary historical practice is a real process of

transforming reality developing on the basis of scientific data and forecasts, the process in the course of which ever new objective characteristics of the objective world, both natural and social, reveal themselves to an ever greater extent.

The processes taking place nowadays, first and foremost the emergence and development of real socialism and the confrontation of the new world system with the old capitalist system have again placed to the fore the problems of dialectics as the core of Marxism.

The decisive aspect of the further study of materialist dialectics is the comprehensive working out of the general theory of development and especially the problems of social development in the present-day epoch. The heightened interest in the problems of development is explained not only by the topicality of the idea of evolution in today's natural sciences but also by the task (which has confronted mankind) of learning to direct socio-historical progress and consciously influence the logic of world developments. Today, as never before, the objective process of historical development is inseparable from the revolutionary activity of peoples, classes and parties. In this context the dialectics of the objective and subjective factors in historical development has acquired greater importance.

The dialectical unity of the objective and subjective factors in social development is most fully embodied in real socialism. To study the regularities of the progress of the new social system has become an issue of prime importance. Analysis of the dialectics of existing socialism deepens and enriches the general theory of development and reveals new aspects of the historical process in the conditions of communist civilisation establishing itself.

When studying the given topic attention should be devoted to many philosophical and sociological problems connected with the scientific and technological revolution, which has emerged as a world historical phenomenon. The destinies of progress today largely depend on the correct understanding of these problems.

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This handbook sets out the basic concepts and categories of Marxist-Leninist philosophy (dialectical and historical materialism). It is intended for self-instruction. The methods recommended by the authors may also be useful to teachers and students of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in higher and secondary educational institutions.

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